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The central problem addressed by this thesis is how narrow content can be genuinely 
representational and relate to the individuation of mental representations.  A second 
problem relates to the explanatory role of narrow content.  The challenge facing the 
proponent of narrow content is that externalism is the standard position with regard 
to representation, individuation, and explanation, and it is often held that narrow 
content is either incoherent or explanatorily redundant.  To this end, I defend a 
version of a two-component theory of content which accepts that wide content is 
relatively uncontroversial but holds that narrow content has an important role to play. 
 
The thesis is divided into two main parts.  In part one I focus on the problem of 
representation and the individuation of mental representations.  In Chapter 1 I 
consider two of the main accounts of wide content from Putnam (1975) and Fodor 
(1994) and show that in each case there is a notion of narrow content that is 
compatible with the externalist approach to representation.  In particular, I discuss 
versions of narrow content associated with two-dimensionalism (Chalmers 2003; 
Jackson 2003a) and radical internalism (Crane 1991; Segal 2000), among other 
views (e.g. Prinz 2000; Kriegel 2008), and highlight important objections to these 
existing accounts of narrow content.  In response to these problems, I defend a 
pluralistic view of narrow content according to which there are two main forms of 
narrow representation, and contend that this account can be systematically supported 
by understanding the supervenience claim made by the internalist, the kinds of 
properties represented by mental representations, and the nature of the underlying 
mental representations that bear narrow content.  I then show that this account of 
narrow content has the resources to respond to a common objection to narrow 
content (Lepore & Loewer 1986; Block & Stalnaker 1999).  In support of this 
approach to narrow content I show in Chapter 2 that internalism is consistent with 




recent work on concepts, and in particular with concept pluralism (Laurence & 
Margolis 1999; Weiskopf 2009) – the view that concepts are comprised of a variety 
of conceptual structures.  I argue that such conceptual structures can be coherently 
individuated by the narrow contents outlined in Chapter 1, giving rise to an 
internalist version of concept pluralism.  I support the internalist construal of concept 
pluralism by identifying problems with externalist versions (Laurence & Margolis 
1999) and responding to objections to narrow content (Weiskopf 2007).  In Chapter 3 
I develop an extended critique of social externalism (Burge 1979; Goldberg 2002), 
and accounts of perceptual psychology (Egan 2009; Burge 2010), both of which 
purport to have anti-internalist consequences for the individuation and nature of 
mental representations and provide a challenge to the account of narrow content and 
mental representations developed in Chapters 1 and 2. 
 
In part two, I defend the explanatory role of narrow content.  In Chapter 4 I contend 
that the truth conditions of propositional attitude ascriptions may relate to the narrow 
contents expressed by attitude ascribing sentences.  To show this, I defend a Fregean 
theory of attitude ascriptions and consider two objections (Soames 2002; Travis 2008) 
to Fregean accounts that would block the relevant semantic role of narrow content.  
In addition, I show how this account provides a basis for rejecting two externalist 
arguments (Putnam 1975; Burge 1979) that rely on assumptions about the nature and 
role of attitude ascriptions.  I contrast this account with existing internalist accounts 
(Segal 2007; Chalmers 2007), and show how it provides a response to Soames’ 
(2002) Perfect Earth objection.  In Chapter 5 I critically assess two existing accounts 
of the role of narrow content in psychological explanations of behaviour (Jackson & 
Pettit 1988; Fodor 1991), focusing on objections raised in connection with proximal 
causes (Burge 1995) and explanatory generality and causal relevance (Yablo 2003).  
In response to these objections, I develop an alternative approach which appeals to 
the rational role of reasons (Davidson 1963; McDowell 2006), and contend that only 
narrow content can provide a suitably rational explanation of behaviour.  I show how 
this provides a response to the objections raised, and how the appeal to reasons 
provides a basis for rejecting Fodor’s (1994) more recent externalist account of 
behaviour. 
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In this thesis I develop and defend an account of narrow content and its explanatory 
role.  There are two questions that a proponent of narrow content must address.  First, 
is whether there is a viable notion of narrow content.  The varieties of narrow content 
in the literature have been subject to much criticism, thus a central challenge facing 
the proponent of narrow content is to articulate an account that withstands the sorts 
of objections raised.  Second, is to say exactly why narrow content is needed, if, as is 
commonly held, wide content is relatively uncontroversial.  Externalism is often seen 
as the default position in the philosophy of mind and language, given the general 
acceptance of the main conclusions stemming from Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) 
on names and natural kind term meaning, as well as from naturalised accounts of 
representation from Dretske (1981) and Fodor (1994) (among others).  In addition, 
while many of the insights of externalism are taken on board by proponents of 
narrow content, externalism is often taken to show that there is no plausible basis for 
narrow content, and/or that narrow content plays no significant explanatory role in 
philosophy and psychology since wide content alone is sufficient.  Despite the 
current externalist orthodoxy, many proponents of narrow content aim to show that 
narrow content is both viable and explanatorily central to philosophy and psychology.  
The version of narrow content I defend is motivated in part by the problems facing 
existing accounts, and is thus intended to contribute to the rehabilitation of the 
internalist tradition by developing a novel approach to both the nature and 
explanatory role of narrow content that avoids the most common objections in the 
literature. 
 
There are nearly as many accounts of narrow content as there are proponents, all of 
which make different claims about the form of representation or representational 
framework, the properties that are represented, and the basis of such content in 




mental representations.  Three approaches exemplify the range of different stances in 
the literature.  The first approach aims to reject externalism and wide content entirely, 
thereby arguing that all mental content is narrow (for instance Crane 1991; Segal 
2000; Farkas 2008b).  Such an approach takes on the unnecessary burden of having 
to show that all varieties of wide content fail to relate fundamentally to mental nature.  
This is not my view.  A second approach seeks to identify a special, limited, notion 
of narrow content that accounts for certain phenomena, allowing wide content to 
account for others.  On this approach, wide content is usually of central importance 
for representation and explanation, however, narrow content is sometimes 
understood as central to understanding the nature of mind, especially in terms of 
reflecting the subject’s way of representing the world (Dennett 1987; Prinz 2000; 
Loar 2003).  A worry with this account is that it fails to appreciate significant 
insights from the internalist literature, especially with regard to the broader 
representational nature of narrow content.  Furthermore, the foundations of these 
views are often contentious, for instance Prinz (2000; 2002; 2005) relies on a 
radically empiricist theory of concepts, and Loar (2003) appeals to the notion of 
phenomenal intentionality, and both notions face substantial criticism.  A third 
approach contends that narrow content is full-blown representational content and 
central to psychological explanations, whilst also endorsing wide content.  The most 
prominent version of this approach is associated with two-dimensional semantics 
(Chalmers 2003; Jackson 2003a).  However, again, this view is subject to an 
extensive critical literature, with a number of criticisms of Chalmers’ framework. 
 
Given these problems, there is scope for developing an alternative, comparatively 
ambitious, account of narrow content that doesn’t rely on the contentious positions 
outlined above.  To this end, I argue for a pluralistic account of narrow content, 
according to which narrow content relates to a variety of forms of representation, and 
contend that we can understand narrow content as relating to different kinds of 
mental representations as understood in the psychological literature on concepts.  In 
particular, I show that narrow content is consistent with concept pluralism, which is 
the thesis that concepts are comprised of a variety of conceptual structures as 
discussed in the psychological literature.  This comprises the topic of part one of this 




thesis, which develops and defends the account of internalism and narrow content.  
In Chapter 1 I develop the pluralistic account of narrow representation and narrow 
content in detail.  I show how this view avoids a common objection to narrow 
content, and I highlight the key assumption relating to pluralism about mental 
representation.  This sets up Chapter 2 which focuses on the account of concepts that 
supports pluralistic narrow content.  Drawing on the philosophical and psychological 
work on concept pluralism, I show that concepts may be individuated by the kinds of 
narrow content developed in Chapter 1.  Chapter 3 rounds-out the account of narrow 
content by defending it against two approaches to the individuation of mental 
representations that purport to have anti-internalist consequences. 
 
A strategy pursued by some externalists, most notably Fodor (1994), is to develop a 
thoroughgoing externalism by arguing that wide content alone is sufficient for 
accounting for both mental representation and psychological explanations that draw 
on mental content.  The central claim is that wide content is all the content that 
psychology needs to recognise, and hence there is no need for narrow content in 
psychology.  Furthermore, other externalists (for instance Soames 2002) argue that 
narrow content plays no semantic role in ascribing propositional attitudes like belief, 
which relate to the nature of the mental representations of the ascribee.  In light of 
this, in the second part of this thesis I aim to show how the account of narrow content 
I defend in part one is also central to psychological explanation, and, in addition, 
plays an important semantic role in propositional attitude ascriptions.  With regard to 
the semantic role of narrow content, in Chapter 4 I show how narrow content plays a 
role in the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions in so far as the ascription of 
narrow content is consistent with a Fregean theory of attitude ascriptions.  Narrow 
content is often taken to play such a role, however, I show how my account has 
important advantages over two exiting accounts.  Finally, in Chapter 5 I develop a 
novel account of the role of narrow content in psychological explanations of 
behaviour.  The view provides a way to avoid objections that face existing internalist 
accounts which rely on the explanatory role of narrow states, rather than narrow 
content.  The view I defend appeals to the role of reasons in explaining behaviour, 
and I make the case that only narrow content of the sort developed in part one can 




play this role.  I then show how this view provides a response to the objections raised 
against existing internalist accounts. 
 
In showing that narrow content is fully representational, relates to the individuation 
of mental representations, and plays an explanatory role in propositional attitude 
ascriptions and psychological explanations of behaviour, this thesis provides a partial 
rebuttal to the kind of univocally externalist approach of Fodor and others.  However, 
the aim is not to reject wide content, but to address the imbalance within current 
philosophy of mind and make the case that narrow content has an important role to 



































It is common to hold that mental content is wide, that is, that the content of thoughts 
supervenes on external factors such as the social and physical environment of the 
thinker.  Whether thoughts also have narrow content is a contested issue.  Among 
proponents of narrow content there is a wide variety of proposals, many of which 
involve fundamental points of disagreement.  Furthermore, there are both internalists 
and externalists who deny that it provides a genuine form of representational content, 
and contend that the role of narrow content should be restricted to cognitive content.  
To this end, there are two main aims of this chapter: to show why narrow content is 
genuinely representational and should be accepted by proponents of wide content, 
and to develop a robust account of the nature of narrow content.  The chapter is 
structured as follows.  In Section 2 I provide an outline of the wide/narrow content 
debate, and a critical review of existing accounts of wide and narrow content.  I 
consider two main forms of externalism and show that in each case there is a kind of 
narrow content available to the internalist.  I begin by considering Putnam’s (1975) 
Twin Earth scenario and the case for wide content based on natural kind terms.   I 
then consider Fodor’s (1994) account of wide informational content.  In both cases I 
identify notions of narrow content that are consistent with the general approaches to 
representation, and highlight key limitations with, and objections to, these accounts 
of narrow content.  This discussion sets up the basis for developing an alternative 
approach to narrow content.  In Section 3 I develop and defend a pluralist account in 
which narrow content represents a range of properties, through different 
representational mechanisms, and which relates to different kinds of mental 
representations.  In Section 4, I consider a common objection to narrow content 




which holds that there is no coherent way to identify or express narrow content, 
hence that narrow content is fundamentally incoherent.  In response, I show that the 
objection can be avoided by appealing to the account developed in Section 3. 
 
2. Externalism, internalism and representational content 
In Section 2.1 I introduce the notions of mental representation and representational 
content, and the distinction between wide and narrow content. 
 
2.1 Mental representation and the wide/narrow content debate 
Mental representations represent such things as individuals (such as my pet cat), and 
natural objects (like water).  The representational content of a mental representation 
is typically understood in terms of what the mental representation represents or is 
about, so the representational content of a mental representation like CAT would be 
cats, and the content of the mental representation WATER would be water.  In 
addition to representational content, mental representations are often taken to have 
cognitive content that reflects how things are represented as being.  The 
representational content of a thought, such as the thought expressed by the sentence 
‘cats like water’, is composed of the contents of each of the mental representations 
expressed by an utterance of that sentence.  Such thoughts are semantically evaluable 
for truth and falsity, so the representational content can be understood as being truth 
conditional content.  We can express the truth condition of a thought expressed by 
‘cats like water’, as ‘cats like water’ is true if and only if cats like water.  The truth 
conditions tell us how the world must be for the thought to be true.  Therefore, we 
need to know what the terms ‘cat’ and ‘water’ (or the representations CAT and 
WATER) represent in order to determine if the thought is true or false. 
 
On one view of representational content, mental representations for natural objects 
like water, or artefacts like chairs, represent properties, for instance the property 
associated with being water or the property associated with being a chair.  It is 
possible to frame this view within the possible worlds representational framework.  
On this approach, representational content is understood in terms of the properties 
represented at possible worlds, so that the content of the representation WATER is 




understood in terms of a property at a relevant possible world or set of possible 
worlds
1
.  Truth conditions for thoughts can also be understood in terms of possible 
worlds.  For instance, the truth conditional content of ‘cats like water’ can be 
captured in terms of the set of possible worlds where cats like water. 
 
There is an extensive literature on mental representations and representational 
content.  An important question in this area relates to the nature of representation, 
such as why CAT represents cats.  Other questions relate to the nature of mental 
representations.  Representations like CAT are typically understood in terms of 
concepts, and there is a debate about the nature of concepts in the philosophical and 
psychological literature.  In Chapter 2 I will look at the nature of mental 
representations in more detail.  In this chapter I am concerned with the nature of 
representation and the individuation of representational content.  In particular, I am 
concerned with whether representational content is wide, narrow, or perhaps a 
combination of both (more on these notions below).  While there is a near-consensus 
that mental representations have wide content, there is some debate about whether 
they also have narrow content, and what such content is like.  Thus, I shall be 
concerned with two issues: motivation for narrow content, and the question of its 
proper nature.  But first, we need to be clear about what wide and narrow contents 
are. 
 
Externalists about mental representation contend that the content of representations 
are determined, at least in part, by certain external, typically causal, conditions 
relating the subject to what is represented.  Consequently, the content of a 
representation is wide because it is said to supervene, at least in part, on facts about 
the subject’s environment.  Supervenience is here understood as a relation that holds 
between two kinds of properties.  If A supervenes on B, then any change to A must 
correspond to a change in B.  According to externalists, representational content can 
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 There are other ways of understanding content, such as in terms of extensions at possible worlds, so 
that ‘water’ would represent the actual instances of water at a possible world.  However, I will 
presume a property-view of representational content as this allows for the distinction between 
representing, say, the property H2O and representing particular instances of H2O.  For instance, if S’s 
mental representation expressed by ‘H2O’ represents the actual instances of H2O, this doesn’t allow 
for a distinction between a general thought of H2O, and particular thoughts of instances of H2O, since 
in both cases the content would be the same, i.e. the set comprising all instances of H2O. 




change even while holding intrinsic properties of subjects constant.  Thus, content 
does not supervene on intrinsic properties (the significance of this claim will be 
shown below). 
 
Internalism is typically understood to be the thesis that content supervenes on 
intrinsic properties of subjects.  Thus, internalists hold that intrinsic duplicates, in 
radically different environments, may possess a representation with the exact same 
content.  When intrinsic properties are fixed, the content will also be fixed (subject to 
further caveats to be outlined below).  Internalists therefore hold that changes in 
content will relate to changes in intrinsic properties, whilst externalists hold that 
content can change even holding intrinsic properties constant.   
 
Given this characterisation of the debate, the guiding question to be addressed in the 
following sections is whether there is a viable notion of narrow representational 
content.  In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 I consider two of the main externalist forms of 
representation from Putnam (1975) and Fodor (1994) that serve to motivate the 
notion of wide content.  I then show that in each case there is a viable notion of 
narrow content and hence that there is a strong case for endorsing a two component 
theory of content.  However, I also show that there are problems with existing 
accounts of each variety of narrow content.  In particular, I highlight specific 
problems with accounts from Segal (2000), Prinz (2000), Chalmers (2003), and 
Jackson (2003a).  In addition, I show that there are broadly two distinct accounts of 
narrow content in the literature, and that we have reason to accept versions of both.  I 
then outline, in Section 2.4, how this critical assessment of narrow content provides 
the basis for a pluralistic form of narrow representation. 
 
2.2 Putnam on natural kind representation 
The first basis for externalism about representational content I will look at is 
Putnam’s (1975) Twin Earth thought experiment.  The thought experiment relies on 
the notion of natural kind terms that are expressions in natural language that aim to 






.  Natural kinds are usually understood as the kinds in nature 
of interest in the sciences (such as water, tigers, and gold) distinguished by their 
underlying microphysical, chemical, and biological properties.  A central tenet of 
Putnam’s thesis is that ‘water’ is a natural kind term and functions to pick out H2O 
exclusively.  Turning to the Twin Earth scenario, we are to consider Earth and a 
superficially identical planet Twin Earth, the only difference being that on Twin 
Earth the stuff they call ‘water’ is not H2O and is instead composed of a novel 
chemical kind abbreviated to ‘XYZ’.  We are then to consider two intrinsically 
identical subjects, Oscar on Earth and Twin Oscar on Twin Earth, and the meaning 
and reference of the term ‘water’.  By assumption, Oscar and Twin Oscar are 
ignorant of the chemical composition of the substances in their respective 
environments.  Furthermore, Putnam holds that Oscar and Twin Oscar may share all 
their psychological states, for instance, they might both think of the different 
substances in terms of a general kind of watery stuff, where ‘watery stuff’ is 
shorthand for the superficial properties common to H2O and XYZ, such as being a 
clear, thirst-quenching, liquid that falls from the sky and fills the lakes and oceans.  
Despite this, Putnam holds that the meaning of ‘water’ as used by Oscar and Twin 
Oscar will be different.    The difference in meaning is taken to result from the fact 
that on Earth Oscar refers to H2O, so that the meaning of Oscar’s term ‘water’ relates 
to H2O, and not XYZ.  On Twin Earth, Twin Oscar refers to H2O, thus the meaning 
of Twin Oscar’s term ‘water’ relates to XYZ, not H2O.  One consequence of this is 
that speakers of English must use the expression ‘twin water’ to talk about XYZ, 
since ‘water’ refers to H2O.  This results in an externalist account of natural kind 
term meaning since Oscar and Twin Oscar are intrinsically identical, and may share 
their psychological states, but the representational content of the term ‘water’ when 
used by each is different.  Consequently, the representational content of natural kind 
terms fails to supervene on intrinsic properties. 
 
Although Putnam accepted that Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s psychological states were 
identical, and hence the thesis was restricted to the reference and meaning of the 
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 Whether natural language has such terms is an important question.  If not, then much of Putnam’s 
position could be rejected.  I consider this point below. 




natural language term ‘water’, it is possible to run the same argument for mental 
representations and representational content.  Thus, on this externalist view, Oscar’s 
mental representation WATER is about H2O and Twin Oscar’s is about XYZ.  The 
contents of their representations are wide since content fails to supervene on intrinsic 
properties, that is, the content of the mental representation WATER can change 
whilst holding fixed the subject’s intrinsic properties.  Properly speaking, we should 
distinguish Oscar’s representation WATER from Twin Oscar’s representation TWIN 
WATER.  Consequently, internalism is held to be false where the thesis is 
understood as being that representational content supervenes on intrinsic properties, 
since the content of Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s mental representations are different, 
despite them being intrinsic duplicates. 
 
An important assumption here is that differences in the natural kinds present on Earth 
and Twin Earth entail that Oscar and Twin Oscar don’t share a kind of mental 
representation or any representational contents.  Putnam’s account of the meaning of 
natural kind terms provides a way of supporting this representational difference 
between intrinsic duplicates (again, a similar point could be made for mental 
representation).  Putnam intended to show that Fregean descriptivism about meaning 
and reference was incorrect.  According to Frege (2000), expressions have both sense 
and reference.  Sense relates to the mode of presentation of the referent, which 
provides a rule for determining reference or provides a condition that something 
must satisfy to be the referent.  On the Fregean view, the sense of the expression 
‘Hesperus’, given by ‘the evening star’, determines its referent (the planet Venus).  
Two expressions can have different modes of presentation but the same referent (for 
instance the mode of presentation associated with ‘Phosphorus’ is given by ‘the 
morning star’, while the referent is also the planet Venus).  Through the Twin Earth 
scenario Putnam intended to show that meaning (sense) alone cannot determine 
reference.  To see this, note that the sense of ‘water’ might be given by ‘the clear 
thirst-quenching liquid’.  However, since ‘water’ refers to different kinds on Earth 
and Twin Earth, then sense can’t determine reference in a strict Fregean manner. 
 




On Putnam’s account, the meaning of ‘water’ is composed of two parts: a stereotype 
and essence.  The stereotype is a descriptive component that relates to a cluster of 
superficial properties associated with the term, such as being a clear, thirst-
quenching liquid.  Since, by assumption, Oscar and Twin Oscar’s terms have 
different referents, the stereotype can’t determine what is represented on its own.  
The essence component is introduced in order to explain the representational 
difference and relates to what Putnam calls a ‘hidden indexical’ component of 
natural kind term meaning.  This indexical component relates to a potentially 
unknown hidden essence of the relevant kind and requires that speakers intend to 
refer to the local kind that has the same internal structure as paradigmatic instances 
of the kind the speaker is acquainted with.  Thus, the indexical component allows 
Oscar to refer to H2O and Twin Oscar to XYZ, since they both intend to use ‘water’ 
to pick out the local natural kinds of which they are acquainted.  Consequently, 
Putnam’s account can be understood as allowing that meaning (or sense) determines 
reference, but where meaning itself is determined in part by what is referred to.  Thus, 
since the meaning of Oscar’s term ‘water’ relates in part to what it refers to, i.e. H2O, 
then meaning can determine reference where we understand meaning as involving a 
hidden indexical component. 
 
Putnam’s thought experiment has engendered a wide range of responses that focus 
on problems with different aspects of the view.  I will not cover all of these here.  
Instead, I will consider two responses to Putnam’s view that relate to the existence of 
narrow content and its possible nature.  In particular, I consider two apparently 
conflicting internalist responses which aim to show that there is available a notion of 
narrow representational content, and I identify problems for each account. 
 
2.2.1 Descriptive representation of natural kinds 
The first account accepts with Putnam that Oscar and Twin Oscar represent different 
natural kinds, but contends that this representational difference is consistent with a 
kind of narrow content that functions to descriptively refer to the relevant natural 
kind at the subject’s actual environment.  There are a variety of such descriptive 




accounts of narrow content in the literature
3
, however, I will consider two of the 
most prominent views associated with two-dimensional semantics (Jackson 2003a 
2003b; Chalmers 2002; 2003). 
 
Two-dimensional semantics aims to account for both wide and narrow content 
through an adaptation of the possible worlds representational framework where wide 
and narrow contents are associated with distinct ways of considering possible worlds.  
The narrow content of Oscar’s representation WATER is determined by considering 
various possible worlds that are superficially identical to Earth as being Oscar’s 
actual world and then determining what thing at that world counts as being 
represented by WATER.  For instance, if we consider Twin Earth as being Oscar’s 
actual world, then XYZ would turn out to be what is represented by Oscar’s mental 
representation WATER since it is XYZ that is the clear, thirst-quenching liquid that 
fills the lakes and rivers, whereas if we consider Earth as the actual world then it is 
H2O.  Wide content is associated with considering worlds counterfactually, so that 
given Oscar’s actual world is Earth, where WATER represents H2O, we then 
consider what would be represented by Oscar’s WATER at various worlds 
considered counterfactually.  For instance, on Twin Earth Oscar’s WATER would 
not represent XYZ, since the representation’s wide content is fixed by Oscar’s actual 
world and represents that property (H2O) at any world considered counterfactually. 
 
The two versions of this view provided by Jackson and Chalmers accept the basic 
model outlined here, but they differ in the fine details.  Jackson’s (2003a) account 
holds that Oscar’s WATER represents the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance, 
where ‘our’ picks out the subject and his colinguals who use ‘water’ to refer to the 
natural kind they are acquainted with.  Importantly, ‘watery stuff’ is intended to 
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 On Searle’s (1983) view the descriptive content of ‘water’ picks out the kind which has the same 
structure as the cause of the subject’s visual experience.  Such a view makes the term ‘water’ function 
to pick out whatever shares the same structure as instances of which the subject is acquainted with 
through visual experience.  More recently, Mendola (2008) has argued for a demonstrative account 
where clusters of descriptions refer via a ‘dthat’ operator which functions to demonstratively refer to 
the thinker’s local environment and the object there which satisfies most of the descriptions.  Both 
views aim to show that in some way Putnam’s general approach is consistent with a notion of narrow 
content.  This appears to be common to the various descriptive accounts of narrow representational 
content. 




reflect the way in which H2O and XYZ appear the same to the subject, and is 
equivalent to Putnam’s stereotype which provides a set of properties that relate to the 
superficial features of water and twin water.  The narrow content is therefore a 
reference-determining function, since we consider what the relevant narrow content 
would pick out at various contexts, i.e. the worlds considered as actual.  Thus, for 
Oscar, the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance picks out H2O, as this is what he is 
acquainted with, whereas it picks out XYZ for Twin Oscar. 
 
Chalmers (2002; 2003) understands narrow content differently.  On his account, we 
understand narrow content in terms of an abstract specification of a subject’s 
epistemic space which is an idealized reconstruction of the subject’s a priori 
knowledge concerning how they take the world to be.  What is represented by such 
narrow content is then associated with the notion of epistemic possibility, so that 
when we consider what Oscar’s thoughts represent, we consider the set of 
epistemically possible worlds that correspond to how things could be given the 
subject’s a priori knowledge.  The main difference between these views is that 
Jackson considers a single space of possible worlds, rather than introducing a special 
notion of epistemic possibility.  This gives Jackson’s approach the benefit of not 
having to articulate and defend epistemic possibility, which is especially pertinent 
given extensive criticism of the relevant apparatus required to construct the set of 
epistemically possible worlds.  For instance, some have argued against the construal 
of the a priori (Byrne & Prior 2006), and others argue that there is no idealized 
language with which to construct the relevant epistemic spaces (Stalnaker 2001; 
Sawyer 2007).  What is important for present purposes is that narrow content 
descriptively determines what natural kind is represented by a natural kind 
representation like WATER (or term ‘water’) by considering what natural kind at 
worlds considered as actual possess the relevant watery properties.  Crucially, the 
account of representation relies on an element of indexicality, so that the relevant 
descriptions (e.g. the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance) indexically determine 
what is represented at the relevant context or world. 
 




Aside from the concerns about the notion of epistemic space, there are two initial 
problems for this view of narrow content.  First, an important question that arises 
here is whether subjects ever have mental representations that relate to this account 
of narrow content.  In particular, it is not clear that subjects have the relevant 
intentions to pick out a unique natural kind, especially subjects like Oscar who, we 
are told, is not aware of the microphysical properties of water.  On Jackson’s account 
it is held that Oscar intends to represent a natural kind with WATER (i.e. ‘the actual 
watery stuff’ relates to a unique kind), however, this is a significant assumption to 
make as it seems possible that mental representations may fail to neatly align with 
natural kinds as they occur in the environment.  For instance, where Oscar thinks of 
watery stuff, one approach might be to distinguish the mental representation of water 
from that of watery stuff, where the former relates to H2O, and the latter relates to a 
more generic kind (I will consider a version of this approach in more detail in 
Section 2.2.2 below). 
 
A second issue is why we should think of representations as representing natural 
kinds indexically.  This sort of objection runs as follows
4
.  Natural kind terms don’t 
function like typical indexical terms like ‘I’ and ‘now’ which differ in their content 
when spoken by different individuals at different times.  The content of ‘I’ changes 
when uttered by Oscar and when uttered by Twin Oscar because the content relates 
to the speaker.  The term ‘water’, so the objection goes, has the same content when 
uttered by different speakers at different times, and hence does not seem to meet the 
criteria to be an indexical expression.  A quick response to this concern is that the 
claim regarding the hidden indexical component is not that natural kind terms are the 
same kind of term as indexicals.  The claim, instead, is that the indexicality of natural 
kind terms relates to the issues raised by Twin Earth scenarios which lead to the 
possibility of terms like ‘water’ representing different natural kinds than those on 
Earth.  The objection can therefore be disregarded since the debate is not whether 
natural kind terms are indexicals in the standard sense, but whether terms for natural 
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kinds should be evaluated across different contexts (or possible worlds), which 
merely leads to a form of descriptive representation. 
 
2.2.2 Representation of heterogeneous kinds 
An objection to the descriptive model of representation that an internalist might raise 
takes issue with the claim that Oscar intends to represent a unique natural kind.  The  
descriptive model of narrow representation shares Putnam’s intuition that Oscar and 
Twin Oscar represent different natural kinds.  An alternative view, noted above, is 
that Oscar and Twin Oscar share a form of mental representation that represents 
something more generic than a natural kind property, reflecting the fact that neither 
subject is aware of the fundamental nature of water and twin water.  If there were a 
way to show that Oscar and Twin Oscar represented the same property, this would 
avoid the need for descriptive representation and the assumption that all subjects’ 
WATER representations represent natural kinds.  This provides the basis for the 
second response to Putnam which rejects the assumption that Oscar and Twin Oscar 
necessarily represent different natural kinds.  On this view, it is questioned whether it 
is appropriate to hold that Oscar represents a natural kind at all, and instead it is 
suggested that Oscar and Twin Oscar represent the same heterogeneous kind, a kind 
that, in effect, subsumes a range of natural kinds.  Crane (1991) and Segal (2000) 
have articulated versions of this view, and both hold that narrow content is just 
ordinary content, so that they deny that there is a need to introduce wide content and 
a special notion of narrow content to account for the Twin Earth scenario
5
.  The 
central claim is that ‘water’, for Oscar and Twin Oscar, effectively represents both 
H2O and XYZ since their mental representations represent whatever Oscar and Twin 
Oscar would classify as falling under ‘water’.  I will say more about Segal’s (2000) 
particular account of representation in Section 2.3.2.  For now, I want to outline 
reasons that support the idea that there can be descriptive representation of 
heterogeneous kinds. 
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narrow, and/or that the arguments for externalism fail. 




Support for the heterogeneous kind view against the position of Putnam and two-
dimensionalists, can be provided by putting pressure on the assumption that subjects 
typically possess natural kind terms or natural kind mental representation.  Segal 
(2004) and Wikforss (2005) (among others) have noted that it is an empirical 
question whether ‘water’ is a natural kind term (and a similar point applies to mental 
representations). For instance, if we found that speakers have different intentions 
relating to these terms, such as intending to only refer to a more generic or 
heterogeneous kind, then much of Putnam’s thesis would fail.  Putnam in fact 
concedes that some kind terms refer to heterogeneous kinds and not natural kinds, 
such as ‘jade’ which refers to both jadeite and nephrite.  Furthermore, since many of 
our kind terms like ‘sofa’ or ‘computer’  relate to non-natural kinds, which appear to 
be the same across possible worlds (more on this below), the proponent of this view 
should not be worried by the intuition, often expressed in the literature, that ‘water’ 
just is a natural kind term. 
 
One worry with this view might be that if we understand watery stuff as a non-
natural kind property, then the introduction of this property would be ad hoc, since 
the property is in some way strange or problematic, and hence we should prefer 
either wide content or descriptive representation that relates to different natural kind 
properties, rather than being committed to a variety of non-natural kind properties.  I 
will say more about heterogeneous properties in Section 3, however, it’s worth 
pointing out that there is no problem in principle with taking terms in natural 
language, or mental representations, to represent non-natural kinds.  Consider once 
more ‘computer’, which represents an artefactual kind.  Any object that instantiates 
this artefactual kind will be represented by ‘computer’ or COMPUTER, thus, if we 
are to question the nature of heterogeneous properties because they are non-natural 
kinds, then we would need to do so for all other non-natural kind terms. 
 
Setting aside this issue for now, there are two objections that can be raised against 
the internalist view of Crane and Segal.  First, wide content is relatively 
uncontroversial, and there are apparently good reasons to accept some form of 
externalism.    Second, it’s not clear that the heterogeneous kind model of narrow 




content is always appropriate, especially for subjects who are aware of the 
microphysical properties of water, or who explicitly intend to represent a unique kind.  
Thus, we should be willing to hold that there are a variety of mental representations 
that relate to the representation of both natural kinds and non-natural heterogeneous 
kinds.  While natural kinds can be represented by the descriptive model, the latter 
may be also be represented by a form of representation where ‘the watery stuff’ picks 
out a heterogeneous property common to Earth and Twin Earth.  What would support 
this view is if there is an account of mental representations that can independently 
motivate the idea of distinct representations of kinds of natural objects, especially 
since some externalists will want to hold that there is just one natural kind 
representation WATER.  In Chapter 2 I provide the details of such an account and 
show how this supports the position suggested here. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the two-dimensional model doesn’t seem right for 
non-natural kinds like sofas and computers, since intrinsic duplicates may plausibly 
represent the same properties at different possible worlds.  Such kinds are different 
from the heterogeneous kinds that relate to H2O and XYZ, so we shouldn’t think of 
the content relating to different natural kinds, but instead to the relevant non-natural 
kind property that is identical at different possible worlds.  For instance, the terms 
‘sofa’ and ‘computer’ appear to pick out the same non-natural kind on Earth and 
Twin Earth without necessarily relating to whatever specific objects instantiate these 
properties.  Differences in the underlying microphysical properties of particular sofas 
would not affect Oscar and Twin Oscar’s SOFA representation which function to 




To summarise the discussion so far, descriptive representation can provide a form of 
narrow representation, and there are a variety of properties that subjects’ mental 
representations represent.  However, existing views raise important questions about 1) 
the nature of the description and its basis in mental representations, and 2) what the 
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resulting property represented is, such as specific natural kind properties at the 
subject’s actual environment, or more generic heterogeneous properties that don’t 
neatly align with natural kinds.  I will consider this form of narrow representation in 
more detail in Section 3.  Before that, I want to consider a second form of narrow 
representation. 
 
2.3 Fodor on wide informational content 
The second basis for externalism and wide content relates to the most prominent 
approach to representation which understands representation in terms of information.  
Several versions of informational semantics have been developed in the literature 
from Dretske (1981), Millikan (1989), Papineau (1993), and Fodor (1994).  Here I 
focus on Fodor’s view, however, similar points could be made against the other 
views.  Informational accounts of content hold that a mental representation, M, 
represents what M carries information about.  Typically, the relation between M and 
what M represents is given in causal terms, and Fodor’s (1994) account is a version 
of a causal co-variation theory of content.  The basic idea is that M represents what it 
causally co-varies with.  On this view, M would represent whatever object, X (an 
individual, kind, etc,), would cause M to trigger in normal circumstances.  For 
instance, CAT can be triggered by cats and hence would represent cats.  However, 
this can’t be the whole story because of things that merely look like cats, and Twin 
Earth cases involving cats and twin cats.  Suppose on Earth there are cat lookalikes 
that trigger CAT in normal circumstances but which we don’t want to say are 
represented by CAT, or on Twin Earth twin cats are creatures with fundamentally 
different properties.  This problem is known as the ‘disjunction’ problem.. 
 
The problem is where we cannot say what unique X a concept in Twin Earth-type 
cases  represents, and must instead appeal to disjunctive contents where a concept 
represents, say, X’s or Y’s.  For instance, when we consider deviant causes which 
may trigger S’s HORSE concept such as cows on a dark night, the problem is to say 
why HORSE represents horses, and not horses or cows on a dark-night, given that 
both can cause S’s HORSE to trigger.  Fodor’s (1994) response to the disjunction 
problem involves noting that lookalikes causing HORSE to trigger asymmetrically 




depends on horses triggering HORSE.  That is, the only reason lookalikes trigger M 
is because the genuine X’s trigger M.  This is the basis of the asymmetric 
dependence theory of wide content.  In order to explain the Twin Earth cases Fodor 
introduces an additional constraint.  On Fodor’s view we hold that Oscar’s CAT 
representation represents cats and Twin Oscar’s CAT represents twin cats, because in 
general M represents those X’s which have actually caused M to trigger, thus Oscar 
and Twin Oscar’s CAT relate to different kinds because different kinds have actually 
caused their CAT representations to trigger.  In appealing to what X’s actually 
trigger M, this rules out disjunctive representation of, say, H2O and XYZ, because 
Oscar’s WATER is triggered by H2O whereas Twin Oscar’s TWIN WATER (or his 
use of ‘water’) is triggered by XYZ. 
 
2.3.1 Relational representation of appearances 
While Fodor intends to identify a notion of wide content, the informational view of 
representation does not preclude the notion of narrow content, since it is possible to 
identify a form of narrow representation based on similar principles.  There are two 
ways that an internalist might make this point, although, as we shall see, there are 
substantive differences between the views which put them at odds with each other. 
 
Assume for now that Oscar’s representation WATER relates to the natural kind 
property H2O.  On Fodor’s account, this follows because it is H2O that causes 
Oscar’s WATER to trigger.  Prinz (2000) notes that using the same form of 
representation we can identify a property that Oscar and Twin Oscar are both related 
to, and hence that there is a kind of narrow content that relates to their WATER 
representations.  According to Prinz, mental representations are individuated by the 
superficial properties they function to detect
7
.  By hypothesis, H2O and XYZ share 
their superficial properties, for instance they have the same appearance properties 
(being clear, translucent, etc).  On the informational model of representation, M’s 
represent what actually cause them to trigger.  Thus, supposing that the appearance 
properties of H2O and XYZ are what cause Oscar and Twin Oscar’s WATER to 
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trigger, then their representations will represent the same appearance properties.  For 
instance, it is plausible that being clear is a property common to H2O and XYZ, and 
this property, along with the other appearance properties, will cause WATER to 
trigger in both Oscar and Twin Oscar.  Consequently, there is a form of narrow 
content common to intrinsic duplicates that derives from the relational view of 
representation.  Note that we can also accept something like Fodor’s account of wide 
content whilst at the same time acknowledging narrow content.  Thus, while Fodor’s 
account may be suitable for representing natural kind properties that differ across 
possible worlds, it seems that narrow content might be required for representations 
that represent other kinds of properties, particularly those properties that are common 
in the Twin Earth scenarios. 
 
The first worry for this view is that it is committed to a specific theory of mental 
representations which can be resisted by externalists and internalists alike.  In 
Chapter 2 I outline why we should reject the appeal to just one kind of mental 
representation, although I show that Prinz’ approach can provide an important part of 
the story.  A more important worry for present purposes is that while narrow content 
is taken to relate to appearance properties, we aren’t told what these are, other than 
that they are common to distinct natural kinds.  As I will discuss in Section 4 below, 
externalists can raise the objection that the superficial properties, like being clear, 
could be further natural kind properties, and hence that Oscar and Twin Oscar in fact 
represent different appearance properties.  However, one way of supporting the idea 
that appearance properties are not natural kinds is to understand appearance 
properties as a variety of heterogeneous kind property.  A version of this approach is 
developed by Kriegel (2008) who construes appearances as response-dependent 
dispositional properties shared by different natural kinds.  The relevant dispositions 
are to cause certain cognitive effects in a perceiver.  This raises the question of 
whether this account of appearances is coherent, and whether an externalist might 
raise the Twin Earth argument again.  In Section 3 I will say more about these 
properties. 
 




Before considering appearance properties in more detail, it is important to note a 
third objection to this view of narrow content.  In restricting narrow content to 
appearance properties, this doesn’t allow narrow content to relate to natural kind 
properties, thus narrow content is restricted to a special kind of property which 
significantly restricts the internalist’s position.  Both Prinz and Kriegel contend that 
it is wide content that relates to the representation of natural kinds, which is a 
position at odds with the descriptive views outlined above where it seemed plausible 
that descriptions could provide a representational notion of narrow content that 
relates to natural kinds and heterogeneous kinds that subsume different natural kinds.  
Before developing an alternative position, I want to consider a way of showing how 
the relational view of representation may relate to more fundamental properties. 
 
2.3.2 Relational representation of heterogeneous kinds 
While Prinz (2000) appears to accept that the representation of natural kind 
properties relates to the natural kinds that actually triggered the relevant 
representation, Fodor’s (1994) concessions elsewhere suggest that his account of 
representation is not strictly based on what has actually triggered a subject’s 
representations.  This provides the basis for rejecting the restriction of narrow 
content to a special kind of property.  In particular, where Prinz aims to show how 
narrow content can relate to relations between S and superficial properties common 
to Earth and Twin Earth, Segal (2000; 2009b) has shown that Fodor’s account 
unjustifiably restricts representation to S’s actual world, even for the representation 
of kinds that don’t involve relations between S and those kinds. 
 
Consider the case of Swampman, who is an intrinsic duplicate of Fodor who has 
spontaneously appeared on Twin Earth.  As yet, Swampman has no causal contact 
with twin water (XYZ), however, according to Fodor, Swampman’s WATER 
representation represents XYZ because we are to consider what would cause his 
WATER to trigger at nearby possible worlds.  The reason H2O isn’t represented by 
WATER is because there is no H2O in any of these worlds, hence Swampman’s 
WATER represents XYZ.  As Segal (2000) rightly points out, Fodor’s position relies 
on an unwarranted restriction of the relevant counterfactuals (what would cause 




WATER to trigger) to nearby possible worlds where the watery stuff is XYZ.  
Instead, we should consider what would cause WATER to trigger in nearby worlds 
where the watery stuff is H2O.
8
  The worry with Fodor’s stance is that the relevant 
set of possible worlds he considers can be extended to include worlds with H2O.  
What is important in questions about what intrinsic duplicates represent is that the 
possible worlds are nomologically possible worlds.  This requires that the relevant 
worlds subjectively appear the same and are functionally identical while the 
microphysical properties of the environments may be different, (I say more on the 
relevant set of possible worlds in Section 3 below).  Thus, we should consider what 
Swampman would represent in worlds that are superficially identical to Twin Earth, 
but where there is H2O, not XYZ.  In which case, we should extend the range of 
relevant counterfactuals to the actual and possible causes of WATER.  Consequently, 
the correct understanding of the relational view of representation is not what has 
actually triggered S’s representation, but what has or would cause S’s representation 
to trigger at relevant possible worlds.  Therefore, since both H2O and XYZ would 
trigger both Oscar and Twin Oscar’s WATER, they represent the same 
heterogeneous kind. 
 
Using the informational view as a basis for heterogeneous kind representation 
provides a useful contrast with the two-dimensional account, as the views rely on 
different mechanisms of representation and understand the possible worlds 
framework in different ways.  Recall that on the two-dimensionalist’s account of 
narrow content we consider what a relevant description (the actual watery stuff of 
our acquaintance) picks out at possible worlds considered as S’s actual world.  For 
wide content we consider what S represents at worlds considered counterfactually 
given that her actual world is known.  The relational view holds that the relevant 
counterfactuals relate to the actual or possible triggers of S’s representation (e.g. 
WATER) at a relevant set of possible worlds.  On this view, S’s narrow content is 
understood as a heterogeneous property that subsumes any natural kind that would 
have the relevant causal effect on S, whereas the descriptive view understands 
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narrow content as a reference-determining function that picks out a unique natural 
kind property at the subject’s actual world. 
 
As noted above, Segal’s view is intended to be a radically internalist account of 
representation, dispensing with any notion of wide content, and does not rely on 
descriptive representation.  However, just as he criticises Fodor’s restriction of 
relevant counterfactuals, a similar point can be raised against Segal.  If we are only to 
consider counterfactuals of the form what did or would cause S’s representation to 
trigger, then this rules-out wide content that relates to counterfactuals in which we 
fix S’s actual relations to natural kinds.  All that the internalist should commit to is 
that there is a notion of narrow content that can be extracted based on the descriptive 
and relational frameworks, and that this can relate to the representation of natural 
kinds by representing a more generic heterogeneous kind. 
 
I want to forestall one kind of objection here, although I will consider a specific 
version of this kind of response in Chapter 3.  Note that in relating WATER to the 
actual or possible triggers of S’s mental representation WATER, the view does not 
entail that S’s representation takes as its content a disjunction or conjunction of 
different natural kinds (for instance, the set containing all the natural kinds with the 
watery properties across various possible worlds).  The property view of 
representation relates representations to the properties they represent.  Hence, on this 
view, since WATER fails to represent a unique natural kind, it takes as a property a 
heterogeneous kind.  Such a property is of course an abstraction, and does not align 
with the kinds found at any one particular possible world, nor would they be 
discoverable via scientific methods.  However, as with the case of many non-natural 
kind properties, such as algorithms and squares, representing properties that are 
abstractions from particular instances of the property is not intrinsically problematic.  
For instance, S’s ALGORITHM representation may be triggered by a particular 
algorithm on Earth, however, there need be no microphysical properties in common 
among the various instances of algorithms on Earth and Twin Earth.  Hence, this is 
not a serious worry for the internalist.  What we should be willing to recognise is that 




some representations fail to represent properties that align with the actual natural 
kinds at a subject’s environment. 
 
2.4 Taking stock of the debate 
It’s time to take stock of the wide/narrow content debate.  I have outlined some of the 
background to these debates, and crucially I have highlighted two basic forms of 
narrow representation together with some objections to existing versions of these 
accounts.  It is important to note that, as they stand, they involve incompatible  views 
about what narrow content is, such as the relevant basis of narrow content in mental 
representations, the form of representation, and the properties represented.  In 
Section 3, I will outline and develop a conciliatory approach which provides a way to 
accommodate both descriptive and relational representation.  The resulting view can 
be independently motivated by considering the key issues and widening the notion of 
narrow representation, so that we don’t have to hold that only a single 
representational relation provides all the varieties of narrow content available.  My 
proposal is that we can outline a systematic basis for this difference by paying 
attention to the different properties represented by different kinds of mental 
representations.  Thus, for some mental representations and the properties 
represented, descriptive representation may be more suitable, and for others non-
descriptive relational representation may be more suitable.  In anticipation of the 
objection that this approach is ad hoc, or that it begs the question against an 
alternative theory of mental representations, I consider in more detail the nature of 
mental representations in Chapter 2, and show, in particular, that the forms of narrow 
content to be outlined in Section 3 are consistent with recent work on concepts in 
psychology and philosophy. 
 
3. Narrow representation and truth conditions 
Section 2 provided a critical overview of two of the main forms of wide and narrow 
content.  This review provides the basis for developing an alternative approach to 
narrow content which incorporates both forms of representation, but which is 
independently motivated by considerations relating to the nature of supervenience 
and mental representation.  In Section 3 I will outline the case that one lesson from 




the extensive literature on wide and narrow content is that a form of representational 
pluralism may be the best approach in questions of mental representation and content, 
which not only endorses both wide and narrow content, but also a variety of narrow 
contents.  I begin Section 3 by outlining the general framework.  In Section 3.2 I 
clarify the supervenience claim that supports the internalist’s account of 
representation.  In Section 3.3 I outline the range of mental representations and forms 
of narrow representation.  In Section 3.4 I show that narrow content relates to a 
variety of truth conditions. 
 
3.1 The framework 
As noted in Section 2, externalism and internalism are characterised by different 
supervenience claims.  Internalists contend that some content supervenes on intrinsic 
properties such that intrinsic duplicates will share a kind of content.  In order to 
accommodate two kinds of narrow content, which relate to different conceptions of 
what narrow content is, we need to be clear about the notion of supervenience.  This 
is especially important given that many objections to internalism revolve around 
conceptions of supervenience that internalist’s needn’t accept.  Just as important as 
supervenience is the nature of the intrinsic properties which narrow content is said to 
supervene on.  Most proponents of narrow content don’t offer very specific accounts 
of which properties are important.  One exception is Prinz (2000) who appeals to 
concrete conceptions of concepts, in particular, prototypes, and more recently 
proxytypes (Prinz, 2002)
9
.  In Section 2 I noted that one worry for existing 
descriptive accounts is that we are not given much reason to endorse the specific 
descriptive component.  An advantage of Prinz’ approach is that his view is 
supported by empirical work in psychology.  As I will develop more fully in Chapter 
2, recent work on concepts supports a view of mental representations as being 
comprised of a variety of conceptual structures.  In anticipation of that more detailed 
discussion, in this section I will show that permitting a range of mental 
representations associated with terms like ‘water’ provides support for endorsing this 
approach to narrow content, since a plurality of mental representations can support 
the representation of different kinds of properties.  Finally, by paying attention to the 
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nature of the properties represented, and the means by which they are represented, 
my approach shows how the different forms of narrow representation can be 
incorporated within a unified account of narrow content.  In the rest of Section 3 I 
will develop these components in greater detail. 
 
3.2 Supervenience 
Internalism is the thesis that there is a kind of content that supervenes on the internal 
states or structure of a subject, such that a subject S and an internal duplicate of S 
will be in states with the same narrow content.  Where narrow content is taken to be 
genuinely representational yet requires appeal to the external environment for its 
characterisation, an internalist should hold that narrow contents relate to the external 
environment.  A proponent of narrow content may also accept that some mental 
states can be individuated by their wide contents, allowing for wide belief states like 
believing that there is water in the cup.  Hence, the internalist and externalist can 
both allow that we individuate some beliefs in part by reference to factors outside of 
the subject.  This understanding of narrow content in terms of supervenience and 
relations to the external world defies a simplistic, and incorrect, construal of 
internalism as the view that narrow content bears no relation to the external world, 
and that any intrinsic duplicates will be mental state duplicates.  In the rest of this 
section I will clarify the notion of supervenience and the nature of narrow content. 
 
3.2.1 Internalism, supervenience, and representation 
The most common way of understanding the internalist’s supervenience claim is to 
say that narrow content supervenes on internal states from the skin in.  
Supervenience is a relation that holds between two properties such that property B 
supervenes on property A iff any objects that share property A also share property B.  
On this view, internalism is the thesis that there is a kind of content that supervenes 
on the internal states of individuals, such that internal duplicates will be in states with 
the same narrow content.
10
  A worry for this way of putting the thesis is that it is 
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implausible that all internal duplicates of S will, necessarily, share a mental 
representation with the same content.  For instance, consider a duplicate of S on a 
world which is radically unlike Earth.  Where the content of a mental representation 
is what it represents, if this world contains few or no properties or kinds found on 
Earth, then the internalist should accept the view that S and her duplicate may fail to 
represent alike.  Consequently, it is crucial to be clear about the representational 
nature of narrow content when explaining the supervenience claim. 
 
To recap the views introduced in Section 2, on the two-dimensional view of narrow 
content duplicates may represent differently when we consider Twin Earth scenarios 
such as where S and T are on Earth and Twin Earth, and their identical narrow 
contents function to determine different extensions at their respective environments.  
Narrow content reflects S’s way of representing the world as being from her 
perspective.  We consider this way (given descriptively or by S’s Epistemic Space on 
Chalmers’ view), at a given world and see what X would be represented at that world.  
For instance, on Earth, S’s narrow content functions to pick out the unique local 
natural kind with the relevant descriptive properties S associates with ‘water’, i.e. 
H2O, while T’s narrow content will pick out the local watery kind, XYZ.  The 
representational role of narrow content is identical on this view, but it can mean that 
Twins’ concepts have different extensions and that different things make their 
thoughts true.  S’s thought expressed as ‘water is wet’ is true if and only if H2O is 
wet, while T’s similarly expressed thought is true if and only if twin water is wet.  
On the informational view of narrow content, internal duplicates in the Twin Earth 
scenarios can represent alike, such as where their narrow contents function to pick 
out an identical set of superficial, dispositional, or other property, at relevant possible 
worlds.  S and T’s concepts have the same extension, namely the set of properties P.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
duplicated to ensure duplicates share narrow content. For instance, it seems reasonable to hold that S’s 
narrow contents supervene on certain of her brain states, such that any duplicate with the same brain 
states must be in mental states with the same narrow content.  However, I set aside Farkas’ point here 
as her main concern relates to the individuation of mental properties, whereas I am concerned with 
supervenience.  It’s also worth pointing out that I will set aside issues about whether the mind may 
extend beyond the borders of the body, such as with the extended mind thesis (Clark & Chalmers 
1998), as this is a question about the individuation of mental states/mental properties, whereas my 
concern is the question of whether there are mental states that bear narrow content. 




We consider what would trigger S’s concept at a range of possible worlds, and 
thereby identify the extension of S’s concept. 
 
The essence of the internalist thesis defended here is that there is a kind of genuinely 
representational content that supervenes on internal states of the subject.  However, 
the supervenience claim alone is not sufficient to understand the representational 
nature of narrow content.  While it sometimes appears to be held in the literature that 
externalism must be true because it is necessary for genuinely representational 
content to make reference to the environment, as the two basic forms of 
representation suggest here, internalists may also appeal to the environment when 
articulating narrow content.  This requires the internalist to be careful when 
articulating the nature of narrow content. 
 
3.2.2 Inter-world and intra-world narrowness 
Following Jackson & Pettit (1993) and Segal (2000), narrow content is perhaps best 
likened to the property of being water-soluble.  It should be noted, however, that 
despite agreement on the analogy with this kind of property, care needs to be taken 
with regard to the implications that the analogy has for the nature of narrow content.  
In particular, Jackson & Pettit (1993) and Segal (2000) appear to draw different 
conclusions about narrow content from its basic nature.  As such, I will show below 
how the internalist who accepts the view outlined in Section 2 should understand the 
nature of narrow content. 
 
To see why the property of being water-soluble is an apt comparison for narrow 
content, we can draw a distinction between inter-world narrow content and intra-
world narrow content (Jackson & Pettit 1993).  A rough characterisation of this 
distinction may be put as follows (subject to clarification below).  A property of S is 
inter-world narrow iff any duplicate of S will share that property no matter which 
worlds they are in.  A property of S is intra-world narrow iff S and a duplicate of S 
share that property within the same possible world.  As noted above, internalists 
should not be committed to a view in which duplicates represent the same properties 




at worlds that are radically different, where there are few or no properties in common 
at these worlds.  Consequently, narrow content should not be inter-world narrow. 
 
In order to see why narrow content is best modelled on intra-world narrow properties, 
we can consider three kinds of properties and whether they are shared by internal 
duplicates.  Take the property of being square (Kallestrup 2012).  The property of 
being square supervenes on the internal structure of a given object, such that an 
intrinsic duplicate of a square object is square at any possible world.  Therefore, 
being square is an inter-world narrow property since a duplicate of a square object 
will share that property at every possible world.  Contrast this with the property of 
being water-soluble.  While an object’s disposition to dissolve when placed in water 
appears to supervene on the internal structure of the object, Jackson & Pettit (1993) 
point out that to know if something is water-soluble you must also know about the 
causal connections between being in a certain internal state and what happens upon 
being placed in water.  An important aspect of water-solubility is that it takes more 
than the intrinsic properties for the property to be realized, such that the environment 
must facilitate the realization of the property.  In this case, the laws of nature must be 
such that the object will dissolve when placed in water.  With regard to the causal 
connections, what matters is how the object relates to water, give the relevant laws of 
nature in place.  Hence, it is the objects being placed within water which will result 
in the realization (or not) of the property of being water-soluble.  Thus, while an 
object may dissolve when placed in water on Earth, if we consider an internal 
duplicate of the object at a possible world where the laws of nature are such that it 
would not dissolve when placed in water, then that property will fail to be realized at 
that world.  However, the object will still possess the disposition to dissolve when 
placed in water at worlds sufficiently like Earth
11
.  Consequently, being water-
soluble is intra-world narrow, since a duplicate of such an object will share this 
property when considered at the same possible world. 
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 I will expand on the notion of worlds that are sufficiently like Earth below.  For now, the idea is that 
the world will be such that the laws of nature facilitate the object’s dissolution when placed in water. 




Before explaining the implications for narrow content it’s worth considering a third 
kind of property introduced by Stalnaker (1989) designed to put pressure on the 
notion of narrow content.  Being a footprint fails to supervene on internal structure.  
Only something that is a foot-shaped imprint caused by a foot is a footprint, hence 
something that is merely an internal duplicate of a footprint, such as an imprint in the 
sand caused by the movement of the tide, will fail to be a footprint.  In terms of the 
point above, if all you know is confined to the internal structure of the imprint, then 
you don’t know if the imprint is a footprint.  To know this, you must also know that 
the imprint was caused by a foot.  Hence, unlike being water-soluble, being a 
footprint fails to supervene on internal states of an object since the causal history is 
crucial to the relevant property.  An implication for narrow content is that in order to 
get intentional or representational properties from internal states, we must consider 
the relevant internal state in an environment where it bears causal connections to that 
environment, and what the state represents will involve more than just its internal 
state.  Hence, internalists should appeal to causal connections to the world, however, 
this doesn’t make content wide, since this content supervenes on internal structure. 
 
One way of understanding the difference between wide and narrow properties is in 
terms of world-dependence, that is, the extent to which a given property depends on 
the specific environmental features at the relevant environment.  Footprints have a 
stronger world-dependence than being imprints in the sand with a certain internal 
structure, since they depend on how feet are shaped at that world.  Thus, where feet 
are shaped differently on Twin Earth, then an internal duplicate to an Earth footprint 
will not be a footprint. Note, however, that these imprints will still share a range of 
properties such as being imprints in the sand, having a certain internal structure, and 
appearing identical to observers.  These properties, we might say, have a weaker 
world-dependence than the property of being a footprint, relying as they do on facts 
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 This distinction between weak and strong world-dependence has an extensive literature, which I 
will not consider in detail here.  For current purposes I will assume that the basic distinction has at 
least prima facie plausibility. 




This captures an important point about narrow content.  While it supervenes on 
internal structure, it nonetheless depends upon the external environment for its 
representational nature, though having a weaker world-dependence than wide content.  
S’s mental representation WATER may have a narrow content which represents 
superficial properties, such as being clear, odourless, liquid, and these properties 
have a weaker world-dependence than the property of being H2O, which may relate 
to the wide content of S’s mental representation.  Thus, while S’s wide contents may 
be fixed by highly world-specific facts about her actual environment, her narrow 
contents may depend only on a more general way on the facts about her environment. 
 
This way of understanding narrow content applies to both kinds of representation 
outlined in Section 2.  On the descriptive view, S’s narrow content is a function from 
worlds to extensions.  We consider what would be represented at a given world, W, 
by considering what X at W meets the relevant description.  On the narrow 
informational view, we consider what X at W1…Wn would trigger S’s concept.  On 
both views, S’s C may represent relevant properties, hence Twins can share narrow 
contents at worlds that are suitable alike (again, I will say more about these worlds 
below).  While the wide contents of S’s concepts are fixed to her actual environment, 
the narrow contents can relate to a broader range of extensions by virtue of the 
weaker world-dependence of narrow content. 
 
Narrow content therefore relates to the external environment, albeit in a more general 
way than wide content.  In order to get genuine representation, narrow content 
thereby requires a subject to bear causal relations to a world and the properties 
represented at that world.  On the descriptive view, we consider S at any of the 
worlds W1…Wn and what X at W S’s narrow content would pick out.  We can 
understand S’s relations to w as underpinning the representational nature of her 
narrow contents such that at W, given her relations to things at w, her narrow content 
will pick out the set of X’s which fit the description associated with her narrow 
content.  On the informational view, causal relations to things at a world plays a 
central role in determining what falls within the extension of S’s concepts.  It is by 
considering what X’s would trigger C at W1…Wn that we determine the extent of S’s 




narrow content.  In practice, this means that we consider the sum total of causal 
relations S bears to things at W, and see what sets of things trigger relevant concepts. 
 
The two accounts may then be seen to be compatible to some extent.  For instance, 
when considering what narrow content descriptively represents, we may consider 
what X’s at the relevant world would trigger S’s C.  However, the accounts of 
representation are importantly different.  On the descriptive view, the extension 
associated with narrow content is determined on a world by world basis, fitting with 
narrow contents’ role as a function from possible worlds to extensions at those 
worlds.  On the informational view, narrow content relates to the representation of a 
property or set of properties, which needn’t be considered on a world by world basis.  
The descriptive views tend to focus on representing natural kind properties, which 
differ at W1…Wn, hence different extensions depending on the world considered.  
The informational view, however, tends to focus on superficial properties which are 
the same at W1…Wn, resulting in the same extension at each of these worlds. 
 
Throughout the above discussion, I have appealed to sets of possible worlds and 
made use of the notion of possible worlds that are sufficiently similar with respect to 
the laws of nature to characterise the notion of narrow content.  In the next Section I 
conclude the discussion of intra-world narrowness and the nature of narrow content 
by considering which relevant set of worlds the internalist requires in order to 
facilitate the representational nature of narrow content. 
 
3.2.3 Cognitive content and nomologically similar possible worlds 
Above, I noted that internal duplicates of S share an intra-world narrow property 
within the same possible world as S.  The main point here is to avoid a commitment 
to the view that any internal duplicate of S will represent the same properties as S, 
such that where S on Earth may represent H2O, there is a sense in which T’s narrow 
content may relate to the representation of XYZ.  For instance, on the descriptive 
view, S and T can share narrow content while their concepts may have different 
extensions and their thoughts different truth conditions.  This means that narrow 
content is not inter-world narrow, since where S bears causal relations to H2O and T 




to XYZ, they represent differently.  However, when we consider S and T within the 
same world, they will represent alike since narrow content is intra-world narrow.  
This entails that if both S and T are on Earth, then S and T would share states that 
relate to the same extension and thoughts with the same truth conditions. 
 
One worry with this way of characterising narrow representation is that it fails to 
allow that in Twin Earth cases there are a range of properties that S and T can 
represent alike, and hence that their thoughts can have identical truth conditions.  
This seems true of thoughts of superficial and abstract/functional properties like 
being clear or being an algorithm (more on this below).  Despite S’s being causally 
related to H2O and T’s being causally related to XYZ, this doesn’t seem to prohibit 
their concepts representing the same superficial and functional properties (for 
instance the watery properties common to H2O and XYZ).  Where narrow contents 
relate to the representation of these non-natural kind properties, and Twins represent 
the same properties, then their mental states have the same narrow representational 
properties.  Furthermore, on the informational view of narrow content noted in 
Section 2, being at the same possible world was not required in order for S and T to 
represent the same properties. 
 
It is important to note that we can distinguish between kinds of Twin Earth scenario.   
Putnam’s original Twin Earth case was such that Twin Earth was a different planet 
within the same possible world.  An alternative is where Twin Earth is another 
possible world.  On the descriptive view of narrow content, Twins may be in states 
with the same narrow content, but this content functions to pick out different 
properties at the different worlds W1…Wn.  On the informational view, however, 
since narrow content relates to superficial and other non-natural kind properties, we 
can allow that the property represented may be the same, even where Twin Earth is 
another possible world. 
 
In relation to the characterisation of narrow content as intra-world narrow, Jackson & 
Pettit (1993), appear to hold that intra-world narrowness entails that narrow contents 
relate to the same representational contents only when considered at the same 




possible world, such as worlds where the same underlying natural kinds would be 
represented by S’s WATER concept.  Kallestrup (2012, 120) characterises the view 
such that “Intra-world narrow properties are only shared by doppelgangers across 
nomologically identical possible worlds, i.e. worlds governed by the same laws of 
nature.”.  However, on the informational approach to narrow representation, we do 
not need to restrict the relevant set of worlds to nomologically identical worlds, since 
something less than identical worlds, i.e. nomologically similar possible worlds, will 
be worlds where Twins may still represent the same set of, say, superficial properties.  
Importantly for present purposes, this is consistent with the comparison with the 
property of being water-soluble, since an object could plausibly dissolve at possible 
worlds where the different laws of nature have no impact on this property being 
realized.  Consequently, the internalist should allow that duplicates may represent the 
same properties or kinds at nomologically possible worlds that are similar enough to 
sustain representation of the same properties.  This view requires an account of what 
it takes for these worlds to be similar enough. 
 
On a first approximation, similar possible worlds are those where things seem the 
same to any intrinsic duplicate of S at those worlds, irrespective of differences in the 
underlying laws of nature or natural kinds at those worlds.  Put another way, things 
seem qualitatively the same to S and T at all of these worlds, i.e. despite differences 
in the natural kinds on Earth and Twin Earth, and differences in the underlying laws 
of nature, from S’s and T’s perspective things seem to be qualitatively identical 
 
If this is the case, then where narrow content relates to how things seem to the 
subject, then these worlds will be such that things seem the same to S and her 
duplicates, and a duplicate of S at any of these similar worlds will represent things as 
being the same as S on Earth.  Where superficial properties relate to appearances, 
then these worlds will likely share superficial properties, and duplicates’ narrow 
contents will represent the same properties.  While some of these worlds will have 




different natural kind properties, they may have a range of other non-natural kind 




This is slightly stronger than the notion of intra-world narrowness, since appealing to 
nomologically similar worlds can allow that Twins at different possible worlds, not 
just at different planets within the same possible world, can represent alike with their 
identical narrow contents.  However, this view can incorporate the idea that narrow 
content is not inter-world narrow, since there are clearly possible worlds where 
duplicates can fail to represent alike, especially the worlds where things would fail to 
seem the same to subjects considered. 
 
At these nomologically similar worlds, many properties including superficial, 
artefactual, and computational, will be identical, while some natural kind properties 
and the laws of nature will differ.  Yet narrow content may relate to these properties 
via the two forms of narrow representation identified here.  So long as things seem 
the same at these worlds, then S’s narrow content will be triggered by objects with 
the same superficial properties, and/or S’s narrow content will still function to pick 
out the local X with relevant descriptive properties.  The internalist’s claim is 
therefore that intrinsic duplicates may share narrow content at nomologically similar 
worlds, and that this is compatible with duplicates’ narrow contents relating to both 
the same properties and different properties, depending on which form of 
representation is in question. 
 
Summarising the discussion so far, internalism is the view that narrow content 
supervenes on the internal states of subjects and is an intra-world narrow property of 
subjects, such that an internal duplicate of a subject S will be in a state with the same 
content at nomologically possible worlds that are sufficiently similar to S’s world.  
While narrow content supervenes on internal states, in order to understand the 
representational nature of this content, we must appeal to the external world, and the 
causal connections subjects bear to that world.  Depending on which form of narrow 
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representation we consider, duplicates may or may not represent the same properties, 
but on both views they will share narrow contents at this relevant set of worlds. 
 
In the rest of Section 3, I consider the two basic forms of narrow representation in 
more detail, paying particular attention to the kinds of properties represented and the 
relevant truth conditions associated with such narrow content. 
 
3.3 The varieties of narrow representation 
Internalists often construe the relevant intrinsic properties in terms of mental 
representations
14
.  It may therefore be asked which intrinsic properties in particular 
relate to narrow contents, and whether suitable accounts of mental representations 
can sustain the view.   As shown in Section 2 above the descriptive and relational 
accounts of narrow content make substantive claims about the relevant mental 
representations that are held to bear these contents.  For instance, the descriptive 
account of Jackson (2003a) proposes that there is a kind of mental representation that 
encodes a descriptive condition that picks out a unique natural kind at the thinker’s 
actual environment.  Similarly, Prinz (2000; 2002) contends that there are specific 
mental representations that relate to the representation of superficial appearance 
properties, and appeals to the theory of concepts to give substance to this account of 
mental representation.  The worry for these views was in their respective 
commitments and whether any such mental representations can be defended.  
Without going into too much detail here, the view I will develop holds that mental 
representations come in a variety of structures.  Corresponding to these structures are 
different representational contents, and these can in turn relate to different forms of 
representation.  As already noted, in Chapter 2 I will show that a recent approach to 
concepts, which draws on work in psychology, is consistent with individuating 
concepts by their narrow contents.  In this chapter I will presume much of this 
framework without drawing on it explicitly.  To this end, I will work with a rough 
notion of pluralistic mental representations where there is no single mental 
representation that accounts for all of a subject’s representations.  On the pluralist 
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view, different mental representations relate to the representation of different kinds 
of property.  In the rest of Section 3 I will focus on the remaining issues of the 
internalist’s representational framework: the properties represented and the different 
representational mechanisms. 
 
In Section 2 I noted that existing accounts of narrow content focus on representation 
of two main kinds of properties, and that this representation goes by way of different 
representational mechanisms.  What I want to show is that the internalist should 
endorse both kinds of view, and that this is plausible once we consider the nature of 
the properties and mechanisms in more detail and relate these to different kinds of 
mental representations.  I consider each of these in turn. 
 
3.3.1 Descriptive representation of natural and heterogeneous kinds 
Recall that one objection to a two-dimensional account of narrow content is that it 
appears to assume that subjects like Oscar will represent the unique local natural kind 
at his environment, rather than a more heterogeneous kind.  I have suggested that the 
latter view could be associated with a version of descriptive representation, where the 
description the clear liquid that fills the lakes and rivers would pick out the same 
heterogeneous kind across W1…Wn.  Against proponents of the heterogeneous view, 
I noted that the exclusion of wide content was not well-motivated, and that 
internalists needn’t choose between allowing subjects to represent natural kinds or 
heterogeneous kinds.  The consequence of this critique leads to a version of 
representational pluralism, which allows for variation in the mental representations 
of different subjects, as well as individuals having a variety of mental representations 
associated with the same term. 
 
Consider the case where Oscar’s WATER represents a heterogeneous kind that 
subsumes H2O and XYZ.  This is consistent with allowing that someone in the know 
will represent the kind H2O with the mental representation WATER.  On the 
descriptive view this difference can be explained by understanding the differences in 
the ways of conceptualizing different properties.  Oscar’s WATER conceptualizes 
the world at a relatively superficial level in terms of properties common to different 




natural kinds, whereas others may have a more sophisticated conception in terms of a 
natural kind individuated by more fundamental properties.  However, a case can be 
imagined where an individual, S, has at least two different ways of conceptualizing 
the world with her WATER representation.  Combining the two representations 
outlined, S could represent things in a superficial way with WATER, such as when 
she thinks only in terms of superficial properties, yet S may also represent things at a 
more fundamental way in terms of the fundamental natures of different kinds.  
Consequently, S’s WATER may be associated with at least two ways of representing 
things.  The descriptive view of narrow content can allow that S’s WATER is 
associated with two kinds of narrow content, one which represents a natural kind, 
and another that represents a heterogeneous kind individuated by its superficial 
properties. 
 
A different way of motivating the same view is to note that the accounts of content 
from Putnam (1975) and Jackson (2003a) make assumptions about the intentions of 
subjects and the associated descriptions that relate to the representation of natural 
kinds.  Hence there is a precedent for deciding what Oscar represents by reflecting on 
the likely intentions of subjects in these cases.  Thus, the pluralist view can be 
motivated by the prima facie plausible claim that Oscar’s representation differs from 
those who know about the microphysical properties of water.   Similarly, it is prima 
facie plausible that S could think of objects in various ways.  Consider an alternative 
to the example above.  Suppose S has a theory of colours relating to the 
microphysical properties of surfaces of objects and the different wavelengths of light.  
S may associate such a theory with her representation RED, yet S may also have a 
more superficial understanding relating to the redness of S’s perceptual experiences, 
and thereby associate with RED a more superficial representation relating to the 
experience of redness
15
.  Such a distinction between ways of conceptualizing 
different properties that are associated with the same linguistic expression (‘water’, 
‘red’, etc) is all that is needed to motivate the pluralist view of narrow representation. 
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Two important issues at this juncture are whether the non-natural kind properties 
associated with WATER and RED are suitable kinds to be represented, and, 
importantly, how these properties should be understood.  Below, I will consider in 
more detail the nature of appearance properties like redness and suggest that the 
relevant heterogeneous properties, such as that associated with WATER, can be 
understood in a similar way to other non-natural kind properties, including 
appearance and artefactual properties.  Thus, in so far as we can make sense of 
mental representations representing these other non-natural kind properties, the 
heterogeneous view should be accepted.  To this end, in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 I 
outline both appearances and other non-natural kind properties like artefacts.  Before 
this, however, I outline in the next section why internalists should also endorse non-
descriptive relational representation of heterogeneous kinds. 
 
3.3.2 Relational representation of heterogeneous kinds 
In Section 3.3.1 I suggested that the descriptive view of narrow representation can 
relate to the representation of natural and heterogeneous kinds, and that a pluralist 
view of mental representations can support this view.  There is another approach to 
narrow representation which appeals to informational relations between 
representations and the actual or possible triggers of those representations.  The 
representational mechanism and associated counterfactuals are different on this 
approach.  This suggests that, in addition to pluralism about what is represented, the 
internalist should be willing to endorse pluralism about the form of narrow 
representation.  On the relational view we consider what did or would cause a 
representation to trigger at relevant worlds in normal circumstances.  Consider Oscar 
and Twin Oscar once more.  Both H2O and XYZ would cause their WATER to 
trigger, thus, on this view, they represent the same heterogeneous kind.  The 
associated mental representation could be understood as relating to the same 
combination of functional and superficial properties that they each associate with 
WATER. 
 
In 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 I have outlined two different accounts of narrow representation.  
The differences boil down to two things:  First, it matters whether we think of S’s 




mental representation as picking out a unique natural kind or a more heterogeneous 
kind.  I contend that we can’t know this a priori since what is needed is an account of 
the relevant mental representations, such as what lay subject’s theories of various 
natural objects are, and whether these pick out natural or heterogeneous kinds.  
Second, the representational frameworks are importantly different: one appeals to the 
actual or possible triggers of mental representations, the other stipulates that S 
represents whatever satisfies a certain description at S’s actual world.  The difference 
is subtle, but is the difference between a version of informational representation 
understood as a kind of narrow representation, and a version of descriptive 
representation which appeals to descriptions that function to pick out what satisfies 
the description. 
 
Returning to the issue of the nature of heterogeneous properties, the next two 
sections motivate the representation of kinds other than natural kinds.  While this 
doesn’t say precisely what property is represented in the case of a heterogeneous 
kind common to H2O and XYZ, it does suggest a way of supporting the idea that 
subjects’ mental representations are not restricted to representing kinds that neatly 
align with the fundamental natures of natural kinds in the environment. 
 
3.3.3 Relational representation of appearances 
As noted above, Prinz (2000) and Kriegel (2008) defend views on which narrow 
representation goes by way of relations between S and superficial properties 
instantiated at the set of nomologically possible worlds W1…Wn.  We need to be 
very clear on what these superficial properties are so as to support the idea that 
narrow content relates to genuine properties.  A basic approach can be extracted from 
Shoemaker’s (2006) account of appearances.  Take an object O and subjects A and B 
with different perceptual systems.  Suppose that A and B are such that when A 
perceives O she has an experience associated with our experience of redness, and 
when B perceives O she has an experience associated with our experience of 
greenness.  O’s fundamental properties are fixed, but the appearance properties 
depend in part on how O appears to perceivers like A and B.  O has the disposition to 
cause in A and B perceptual experiences with different phenomenal characters.  




Phenomenal character is the specific quality of what it is like to undergo a given 
perceptual experience.  A quirk of Shoemaker’s view is that phenomenal characters 
are understood as properties of objects, thus it is O that has the relevant phenomenal 
character.  Shoemaker contends that the same object O can have multiple 
phenomenal characters in so far as O has the relevant dispositional property to cause 
the different perceptual experiences in subjects like A and B.  Setting aside this 
particular feature of Shoemaker’s view, we can hold instead that O has a disposition 
to cause states with different phenomenal characters.  Hence, the property is 
relational, since it partly depends on the states it causes in perceivers.  When we 
consider intrinsic duplicates in the Twin Earth scenario, we can hold that objects X 
and Y on Earth and Twin Earth could be such that they have different natural kind 
properties but cause in subjects S and T states with the same phenomenal character
16
, 
such as that associated with our experiences of redness.  On this view, we can say 
that objects X and Y share a dispositional property to cause states with the relevant 
phenomenal character in S and T, and identify this dispositional property as the 
relevant appearance property shared by X and Y, represented by both S and T. 
 
Such a view could be rejected by denying that appearance properties are 
dispositional properties in Shoemaker’s sense.  Here I defend the view that these 
properties, or something like them, are viable, although a complete analysis of the 
metaphysics of properties is outside the scope of this thesis.  Shoemaker’s account 
could be rejected on the basis of holding that the property of being red is identical to 
the relevant natural kind property.  Thus, S would represent the local natural kind 
property on Earth, and T would represent the relevant natural kind property on Twin 
Earth, hence the content would be wide.   However, the view of narrow content here 
is not tied to Shoemaker’s view of appearance properties.  What the view developed 
so far requires is that there is a kind of mental representation that can represent 
superficial properties primarily based on how things seem to the subject.  Since 
objects X and Y at least have in common the property of appearing to S and T to be 
the same, then something less than Shoemaker’s theory of appearances would be 
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enough.  For instance, an alternative account is to identify a more basic notion of a 
disposition to cause states with a given phenomenal character.  Something has the 
dispositional property if they trigger in S the relevant state.  Thus, S’s representation 
RED could plausibly represent a dispositional property to cause experiences of 
redness, and whether or not it is held that these dispositions are appearance 
properties or whether appearance properties are some other kind of property, the 
appeal to dispositional properties would stand. 
 
3.3.4 The representation of other non-natural kinds 
The narrow content associated with mental representations of other non-natural kinds 
like algorithms, computers, and sofas can be understood in a similar way.  However, 
there are two issues that need to be considered for functional and artefact properties:  
the appropriate form of representation, and how to understand the properties such 
that intrinsic duplicates represent the same property.  With regard to the first point, 
when considering the range of other non-natural kind properties, it is not obvious 
what form of narrow representation is appropriate.  Much of the debate has focused 
on natural kind terms because of Putnam’s example, and this has lead some 
internalists to the descriptive account of narrow content.  However, as a general 
model of narrow content one worry is that  descriptive representation results in 
intrinsic duplicates not representing any properties in common.  In addition, we don’t 
want to hold that the properties are descriptively determined at W1…Wn, since this is 
unnecessary.  A better approach would be to allow either descriptive representation 
or relational representation.  However, I will not consider the details of the form of 
representation that is most suitable here.  What is more important for present 
purposes is the second issue, relating to the properties represented, and to indicate 
how these non-natural kind properties support the representation of heterogeneous 
kinds in general. 
 
For non-natural kind properties, we want to say that S and T represent the same 
properties at possible worlds, not because they are related to a dispositional property, 
but rather because these properties (whatever they are) are also the same at W1…Wn.  
Consider artefacts.  While particular instances of artefacts like sofas might be 




composed of different natural kind properties, the property of being a sofa is not 
associated with any particular set of natural kind properties that instantiate the 
artefact type.  Being a sofa is a matter of being a long upholstered seat with a back 
and arms, for two or more people.  Something is a sofa as long as it has these 
properties.  Consequently, SOFA represents the artefact type, which can be 
instantiated by a wide range of objects with any number of different fundamental 
properties.  The same principle applies to functional properties like being an 
algorithm, which may be defined as a process or set of rules to be followed in 
calculations or other problem-solving operations, especially by a computer.  The 
same point can be made for COMPUTER and any of many other non-natural kind 
terms.  Returning to the case of the heterogeneous kind common to H2O and XYZ, 
the point can now be made as follows.  Oscar and Twin Oscar’s WATER represents 
a common heterogeneous property because the description each associates with 
WATER, the clear drinkable liquid that falls from the sky and fills the lakes and 
oceans (i.e. watery stuff), picks out the same set of non-natural kind properties.  As is 
the case with artefacts and functional kinds, being the heterogeneous kind watery 
stuff is a matter of being a kind individuated by a certain set of properties, and it is 
these properties that are common across W1…Wn.  So long as we can countenance 
properties like being a sofa or being an algorithm, there should be no serious concern 
with the property of being watery stuff. 
 
3.3.5  The pluralist view 
Before considering the variety of truth conditions associated with narrow content, it 
is worth outlining the pluralist view developed so far.  There are three central 
components relating to the nature of mental representations, what they represent, and 
the form of representation (or the representational relation). 
 
The claim about pluralism concerning what is represented relates to the idea that 
different properties may be represented by the same concept.  Where some 
internalists focus on one kind of property only, for instance Prinz (2002) contends 
that narrow contents relate to the representation of superficial properties only, the 
case can be made that narrow contents can relate to different kinds of properties, 




including superficial and natural kind properties. On the descriptive view, natural 
kind properties are of primary concern, since narrow contents are functions from 
worlds to extensions, effectively representing the X at world W which satisfies the 
description associated with S’s narrow content.  On the informational view, 
superficial appearance properties are dominant, since these are what tend to trigger 
S’s concepts when she encounters instances of a relevant kind, for instance, it is the 
superficial watery properties common to H2O and XYZ which would both trigger S’s 
WATER concept.  According to the pluralist view developed here, S’s concept 
WATER can represent different properties in so far as it is comprised of a number of 
conceptual structures which represent different properties.  For instance, prototype 
structure may relate to superficial properties while theory structure may relate to 
more fundamental properties or to a range of non-natural kind properties. 
 
This account of how a concept may represent different properties involves the other 
two aspects of the view, relating to pluralism about mental representations and the 
representational relation.  Pluralism about mental representations relates to the 
concept pluralist thesis, according to which concepts are comprised of a variety of 
concrete conceptual structures, such as prototypes and theories.  This contrasts with 
other internalists who restrict mental representations to, say, just prototypes, or don’t 
explore the view that narrow content is suitable for individuating a wider range of 
mental representations than is typically the case.  While narrow content is often 
related to idiosyncratic concepts which can differ from the standard public concept, 
thereby allowing individuals to have different concepts, the extent to which these 
concepts relate to a specific theory of concepts has not been developed in much 
detail (with Prinz (1999) being the exception).  For reasons identified above, narrow 
content needn’t be restricted to one kind of conceptual structure, hence the internalist 
should accept pluralism.  Thus, the pluralist account is not simply the standard 
internalist view that different subjects possess different concepts, such as Alf’s 
arthritis concept and the expert’s arthritis concept.  Pluralism is the thesis that 
concepts themselves are pluralistic, coming in a variety of structures, and indeed 
some concepts being comprised of a variety of structures.  This is similar to a 
standard internalist position, but adds an additional dimension where subjects may 




have different concepts in so far as they come in a variety of structures.  My claim is 
that internalism is a natural fit with concept pluralism, and that this has implications 
for the nature of narrow content when we consider the narrow content of the different 
kinds of conceptual structures.  For instance, we therefore get pluralism about the 
properties represented as noted above.  Hence the first and second components of my 
view are closely connected. 
 
The third aspect of my account, pluralism about the representational relation, relates 
to the view developed in Chapter 1 that the internalist’s representational relation may 
include a kind of descriptive representation along the lines of the Jackson-Chalmers 
two-dimensional account (and similar accounts from Searle (1983), Mendola (2008), 
and Farkas (2008)), as well as a form of informational representation along the lines 
of an internalist version of Fodor’s informational theory of content (versions of 
which have been developed by Segal (2000) and Prinz (1999)).  What I defend is a 
hybrid pluralist account of the representational relation, which incorporates at least 
these two basic internalist accounts of representation.  The differences in these 
accounts of representation lend some support to pluralism about what is represented 
in so far as the descriptive view is perhaps best suited for representing natural kind 
properties, while the informational view may relate to superficial and other non-
natural kind properties. 
 
3.4 Narrow content and truth conditions 
I have shown that narrow content is genuinely representational content and comes in 
a variety of forms.  In this section I show that narrow content is semantically 
evaluable for truth and falsity.  The worry for internalism is that truth conditional 
content is standardly taken to be wide.  The view developed so far holds that there is 
only a difference in the truth conditions of intrinsic duplicates’ thoughts if they 
represent different properties.  Where the properties represented are the same, then 
the truth conditions will also be the same.  This allows the internalist to 
accommodate two apparently conflicting views about the truth conditions associated 
with narrow content, as I will now show. 
 




Thoughts typically reflect how the world is taken to be, and the truth of a thought 
depends on whether the world is that way.  Consequently, it matters how a subject’s 
thoughts, and mental representations, represent the world as being, since this is 
crucial for determining what the truth conditions of the thought are.  It is standard to 
take the truth conditions of a thought, such as the thought expressed by ‘water is wet’, 
to be comprised of the contents of the representations expressed by the relevant 
thought, i.e. the content of WATER and WET, together with the semantic 
significance of ascribing the latter to the former.  In the possible worlds framework 
we can identify the relevant truth conditions with the state of affairs or scenario in 
which the thought is true or false.  The issue with regard to wide and narrow contents 
is that proponents of wide content would hold that S and her intrinsic duplicates at 
W1…Wn would have thoughts with different truth conditions because they represent 
different natural kinds.  Consequently, the truth conditions would relate to the 
different state of affairs at W1…Wn, specifically relating to scenarios involving the 
relevant natural kind properties represented by WATER and WET at each world.  
This conforms to a standard account of the truth conditions associated with thoughts.  
For instance, the thought expressed by ‘water is wet’ is taken to have the following 
truth conditions: 
 
(1) ‘water is wet’ is true if and only if water is wet 
 
Typically the terms occurring on the right hand side are construed as natural kind 
terms, so that ‘water’ on the right hand side represents H2O and could not be used to 
properly characterize the truth condition of S’s intrinsic duplicate on Twin Earth 
whose thought has the truth condition: 
 
(2) ‘water is wet’ is true if and only if twin water is wet 
 
On the view developed above, intrinsic duplicates may share representations that 
represent the same heterogeneous, appearance, and other non-natural kind properties 
at W1…Wn, thus the same scenarios at each of W1…Wn would make the thought 
expressed by ‘water is wet’ true when thought by each intrinsic duplicate. Put 




another way, the thoughts expressed by each subject have the same truth conditions.  
These truth conditions can be expressed as follows: 
 
(3) ‘water is wet’ is true if and only if watery stuff is wet 
 
Here ‘watery stuff’ is used as shorthand for the set of functional and appearance 
properties that S associates with the term ‘water’.  Thus, while S might use the term 
‘water’ to express her representation WATER, ‘watery stuff’ reflects that S’s 
WATER represents a heterogeneous kind individuated by these non-natural kind 
properties.  Since the properties represented by S’s WATER includes the property of 
being wet, itself a non-natural kind property, then the thought would be true at all of 
W1…Wn where this is the case.  The truth conditions will depend on what mental 
representations are being considered, and hence what the narrow content of the 
mental representation is.  For instance, on Jackson’s descriptive view of narrow 
representation the truth conditions of S’s thought expressed as ‘water is wet’ may be 
given as: 
 
(4) ‘water is wet’ is true if and only if the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance  is 
wet 
 
Note that S’s theory of water might not be as specific as to pick out a natural kind, 
thus, unlike Jackson, et al, it might be better to allow that while some may have 
representations that relate to natural kinds, others have more generic heterogeneous 
kind mental representations with truth conditions similar to (3) (or even the same 
individual may have a representation that relates to both).  For heterogeneous kinds, 
both H2O and XYZ can make S’s thoughts true, since it is not only the local natural 
kinds that would satisfy this truth condition as both H2O and XYZ have the property 
represented by WET.  In so far as the natural kind and heterogeneous kind views 
result in different truth conditions, S and her intrinsic duplicates may then have 
mental representations with different narrow contents, which represent different 
properties, and have different truth conditions.  The same principle applies when 
considering a mental representation that relates to a scientific theory of a property 




like H2O.  The truth conditions of S’s thought expressed as ‘H2O is not combustible’ 
would be: 
 
(5) ‘H2O is not combustible’ is true if and only if H2O is not combustible 
 
In contrast to the standard account of the truth conditions of thought, the view 
developed here contends that we must pay attention to the specific representations 
expressed by the subject, and to the properties represented.  A useful way of 
characterizing some of the truth conditions associated with narrow contents is to 
appeal to the notion of relativized truth conditions
17
.  A paradigmatic instance of 
relativized truth conditions involves the use of terms which generate contents that 
may differ depending on who the thinker is.  For instance, if you and I both think a 
thought expressed as ‘my pants are on fire’, then our thoughts have different truth 
conditions because the person represented by ‘my’ differs when we each think the 
relevant thought.  To get the truth condition of each thought associated with the 
sentence ‘my pants are on fire’, it is necessary to relativize the sentence to the 
relevant thinker.  In a similar manner, when identifying the truth conditions of the 
thought expressed as ‘water is wet’, it is necessary to relativize the expression to the 
relevant thinker’s mental representations associated with the thinker’s use of ‘water’ 
and ‘wet’.  If S thinks of the property represented by WATER as a generic watery 
kind with certain superficial features then the truth conditions will be less specific 
than if S thought of the kind as a specific chemical kind composed of H2O.  For 
natural kind representation, we would also relativize the truth conditions to S’s actual 
world, thus relativizing to both the mental representation and the actual world of the 
thinker.  For heterogeneous, superficial, and other non-natural kind properties we 
don’t need to relativize to a specific world, only to W1…Wn, and to the subject’s 
specific mental representations. 
 
It should be noted that recognising truth conditions associated with narrow contents 
does not preclude recognition of the standard externalist truth conditions.  
Externalism can provide alternative truth conditions allowing for different ways of 
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semantically evaluating thoughts and utterances.  For instance, in the Twin Earth 
cases we may allow Oscar to have two kinds of truth conditions associated with wide 
and narrow contents.  The narrow content could reflect how Oscar’s representation 
represents a heterogeneous watery substance, while the wide content reflects the 
wide content determined by the local natural kind, H2O.  Both contents are 
semantically relevant, since we may semantically assess Oscar’s thought from the 
perspective of what ‘water’ means in the local linguistic community (or what Oscar 
is actually acquainted with) and from what properties Oscar’s mental representations 
represent understood in terms of how his representation represents the world as being.  
It might be objected that a subject like Oscar could not then fail to have true thoughts, 
since whatever Oscar is disposed to think of as falling under WATER would thereby 
make his thought ‘that is water’ true.  However, the view is not at risk of making a 
subject’s thoughts trivially true in the sense that S could not have false thoughts.  A 
thought could be false on this view if, for instance, a subject predicated a property of 
an object which it did not possess.  For instance, where S thinks the thought 
expressed as ‘water is combustible’ is true.  In addition, we can hold S semantically 
responsible to linguistic conventions in her linguistic community, or to the actual 
kinds at her environment, thus there would be a way to show that her thoughts could 




Hence, the internalist can allow wide content to serve as a constraint on the truth of a 
subject’s utterances and perhaps on a subject’s manner of conceptualizing and 
representing the world.  Consider Burge’s arthritis case, where Alf incorrectly 
believes that the term ‘arthritis’ refers to the condition in his thigh.  On this view, we 
can hold that wide content relates to the conventional public meaning of the term 
which can serve as a constraint on the correctness of a speaker’s usage.  Hence, with 
respect to linguistic conventions, Alf’s utterance ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’ is false.  
Norms of correct usage therefore relate to the conventional meaning of the term, and 
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thereby to wide content. 
19
  The same point applies to Oscar and his use of ‘water’, 
since the wide content of the concept he expresses relates to H2O, say, and this serves 
as a basis from which to semantically evaluate his thoughts and utterances. 
 
4. The Twin Earth argument revisited 
One of the most common objections to narrow content is based on the view that any 
attempt to express or state what narrow content is will be thwarted, since the terms 
we use to express narrow content, and which are also used to attribute mental 
representations to subjects, may always represent different natural kind properties at 
intrinsic duplicates’ actual worlds.  As a result, any attempt to say what narrow 
content is will result in our expressing a form of wide content that relates to different 
properties represented by intrinsic duplicates.  This objection relies on the point, 
disputed throughout this chapter, that there are no terms that are not subject to the 
Twin Earth argument.  The idea is that there is no mechanism in natural language to 
express any sort of content common to the representations of intrinsic duplicates.  
The main response considered here revolves around denying that any such problem 




4.1 The Twin Earth argument and the expressibility of narrow content 
Versions of this objection are abundant in the philosophical literature, having been 
deployed by Lepore & Loewer (1986), Block & Stalnaker (1999), and Sawyer (2007), 
among others.  The essence of the objection is that the terms used in expressing the 
narrow content of representations like WATER, such as ‘clear’, ‘thirst-quenching’, 
and ‘liquid’, are all themselves natural kind terms that pick out different natural kind 
properties on Earth and Twin Earth.  Suppose an internalist were to try to define 
narrow content in such a way that the narrow content of WATER was given by the 
relevant set of descriptive terms, and held that this captured a content common to 
intrinsic duplicates.  This approach is common among internalists, for instance on 
Jackson’s view ‘water’ represents the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance, where 
                                                          
19
 I assume here that conventional linguistic meaning relates to wide content, however, elsewhere in 
the thesis I note that on some Internalist views there is a kind of semantic content of utterances which 
is narrow. 
20
 As noted, I will consider Burge’s (1979) arthritis argument, which makes a similar claim, in 
Chapter 3. 




‘watery stuff’ is shorthand for the relevant set of watery properties (clear, thirst-
quenching, liquid, etc).  The objection is that terms like ‘liquid’ would not pick out 
properties common to intrinsic duplicates’ respective worlds because what each term 
picks out at that world may in fact be a different natural kind property.  For instance, 
Block & Stalnaker (1999) consider a case where on Twin Earth ‘liquid’ refers to a 
kind most of which is a slippery granular solid, which shares the superficial features 
of Earth liquids but the underlying microphysical properties are radically different.  
The problem for a view like Jackson’s is therefore that we can’t use terms like 
‘liquid’ or ‘watery stuff’ to identify a shared narrow content, because in using these 
terms we may in fact just be expressing, and attributing, different wide contents.  So, 
for Oscar, ‘liquid’ represents liquids, while for Twin Oscar it represents twin liquids.  
Hence, where ‘watery stuff’ is understood as a shorthand term, we cannot rely on this 
neologism to express a shared narrow content, since its meaning derives from that of 
the relevant descriptive terms, which, the objection contends, express wide contents.  
A similar objection is made by Lepore & Loewer (1986) who contend that ‘red’ in 
English is a natural kind term that picks out the relevant physical property on Earth. 
They consider a version of the Twin Earth scenario where ‘red’ on Twin Earth picks 
out an object with the same microphysical properties of the green objects on Earth.  
However, due to a peculiar feature of the environment, when Twin Earthers 
encounter these objects they have experiences that are the same as our experience of 
red objects.  Thus, in twin English, ‘red’ represents a different natural kind from that 
on Earth, despite intrinsic duplicates having subjectively identical colour experiences 
of these different natural kinds.  Consequently, colour terms, and by extension 
appearance terms in general, would not be suitable for expressing narrow content, 
since they, like ‘liquid’, are further natural kind terms. 
 
4.2 Responses to the argument 
The response I will make holds that if mental representations (and hence the terms in 
natural language we use to express these representations) represent the range of 
properties noted in Sections 2 and 3, then the internalist can deny that ‘liquid’, and 
even ‘red’, necessarily function to exclusively pick out natural kind properties.  In 
response to Block & Stalnaker (1999), an alternative account of ‘liquid’ is that the 




term expresses a mental representation which represents a mixture of functional and 
appearance properties, and not the underlying natural kind properties.  Thus, intrinsic 
duplicates’ LIQUID representation may pick out the same functional and appearance 
properties despite different natural kind properties at W1…Wn instantiating these 
properties.  For instance, liquids and twin liquids, by hypothesis, will appear and 
function in superficially the same way.  Thus, the point the internalist should make is 
that we can appeal to non-natural kind properties, and hold that many terms which 
externalists hold are natural kind terms, may in fact function, in part, like typical 
non-natural kind terms that pick out properties common to W1…Wn.  It is possible 
that such terms have both wide and narrow contents, thus the internalist needn’t be 
committed to the denial that LIQUID also has wide content that relates to a relevant 
natural kind property. 
 
Similarly, in response to Lepore & Loewer (1986), an alternative view would be that 
RED may be associated with several mental representations that represent different 
properties.  For instance, S’ mental representation RED may represent a dispositional 
appearance property common to objects across W1…Wn that have the same 
disposition to cause experiences with the same phenomenal character of redness in S 
and her duplicates.  S may also have a further mental representation associated with 
RED which may function to represent a relevant natural kind property, and here the 
content of intrinsic duplicates’ representations could differ.  For instance, on the  
descriptive model of narrow representation, it could be held that S’s RED represents 
the local natural kind with the relevant appearance properties.  The appeal to the 
meaning of terms in English appears to beg the question against the internalist.  If we 
understand the content of terms like ‘red’ through the mental representations they 
express, then we can reject the apparent assumption that in English terms like ‘red’ 
are natural kind terms, since there is a plausible case that they might represent a 
mixture of natural and non-natural kind properties possessed by objects with 
different underlying natural kind properties.  Consequently, we can express narrow 
content using terms like ‘liquid’ and ‘red’ because there is no good reason to hold 
that English, and the mental representations expressed by linguistic expressions, 
relate fundamentally to natural kinds. 




I will conclude this chapter by noting how this response avoids a worry with 
Chalmers’ account of narrow content.  Recall that on Chalmers’ (2003) account we 
understand the narrow content of WATER in terms of epistemically possible 
scenarios which we express by means of an idealized language that reflects the 
subject’s a priori knowledge.  A central requirement of this language is that the terms 
are semantically neutral, that is, they do not pick out different natural kinds at 
W1…Wn.  If this requirement can be met, then we can express the relevant 
epistemically possible scenarios.  Sawyer (2007) and Stalnaker (2008) contend that 
there is no such semantically neutral language available, and hence that there is no 
way to express these scenarios.  However, contrary to Chalmers claim, the internalist 
doesn’t need to appeal to an idealized, semantically neutral, language.  Instead, if we 
pay attention to the properties represented by non-natural kind terms, many of the 
terms plausibly pick out kinds that are identical across W1…Wn.  Consequently, 
terms like ‘red’, ‘liquid’, and so on, are immune to the Twin Earth argument, hence 
there is no need for the internalist to accept that we must introduce a novel language 
to express narrow content, since much of ordinary language appears to be 
semantically neutral in the required sense. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter was to show that narrow content is genuinely 
representational and to make the case for a pluralistic account of the nature of narrow 
content.  The pluralistic account was motivated by reflecting on the externalist 
accounts of Putnam (1975) and Fodor (1994) and the descriptive and informational 
accounts of narrow content that are consistent with these approaches.  Given the 
objections and limitations of each approach to narrow content considered 
individually, I suggested that a conciliatory view can be motivated by paying 
attention to the supervenience claim, the relevant mental representations, and the 
range of properties represented.  This resulted in a range of truth conditions 
associated with narrow contents in so far as different properties are represented by, 
for example, the term ‘water’ or representation WATER.  I also showed that a 
common objection to narrow content that involves redeploying the Twin Earth 
argument can be resisted.  As noted throughout the chapter, my account relies on the 




viability of pluralism about mental representations, since this provided the basis for 
allowing a variety of narrow contents that relate to the representation of different 










































In Chapter 1 I argued that some content is narrow and genuinely representational on 
the basis of a correct understanding of the internalist’s supervenience claim together 
with an account of the form of representation, the properties represented, and the 
nature of the underlying mental representations.  I proposed that narrow content 
relates to a range of natural kind and non-natural kind properties, allowing for two 
main forms of narrow representation.  However, it was assumed that mental 
representations come in a variety of forms, thus in Chapter 2 I develop and defend 
the account of pluralistic mental representations in more detail. 
 
Concept pluralism has recently been defended as the most plausible account of 
mental representations given work in empirical psychology which proponents argue 
gives rise to a pluralist account of conceptual structure and an account of the 
ontology of concepts as concrete mental representations.  Concept pluralists reject 
traditional monistic theories of concepts which treat concepts as having just a single 
structure, as well as accounts of concepts construed as abstract entities.  This 
development has an important impact on the psychological externalism/internalism 
debate, since many of the most prominent accounts in the literature defend either an 
abstract ontology of concepts and/or a monistic theory of conceptual structure.  The 
possibility of an internalist construal of concept pluralism would thereby provide a 
solid basis for defending the psychological internalist thesis if it could be shown that 
the range of structures could be individuated by their narrow contents.  One potential 
barrier to an internalist account of concept pluralism comes from a preference for 
externalism by leading proponents of pluralism.  Laurence & Margolis (1999) 




propose that Fodor’s (1994) theory of content could serve as an account of the 
relevant content responsible for the individuation of concepts.  In addition, Weiskopf 
(2007) raises two objections to internalism: the first is that narrow content is always 
subject to the Twin Earth argument (as noted in Chapter 1); the second relates to the 
inability of narrow content to play the role of cognitive content.  Against these 
externalist construals of pluralism, in this chapter I will develop and defend an 
internalist account of concept pluralism.   
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows.  In Section 2, I motivate pluralism by 
raising two lines of objection to existing externalist and internalist accounts of 
concepts.  First, concepts are typically treated as concrete mental entities in the 
psychological literature, and abstract accounts appear to be incapable of explaining 
the relevant data that a theory of concepts must explain.  Second, given the data to be 
explained, monistic theories that treat concepts as a single type of structure are 
similarly unable to handle all the relevant data.  This leaves pluralism, and the 
remaining question is whether it should be understood as fundamentally internalist or 
externalist.  To decide this question we need to know how concepts are individuated.  
I begin the positive case for internalism about general concepts in Section 3 by 
drawing on the account of narrow content from Chapter 1.  In particular, I argue that 
two of the main conceptual structures, prototype and theory structure, may be 
individuated by narrow content.  In support of this account of individuation in 
psychology I consider and reject an argument designed to show that internalist 
individuation is incompatible with psychological generalisations.  I then show, in 
Section 4, why we should take the cognitive content of concepts to be narrow. First, I 
respond to Weiskopf’s argument that cognitive content is identical to a kind of wide 
content.  I then show that the cognitive content of prototypes should be understood in 
terms of the perceptual representations encoded in perceptual templates.  I argue that 
the relevant cognitive content of these perceptual templates derives from the 
phenomenal character of relevant perceptual representations, which in turn 
supervenes on internal states.  The basis of cognitive content therefore relates to the 
thesis of phenomenal internalism.  I defend this account of cognitive content against 
two objections.  First, I consider an objection that might be raised in relation to Tye’s 




case for phenomenal externalism, and second I consider whether the resulting notion 
of narrow cognitive content is too conceptually sophisticated to play the role of 
cognitive content. 
 
2. Concepts and the psychological externalism/internalism debate 
In Section 2 I provide the basis for an internalist account of pluralism by highlighting 
problems with existing externalist and internalist accounts of concepts, and rejecting 
two externalist conceptions of pluralism.  I begin, in Section 2.1, with an overview of 
the issues relating to the individuation of concepts and the externalism/internalism 
debate.  In Section 2.2 I develop two basic arguments against existing externalist and 
internalist accounts of concepts.  The first argument makes a case based on the 
ontology of concepts.  The idea is that concepts should at least be considered as 
concrete mental entities, since this is how they are treated in empirical psychology.  
Therefore, if we adopt an abstract conception in addition to the concrete conception, 
we must account for the concrete conception.  This raises the question of why we 
should also endorse the abstract conception.  The second argument relates to the 
structure of concepts as required to explain all the data that an adequate theory of 
concepts should be able to account for.  I contend that accounts from externalists 
such as Fodor, as well as internalist’s like Prinz, should be rejected on the basis of 
being inadequate, as they can’t handle all the data a theory of concepts should 
account for.  Finally, in Section 2.3, I consider and reject two bases for an externalist 
account of pluralism from Laurence & Margolis (1999) and Weiskopf (2007; 2009). 
 
2.1 Concepts, content and the externalism/internalism debate 
Concepts are often construed as the basic units of thought.  For instance, the thought 
expressed by ‘the cat caught the bird’ is partly composed of the concepts CAT and 
BIRD.  What concepts are and how they relate to what they represent is a vexed 
question, with a wide range of accounts in the philosophical and psychological 
literature.  We can identify two basic questions that a theory of concepts should 
explain.  First, there is an ontological question which asks what kind of entities 
concepts are.  On one view, concepts are abstract entities of some kind, with the 
same concept being shared or grasped by a number of different individuals.  On 




another view, they are concrete entities, with each individual having their own 
concrete token concept.  Second, there is the question of what kind of structure 
concepts have.  For instance, on one view, the concept CAT can be understood as a 
complex concept comprised of further concepts, such as TAIL, FURRY, FELINE, 
and so on.  On another view, they lack constituent structure and are atomic, so the 
concept CAT is primitive in the sense of not being composed of further concepts.  I 
will set these two issues regarding ontology and structure aside for now. 
 
A different set of questions relate to the content of concepts.  The representational 
content of a concept can be distinguished from its cognitive content.   
Representational content is associated with what concepts are about or represent 
while cognitive content is associated with how concepts represent what they are 
about.  Consider the concept CAT.  The representational content is plausibly the 
property of being a cat, while the cognitive content reflects the manner in which that 
property is represented, such as how an individual thinks of cats as being.  The 
question of content raises an important question about when two concepts are the 
same or different, that is, how to individuate concepts.  For instance, on the concrete 
view of concepts, two subjects, S and T, may have different token CAT concepts.  
We then need some criteria for individuating their concepts.  Concepts are typically 
taken to be individuated by what they represent, thus, we may individuate the 
concept CAT by its representational content, i.e. by the property represented. 
 
A final distinction can be made between wide content and narrow content, which is 
intimately related to the issue of individuation and the representational 
content/cognitive content distinction.  As was noted in Chapter 1, wide content 
supervenes in part on factors specific to the actual environment of an individual, thus 
intrinsic duplicates on Earth and Twin Earth will have concepts with different wide 
contents.  Narrow content, on the other hand, supervenes on internal states.  With 
these distinctions in place, it is possible to understand the psychological 
externalism/internalism debate as arising in part by how representational 
content/cognitive content and wide content/narrow content intersect.  
Representational content is often held to be wide content, and externalists contend 




that intrinsic duplicates considered at worlds W1…Wn will have different wide 
contents, and therefore will be ascribed different concepts.  However, as I argued in 
Chapter 1, wide content does not have sole claim to being genuinely representational 
content, thus an internalist will contend that some representational content is narrow 
content.  On this view, where intrinsic duplicates have the same narrow content, they 
could thereby be ascribed the same concepts.  Psychological externalism and 
internalism can therefore be seen to come into conflict with regard to the 
individuation of concepts by virtue of their different treatments of content.  Thus, an 
account of the content of concepts is of central importance for resolving this debate. 
 
While externalists reject the idea that narrow content is genuinely representational, 
there is less consensus among externalists as to whether cognitive content is wide or 
narrow.  Recall that cognitive content reflects how a property is represented as being.  
Some externalists hold that while concepts have, and are individuated by, 
representational content which is wide content, they may also have cognitive content 
that is a kind of narrow content.  For instance, Laurence & Margolis (2007) allow for 
the possibility that while concepts are individuated by their wide content, they may 
have narrow content which plays the role of cognitive content, where narrow content 
is construed in terms of the narrow conceptual role of a concept.  Conceptual role 
semantics has been proposed as a fully-fledged internalist theory of conceptual 
content by Block (1986) and Loar (1988).  On this view, a concept’s content is 
defined in part by its conceptual relations to other concepts.  For instance, the content 
of CAT would be given by the concept’s relations to other concepts, such as TAIL, 
FURRY, and FELINE.  Furthermore, some externalists have expressed acceptance of 
the idea that there is a kind of narrow content that relates to the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experience (for instance Williamson, 2000).  Internalists are 
divided about what to say on the issue of representational content and cognitive 
content.  For instance, psychological internalists who take narrow content to be a 
form of representational content defend a more significant role for narrow content 
than just accounting for cognitive content.  On one view, concepts may be 
individuated by narrow content that is representational content, and the cognitive 
content of concepts is also a variety of narrow content.  Such views do not 




necessarily reject wide content.  What the psychological internalist denies is that 
wide content individuates the relevant class of concepts or plays the role of cognitive 
content. 
 
As the range of views outlined so far suggests, there is considerable disagreement 
about how to understand concepts and the notion of content.  Consequently, in so far 
as both sides of the externalism/internalism debate disagree about the fundamental 
nature of concepts, there is no simple way to decide whether externalism or 
internalism is true, given the different accounts of the basic units of thought.  To this 
end, in the next section I outline two lines of argument that raise problems for 
existing externalist and internalist accounts of concepts.  The purpose of raising these 
objections is to narrow the scope of the subsequent discussion and case for 
psychological internalism by showing that pluralism is the best account of concepts.  
With this foundation, I will then focus, in Sections 3 and 4, on showing that 
pluralism is consistent with individuation by narrow content, and that narrow content 
is best suited to playing the role of cognitive content. 
 
2.2 The ontology and structure of concepts 
It is possible to identify two dimensions along which a theory of concepts must be 
adequate.  The first is that the theory must get the ontology correct, that is, the theory 
must tell us whether concepts are abstract or concrete entities of some kind.  The 
second dimension relates to the structure of concepts, which tells us whether 
concepts have one kind of structure (monism), no structure at all (atomism), or a 
variety of structures (pluralism or hybridism
21
).  From these considerations about 
ontology and structure it is possible to identify two basic lines of objection to several 
prominent accounts of concepts in the externalism/internalism literature. 
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2.2.1 Abstract Vs concrete ontology of concepts 
Typically, theories of concepts are of two kinds: on one view, concepts are abstract 
entities where the same concept is grasped or ascribed to all members of a population.  
On another view they are concrete entities, normally taken to be realized in the 
neural architecture of the brain.  The basic case for construing concepts as concrete 
entities is that empirical work on concepts treats concepts in this way, and does so in 
order to account for data stemming from experiments concerning concepts and 
categorisation.  Both externalists (e.g. Fodor 1998) and internalists (e.g. Prinz 2000) 
defend views of concepts as concrete entities, and are motivated by issues that they 
understand as being of concern to psychologists. 
 
As an example of the concrete view, concepts have been identified with prototypes 
by psychologists (Barsalou 1987) and philosophers (Prinz 2000).  Prototype concepts 
are sets of representations of features or properties that are stored in memory.  
Prototypes were introduced in part to account for data in categorisation tasks (the 
Typicality Effect experiments) where subjects classified various kinds of objects 
based on their judgements of the typical superficial properties of a given category 
such as the category bird (Laurence & Margolis 1999).  Depending on which 
properties are judged to be typical of a category, different members of a category can 
be judged to be more or less typical of the focal category.  For instance, some birds 
will have more of the typical properties associated with an individual’s concept 
BIRD than others.  Suppose being able to fly is a typical property of birds.  In this 
case, robins may be more likely to be classified as birds than penguins are.  
Prototypes are often taken to provide a basic or default concept of a category used in 
everyday conceptual activities, by virtue of the way in which quick judgements about 
category membership prevail over more measured judgements about fundamental 
properties.  Thus, the construal of concepts as concrete arises from considering how 
subjects make classificatory judgements, which involves drawing on information 
from memory to classify objects on the basis of their typical superficial properties.  
On this view, two subjects, S and T, may have similar dispositions to classify robins, 
but differ in the extent that they would classify penguins as birds.  This could 
provisionally be accounted for by differences in the information stored in memory.   




Where concepts are construed as abstract entities of some kind, there is a worry 
about what to say about empirical work and the concrete view of concepts.  For 
instance, Burge (1979) defends an abstract account of concepts, and his view faces 
this question
22
.  On Burge’s view, concepts are identified with Fregean senses.  
Fregeans make a distinction between the sense of an expression which is objective, 
public, and grasped by different subjects, and ideas which are subjective, private, and 
specific to each subject.  Burge (1979) specifically rejects the view that we can 
identify a subject’s concepts with the subjective conception of a category as 
determined by dispositions to classify objects
23
.  Therefore, the approach to concepts 
in psychology creates a problem for philosophers like Burge who treat concepts as 
abstract entities.  In particular, the connection between the subject’s concepts and 
their judgements of category membership based on retrieving information stored in 
memory is lost.  The main worry then is that in treating concepts as abstract, 
empirical work in psychology must in some sense be considered as not really 
revealing conceptual nature.  The problem here is that the data provides very good 
reason to at least treat concepts as in one important sense concrete entities of some 
kind. 
 
One possible line of defence for proponents of the abstract view is noted by Laurence 
& Margolis (1999; 2007) who raise the possibility of construing concepts as both 
abstract and concrete entities (call this the ‘dual view’).  Concrete entities would be 
identified with concepts as construed in psychology, whilst abstract entities resemble 
something akin to Fregean senses.  The dual view is initially attractive, as it holds out 
hope of accommodating empirical work on concepts as well as Fregean intuitions 
about the distinction between public senses and an individual’s ideas.  However, 
there is a simple line of reasoning which can be used to urge the rejection of the dual 
view.  On the one hand, a proponent of the abstract view could deny the concrete 
conception relates at all to concepts, as Burge seems to do.  However, this has the 
unfavourable implication that they would thereby deny that empirical psychology has 
any bearing on the fundamental nature of concepts, which is not an attractive 
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position.    On the other hand, they could endorse the dual view as outlined above, 
where there are both abstract and concrete concepts, and provide an account of how 
they would combine.  The main problem with giving preference to the abstract 
conception is that there needs to be some convincing reason why we should allow 
two kinds of mental entities rather than one, and why the abstract conception is 
required at all if, as proponents of the concrete view will contend, the concrete view 
is sufficient for a theory of concepts.  Proponents of the dual view would then need 
to explain why we can’t treat concrete structures as the relevant mental entity, and 
perhaps deflate or reject Fregean senses altogether when discussing issues about 
concepts.  This places an explanatory burden on the proponent of the dual view to 
explain why we should allow the abstract view to take central place within a theory 
of concepts.  While this doesn’t provide a knock-down objection to abstract accounts 
of concepts, the treatment of concepts in psychology puts proponents of the abstract 
view under pressure to explain why we shouldn’t just look to psychology for the 
theory of concepts. 
 
I return to this issue of abstract and concrete views of concepts below, where I 
suggest that the two-component theorist who endorses wide and narrow contents may 
associate these with the abstract and concrete construal of concepts, and that we can 
identify two distinct roles for each account. 
 
2.2.2 Monistic Vs pluralistic conceptual structures 
As noted above, theories of concepts can also be distinguished in terms of their 
structure.  On one view, concepts have no significant structure at all (atomism), 
while the traditional approach is to treat concepts as having a single structure 
(monism).  Monism has historically been the standard view of conceptual structure, 
with the various proposals about concepts revolving around a debate as to which 
structure is the correct structure of concepts.  A third view, concept pluralism, rejects 
atomism and monism and contends that concepts should be understood in terms of a 
variety of structures, each of which can play different roles
24
. 
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Pluralists (for instance Laurence & Margolis 1999; Weiskopf 2009) make two main 
points about the data arising from the empirical literature.  The first point is that each 
of the monistic theories developed in the literature are individually inadequate 
because they cannot explain all the data.  The second point is that if we hold that a 
theory of concepts should be able to explain all the data, then we should construe 
concepts as being comprised of a range of conceptual structures which collectively 
can explain the data.  The basic argument is therefore that a theory of concepts must 
be able to account for all the data, however, since monistic theories are unable to do 
this, concepts should be identified with a variety of structures which are jointly 
necessary and sufficient for a theory of concepts.    Some of the structures typically 
included within pluralism relate to theories which psychologists and philosophers 
have previously proposed as monistic theories, for instance Weiskopf notes that: 
 
 …concepts have been identified with prototypes, bundles of exemplars, 
 theory-like structures of some sort, perceptual ‘proxytypes’, and unstructured 
 atomic symbols. (Weiskopf 2009, 1) 
 
As noted above, prototypes were introduced to account for judgements of category 
membership based on superficial features.  However, prototypes alone are unable to 
account for different ways in which categories can be conceptualized, and 
psychologists have introduced a range of other structures.  The second structure 
worth considering relates to more complex conceptualizations of categories in terms 
of fundamental properties not represented by prototypes.  Theory-theory (Laurence 
& Margolis 1999) construes concepts in terms of theory-like structures which allow 
for a far richer conception of a relevant kind, being able to encode information about 
more fundamental, perhaps hidden, properties of a category.  What pluralists like 
Laurence & Margolis (1999) and Weiskopf (2007; 2009) contend is that in 
construing concepts as having pluralistic structure, we can combine the benefits of 
each of the proposed theories in the psychological literature, and avoid their 
individual limitations.  Taking this basic line of reasoning in favour of pluralism, we 
can use this to show that several existing externalist and internalist accounts of 
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concepts as concrete entities fail to be adequate in so far as they are committed to 
atomic or monistic structure.  I will briefly consider three prominent accounts in the 
literature to demonstrate the advantages of pluralism. 
 
On Fodor’s (1998) theory, concepts are atomic entities in a Language of Thought, 
and lack constituent structure.  On this view, concepts are individuated by their 
representational content, which for Fodor (1994) is a variety of wide content.  A 
similar objection as was raised against the abstract view can be raised against atomic 
concepts.  While psychologists have treated concepts in terms of a variety of 
structures to account for different phenomena, this places the onus on Fodor to either 
explain the data via atomic concepts, or show how atomism is compatible with 
explaining the data in some other way.  Considering each of these issues is outside 
the scope of this thesis, however, the inability of atomic concepts to account for 
typicality effects suggests that Fodor’s account is at best incomplete
25
.  As noted 
above, Loar (1988) has held that concepts can be understood in terms of their 
conceptual role.  The conceptual role of a concept consists in its conceptual relations 
to other concepts, so that the conceptual role of the concept BIRD would be given by 
its conceptual relations to WING, BEAK, FEATHER, and so on.  One worry here is 
in determining what the conceptual role of a given concept is, and hence with how to 
individuate concepts on this approach (Prinz 2000).  Whereas Fodor’s theory 
individuates concepts by their representational content, which allows for 
individuation by what the concept represents, according to conceptual role theories 
we must individuate by a concept’s relations to other concepts.  However, specifying 
this is a notoriously complex issue, and may lead to a highly abstract specification of 
a concept.  Finally, as was also noted above, Prinz (2000) has defended an internalist 
account of prototypes.  To recap, prototypes represent superficial properties and are 
motivated by the typicality effect experiments.  In endorsing a monistic account of 
concepts, however, Prinz is open to the pluralist’s objection that we need other kinds 
of structure to account for all the data.  In particular, in restricting concepts only to 
prototype structure, Prinz’s account seems unable to account for the representation of 
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fundamental properties, as was noted in Chapter 1.  I have not intended to provide a 
knock-down argument against these accounts of concepts.  Instead, I aim to highlight 
the basic motivation for concept pluralism, and to draw attention to its benefits over 
other accounts, as well as to the advantages in being able to draw on a wide range of 
conceptual structures.  It is this diversity in conceptual structure which provides the 
basis for a novel account of psychological internalism as I will show in Section 3.  
 
2.3 Pluralism and externalism 
The objections to existing externalist and internalist accounts relating to ontology 
and structure provide prima facie support for concept pluralism.  Assuming for now 
that pluralism provides the best basis for a theory of concepts, the issue at stake is 
whether pluralism is fundamentally an externalist or internalist theory of concepts.  
The pluralists discussed so far take pluralism to be externalist.  However, their 
reasons for endorsing externalism can be resisted, as I will now show.  The first case 
rests on a rejection of narrow content.  Weiskopf (2007) contends that pluralism is 
fundamentally externalist by providing two objections to narrow content.  The first 
objection is the Twin Earth argument, which was rejected in Chapter 1.  I will return 
to this argument below.  The second argument relates to the individuation of 
primitive concepts, and I will consider this objection in Section 4 below after I have 
developed the internalist account of pluralism in more detail.  A positive case for an 
externalist construal comes from Laurence & Margolis (1999) who take concepts to 
be individuated by Fodor’s (1994) theory of wide content.  However, in Chapter 1 I 
noted that an account of narrow representation can be developed in keeping with 
Fodor’s general approach to content.  On Fodor’s account, wide content relates to the 
representation of properties at possible worlds.  What S’s concept C represents on 
Earth is determined by what would trigger C, in line with the asymmetric 
dependency constraint which rules-out mere lookalikes that trigger C from being 
represented by C.  What purportedly makes such content wide is that we are 
restricted to considering a certain proscribed set of counterfactuals, namely what has 
actually caused C to trigger, or what would cause C to trigger at worlds where the 
relevant natural kind property is the same as S’s actual world.  However, on the 
relational view of narrow representation, we consider what did or would cause C to 




trigger at worlds W1…Wn, i.e. the set of nomologically possible worlds that are 
superficially, though perhaps fundamentally, different.  Another problem for Fodor’s 
account is that it seems to entail that intrinsic duplicates never represent the same 
property.  Against this, it is plausible that the property of being able to fly is a 
functional property and that two creatures on Earth and Twin Earth with different 
natural kind properties may share this functional property.  Thus, when we consider a 
subject S on Earth and her intrinsic duplicate T on Twin Earth, S’s concept FLIES 
would represent a property that is also instantiated on Twin Earth, and vice versa for 
T.  This is all that is required for there to be a kind of content shared by S and her 
intrinsic duplicate T, which meets the definition of narrow content.  Consequently, 
where we individuate concepts by representational content, S and T may share the 





3. Concept pluralism and internalist individuation 
In Section 2 I outlined two objections to externalist and internalist accounts of 
concepts.  I also suggested how to respond to the externalist accounts of pluralism 
from Laurence & Margolis (1999) and Weiskopf (2007).  In Section 3 I provide a 
positive case for an internalist account of concept pluralism.  In particular, I show 
how prototypes and theory structures may be individuated by two kinds of narrow 
content identified in Chapter 1.  I then consider how the account provides a response 
to an objection which questions the consistency of internalist individuation with 
psychological generalisations in psychology. 
 
3.1 Pluralism and internalist individuation 
As noted in Section 2, some concept pluralists treat pluralism as fundamentally 
externalist.  Where concepts are individuated by their representational content, the 
externalist equates representational content with wide content. Consequently, since 
wide content supervenes in part on external factors specific to the actual environment 
of subjects, intrinsic duplicates S and T on Earth and Twin Earth would be ascribed 
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different concepts.  However, in Section 2 I noted that Laurence & Margolis (1999) 
appeal to Fodor’s (1994) account of wide content, and a problem with Fodor’s theory 
was that it doesn’t seem to rule-out narrow content.  Rather than consider other 
accounts of wide content, in this section I will provide a positive case for construing 
pluralism as being consistent with internalist individuation with respect to general 
concepts.  .  If it can be shown that general concepts comprised of prototype and 
theory structures can be individuated by narrow content consistently with the 
approach to individuation of these structures, then the internalist does not need to 
rely on rejecting each possible account of wide content. 
 
Before showing that prototypes and theory structures have, and are individuated by, 
narrow content, it will be useful to revisit the accounts of narrow representation 
developed in Chapter 1.   
 
In Chapter 1 I identified two main forms of narrow representation: informational (or 
relational) and descriptive.  It was noted that appearance properties relate to the 
relational view of narrow representation, such that S and T represent the same 
property by virtue of information-like relations to the relevant property.  The 
relational view was also taken to be suitable for representing heterogeneous kind 
properties such as a relevant property that subsumed H2O and XYZ.  For these 
properties, attention was paid to the relevant counterfactuals.  In particular it was 
held that we need to consider the actual or possible triggers of S’s concept C at 
worlds W1…Wn, since the restriction to what would cause C to trigger at S’s actual 
world was not sufficiently motivated.  In contrast, the descriptive view of narrow 
representation appealed to the idea of what a description would pick out at W1…Wn.  
The descriptive view was found to be suitable for representing natural kinds, since 
we consider what natural kind is represented at S’s actual world, and a version of the 
descriptive view can allow for the representation of non-natural kind properties 
where the relevant properties are the same at W1…Wn.  For psychological 
internalism to be true, therefore, it must be the case that the individuation of 
prototype and theory structures is consistent with supervenience* and the accounts of 




narrow representation.  To this end, in the next two sections I show how the accounts 
of narrow content from Chapter 1 sit comfortably with prototype and theory structure. 
 
3.2 The individuation of prototype structure 
Turning first to prototypes, recall that prototypes encode information about 
superficial properties, which are the properties that subjects base their judgements of 
typicality on.  Prototypes can therefore be construed as representing a category, such 
as bird, by virtue of the representation of a set of superficial properties.  We can then 
say that prototypes are individuated by the superficial properties they represent, and 
which subjects’ judgements are based on: 
 
(Prototype structure) Prototype structures are individuated by sets of superficial  
    properties 
 
What the internalist needs to show is that there is a notion of narrow content which 
can relate to the representation of superficial properties so that prototypes are 
individuated by such narrow contents.  At this point an externalist may appeal to the 
Twin Earth argument against narrow content, as Weiskopf (2007) does.  The Twin 
Earth argument is that the properties at issue are potentially natural kind properties, 
and hence that the superficial properties like being wet, red, and so on, at Earth and 
Twin Earth, relate to the different underlying natural kind (i.e. microphysical) 
properties at each world.  Thus, while prototypes represent superficial properties, the 
relevant superficial properties would be construed as being further natural kind 
properties, so that the prototypes of intrinsic duplicates would represent different 
properties, and the relevant representational content would be wide content.  
Consequently, an internalist needs to be very clear about what superficial properties 
are in order to show why they relate to narrow content.  This issue is not addressed 
by Prinz (2000) who has argued that prototypes are individuated by the appearances 
they function to detect.  Prinz uses this as a basis for the claim that intrinsic 
duplicates share prototypes because they detect the same appearances, however, we 
need more from such an account in order to avoid the externalist’s appeal to the Twin 
Earth argument. 




Focusing for now on appearance properties represented by prototypes, in Chapter 1 I 
suggested that appearances are plausibly non-natural kind dispositional properties, 
and that we can identify a notion of narrow content that relates to the representation 
of such properties.  In particular, I suggested that following Shoemaker (2006) we 
can understand appearance properties in the following way
27
.  Take an object O and 
subjects A and B with different perceptual systems.  Suppose that A and B are such 
that when A perceives O she has an experience associated with our experience of 
redness, and when B perceives O she has an experience associated with our 
experience of greenness.  O’s fundamental properties are fixed, but the appearance 
properties depend in part on how O appears to perceivers like A and B.  O has the 
disposition to cause in A and B experiential states with different phenomenal 
characters, that is, the way things appear perceptually to A and B is different.  
Shoemaker advances a particular view of phenomenal character, holding that the 
same object O can have multiple phenomenal characters in so far as O has the 
relevant dispositional property to cause relevant experiential states in subjects like A 
and B.  However, it is not obligatory to accept this account of phenomenal character, 
and here I assume a view of phenomenal character in which it relates to the relevant 
property of a subject’s perceptual experience that relates to what the experience is 
like for the subject.  I say more about phenomenal character in Section 4 below.   
 
Applying this view of appearance properties to the Twin Earth scenario, when we 
consider intrinsic duplicates S and T we can hold that objects X and Y on Earth and 
Twin Earth could be such that they have different natural kind properties but cause in 
S and T states with the same phenomenal character.  On this view, we can say that 
objects X and Y share a dispositional property to cause states with the relevant 
phenomenal character in S and T, and identify this dispositional property as the 
relevant appearance property shared by X and Y.  This would provide a suitable 
account of an appearance property that can avoid the Twin Earth argument, since the 
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same dispositional property is represented on Earth and Twin Earth, so the externalist 
cannot say that the superficial properties represented by prototypes could just be 
further natural kind properties and that S and T will represent different properties. 
 
What remains to be seen is whether these properties are consistent with how 
prototypes are individuated.  The following example serves to highlight the central 
issue at hand.  Suppose a given object O belonging to category C has the superficial 
property of appearing red.  Where a subject S judges that O belongs to C on the basis 
of O appearing to be red, the question is whether the theorist should treat this 
property as being a natural kind or a non-natural kind dispositional property.  
Answering this question provides a plausible basis for an account of what property 
S’s prototype represents, since it is that property which S bases her judgements on.   
 
The basic case in favour of S making her judgement based on a dispositional 
property can be motivated as follows.  When S encounters an object O that she is to 
classify, she makes her classificatory judgement based on the appearance properties 
of O since, in the first instance, it is the appearance of O that would be of relevance 
to S when she makes her judgement.  Consider the alternative position that S bases 
her judgements on O’s fundamental properties.  Here, S would have to be aware of 
what these properties were, which may require further investigation.  However, 
prototype structures are taken to relate to quick judgements of category membership, 
and hence S is not in a position to base her judgements on fundamental properties.   
 
Following the view outlined above, appearances are dispositional properties, so it is 
the dispositional property which is relevant to the individuation of S’s prototype.  
This suggests that a theorist would be able, in principle, to attribute the same 
prototype to S and T despite their being at worlds with different natural kind 
properties, since they base their judgements of category membership on the same 
superficial properties.  So long as we can construe superficial properties along the 
lines of these dispositional appearance properties, then the approach to individuation 
from the typicality experiments is consistent with internalism. 
 




Further examples support this account.  Judgements relating to the category bird may 
plausibly involve the superficial properties such as having wings, feathers, and a 
beak.  These could in principle relate to further superficial properties relating to 
appearances.  Where S makes her judgements of category membership on the basis 
of these appearance and functional properties, we can identify narrow content with 
this set of properties, and so S’s prototype may be individuated by the associated 
narrow content.  This view is unaffected by the Twin Earth argument.  One version 
of the argument might run as follows.  Take feathers: the externalist may contend 
that the concept FEATHER is a natural kind concept in so far as this relates to the 
representation of a property specific to a species of bird native to Earth.  The bird-
like creatures on Twin Earth, that look and act the same, are not birds, and they don’t 
have feathers.  Instead, they have twin feathers, which look and feel just like feathers, 
but have different fundamental properties.  It is important to note that the internalist 
needn’t deny that the creatures are different species and have different fundamental 
properties.  What the internalist holds is that feathers and twin feathers share 
superficial properties that relate to their appearance properties, and that S and T on 
Earth and Twin Earth plausibly have prototype concepts that represent the same set 
of superficial properties.  S and T may also have wide contents that relate to these 
different creatures, such as when they deploy singular concepts like THAT BIRD or 
THAT FEATHER.  Consequently, since prototypes relate to superficial properties, 
and these do not seem to be subject to the Twin Earth argument, prototypes are 
consistent with internalist individuation. 
 
3.3 The individuation of theory structure 
There are several problems for an internalist who commits only to prototype 
structure.  First, concept monism comes with the general problem of being unable to 
account for all the data a theory of concepts should ideally handle.  Second, where 
prototypes only represent superficial properties, it would seem that the internalist 
would thereby deny that narrow content can relate to the representation of natural 
kind properties.  As noted in Chapter 1, some internalists, such as Prinz (2000) and 
Kriegel (2008), appear to restrict narrow content only to superficial properties.  On 
this view, intrinsic duplicates can represent the same superficial properties, but their 




narrow contents cannot relate to the representation of fundamental properties like 
H2O or XYZ.  This is a large concession to externalism.  An advantage of pluralism 
is that by introducing further conceptual structures like theory structure, which relate 
to the representation of fundamental properties, there is scope for a more extensive 
internalist position that would allow narrow content to relate to the representation of 
a variety of fundamental properties. 
 
In Section 3.2, I outlined the informational and descriptive views of narrow 
representation.  These were taken to be suitable for representing both natural kind 
and heterogeneous kind properties.  The problem identified in Chapter 1 for existing 
views was two-fold.  First, I suggested that we should permit both forms of 
representation, allowing different mental representations to be suitable for 
representing natural kinds and heterogeneous kinds, and hence that the internalist 
should not restrict narrow content to one or the other.  Second, I noted that existing 
accounts fail to provide adequate support for the psychological basis for this content 
and the relevant mental representations.  In particular, I noted problems for 
Chalmers’ (2003) accounts that relies on the notion of epistemic space, and Jackson’s 
(2003a) which holds that subjects like Oscar in the Twin Earth scenario possess 
natural kind concepts of some form that represent the local natural kind.  Thus, in the 
rest of Section 3.3 I show how the two forms of narrow representation are consistent 
with the notion of theory structure, and hence that this provides a plausible basis for 
the view developed in Chapter 1. 
 
To recap the descriptive view, narrow content provides a rule or condition that picks 
out the property represented.  On this view, narrow content operates as a determiner 
on what is represented at a context.  For instance, on Jackson’s (2003a) account, the 
narrow content of WATER can be expressed as ‘the actual watery stuff of S and her 
colinguals’ acquaintance’.  The narrow content of intrinsic duplicates’ concepts will 
be the same, however, considered at their relevant contexts, i.e. their respective 
actual worlds, the description functions to pick out different kinds which play the 
role of watery stuff at these worlds, i.e. H2O on Earth and XYZ on Twin Earth.  As 
noted in Chapter 1, what was lacking on descriptive views was a convincing 




treatment of narrow content that would satisfy the externalist who denies that our 
concepts have such content.  The worry relates to both the nature of the descriptions, 
and the two-dimensionalist’s treatment of such content.  On Jackson’s (2003a) view, 
the narrow content of S’s WATER concept picks out H2O by virtue of the narrow 
content functioning to pick out the actual watery stuff of S and her colinguals’ 
acquaintance.  The main worry is with regard to where these descriptions come from 
and why we should believe that concepts encode this sort of descriptive information. 
 
An important question is why we should think that a subject’s concepts have a kind 
of content that relates to descriptive representations at all.  In particular, linking a 
subject’s WATER concept to content that relates to the notion of one’s actual world, 
seems to require a high level of conceptual sophistication on the part of the subject, 
or reliance on such a subject having appropriate representational intentions to pick 
out a unique natural kind.  It is a substantive thesis what kind of descriptive 
information, if any, our concepts encode, and the mere fact that we can identify a 
description that would work in this way is not the same thing as identifying a genuine 
kind of content of normal subjects’ concepts.  There is a worry then that the view can 
appear to be ad hoc since the  descriptive components are introduced specifically to 
save the internalist’s view that there is a kind of content that is narrow and relates to 
natural kind representation.  What would support the proponent of a descriptive 
account of narrow content would be some reason to think that concepts either 
explicitly or tacitly encode descriptive information that can function in this manner 
to pick out natural kind properties.  To this end, in the rest of Section 3.3 I will 
outline how theory structure may relate to two kinds of narrow content in a way 
which sits comfortably with the construal of theory structures within concept 
pluralism. 
 
In Section 2, theory structures were described as theory-like entities that encode 
information about essential or fundamental properties of categories.  The 
representational content of theory structures should therefore be understood in terms 
of the relevant fundamental properties that they function to represent.  Consequently, 




theories should be individuated by these fundamental properties.  We can gloss the 
individuation claim as: 
 
(Theory structure) Theory structures are individuated by fundamental properties 
 
I will focus on natural kind and heterogeneous kind properties which are plausibly a 
variety of fundamental property.  It is possible to identify two ways in which a 
plausible internalist account of theory structure can facilitate the representation of 
these properties: 
 
(1) Descriptions that pick out natural kind and heterogeneous kind properties 
(2) Relational representation of heterogeneous kind properties 
 
One way to motivate the descriptive account is to understand how theory structures 
are taken to represent.  A common approach is to understand theory structures in 
terms of bodies of knowledge, and to liken them to theoretical terms (Laurence & 
Margolis 1999).  A second approach is to see them as relating to subjects’ 
conceptualization of categories in terms of essential or fundamental properties, which 
are typically hidden or unknown.  For instance, Medin & Ortony (1989) introduced a 
version of theory structure to account for the tendency to conceptualize certain kinds 
on the basis of such essential properties, even where knowledge of the specific 
essences is unknown.  Examples are easy to find, such as where knowledge that the 
watery stuff on Earth is composed of H2O has not been acquired, or where the 
specific essential properties of tigers is unknown, yet it is believed that both water 
and tigers have some kind of essential properties. 
 
With this background in place, a first pass at S’s theory associated with WATER, or 
BIRD, might be the X with hidden properties that explain the superficial properties.  
Here, S links the hidden properties to the superficial properties of which she is aware, 
and relates the former to the latter.  Put this way, the account does not obviously 
support the representation of a natural kind.  To get this, we would treat ‘the X’ in 
terms of the unique local X, or the actual X of my acquaintance.  The motivation here 




might be that we can understand S as tacitly intending to represent the unique X’s 
around her, at her world (as suggested by Jackson 2003a).  Thus, duplicates will have 
the same intention to pick out the X around them, and this will then relate to different 
X’s in so far as ‘the actual’ functions as a reference-determiner at a context.  
However, this account requires support for the claim that subjects typically intend to 
represent a unique X.  To believe that there is a unique hidden essence is to already 
attribute tacit beliefs that correspond to the representation of a local natural kind.  
This is partly why the relevant reference-determining component was incorporated 
within the narrow content, since the motivation was to explain the externalist’s 
intuition that a unique natural kind was represented at each of W1…Wn. 
 
Suppose we ignore the relevant reference-determining component.  It would then be 
plausible that what is directly encoded within a subject’s theory is merely that there 
are essential properties that explain the superficial properties of which the subject is 
acquainted.  If this is the case, then the description would fail to pick out a unique 
natural kind.  This is because the same superficial properties considered across 
worlds W1…Wn relate to kinds with different hidden essences, for instance H2O, 
XYZ, or birds and twin birds, and so on.  This would lend support to the view that 
certain subjects have token WATER theory concepts that represent a heterogeneous 
kind, which would subsume H2O, XYZ, and any other kind with relevant superficial 
properties.  Where S’s theory structure represents a heterogeneous kind, both forms 
of narrow representation will get the desired result.  For instance, where S’s theory 
structure for WATER relates to certain unknown essential properties, the property 
represented can be determined either descriptively, so that whatever X at W1…Wn 
satisfies the description is represented, or relationally, so that whatever triggers 
WATER at W1…Wn is represented by WATER.  
 
This potential proliferation of concepts, and forms of representation, should not be a 
concern to the concept pluralist.  Where prototypes and theory structures relate to the 
information encoded in memory, we should allow that there could be conceptual and 
representational variation between subjects and kinds of conceptual structures.  Only 
once there has been adequate empirical investigation of the range of theories 




possessed by subjects will many of these issues be resolved.  Thus, I tentatively 
conclude that pluralism is consistent with theory structures that represent both natural 
kind and heterogeneous kind properties.  Subject to empirical investigation regarding 
the specific essence beliefs of different subjects, pluralism leaves it open as to 
whether a unique natural kind or a more heterogeneous kind is represented by a 
particular subject’s theory structure, hence both views are compatible with concept 
pluralism.  This suggests that internalists should be willing to countenance a range of 
narrow contents that relate to different kinds of mental representations as well as 
different representational mechanisms, rather than rely on just one kind of property, 
and one form of narrow representation. 
 
3.4 Concept pluralism and pluralistic representation 
The view I am defending is that a given subject’s concept, such as WATER, which is 
comprised of a variety of conceptual structures, may lend itself to representing a 
range of different properties.  This arises because each of the different conceptual 
structures may relate to the representation of different properties, while each of the 
conceptual structures mutually comprise the subject’s single concept WATER. 
 
This contrasts with a view accord to which S’s concept WATER would represent 
H2O, while the other pieces of information she associates with the concept may 
represent other properties. On this view, the concept would not itself represent 
plurally, and it would be the diverse pieces of information, perhaps stored in a mental 
file, that related to a plurality of properties being represented by S. This is one 
contrast that the pluralist view makes with, say, a Burgean distinction between 
concepts and conceptual explication, where S and T may share their concept but may 
also have different theories/conceptual explications. The concept pluralist takes the 
different theories/explications to relate to distinct conceptual structures that partly 
comprise the subject’s concept itself. 
 
My suggestion is that if we understand mental representations in the way concept 
pluralists do, as concrete mental entities comprised of a range of conceptual 
structures, then where each conceptual structure associated with that concept may 




relate to a different property being represented (such as deeper or more superficial 
properties), then we get the idea of mental representations representing plurally. Now, 
the view is not that a token concept such as a specific conceptual structure, like 
prototype structure, will represent plurally.  The claim is rather that a wide range of 
concepts are plausibly comprised of a range of conceptual structures, and thus the 
mental representation associated with, say, the expression ‘WATER’, represents 
plurally in so far as the concept WATER (belonging to a relevant subject) is 
comprised of a range of conceptual structures each of which represent different 
properties.  For example, S’s theory structure may represent H2O, while her 
prototype may represent watery stuff (comprised of a set of superficial properties like 
being clear, thirst-quenching, etc).  It is the composite mental entity WATER that 
represents plurally, but each constituent conceptual structure represents individually. 
 
It is worth noting that many concepts are complexes comprised of primitive concepts.  
For instance, WATER may be comprised in part by various primitive appearance-
based concepts.  Where each of the constituent primitives may individually represent 
different properties, WATER may then represent each of these individual properties, 
as well relating to the representation of, say, watery stuff or H2O. 
 
Above, I noted that the linguistic token ‘water’ may express the concept WATER.  
Where S’s concept WATER is associated with a range of structures, S’s term ‘water’ 
may then be used on different occasions to express any of these conceptual structures.  
In this way, concept pluralism supports a kind of linguistic pluralism, where terms in 
natural language may systematically represent different properties depending on 
which conceptual structure the speaker uses the term to express, and what property 
that structure represents. 
 
3.5 Internalist individuation and psychological generalisations 
One important objection internalist accounts of concept individuation face is that it is 
incompatible with assumptions about the ascription of concepts in psychology.  In 
particular, so the objection goes, if we individuate concepts by narrow content that 
supervenes on intrinsic properties, then there is a risk that the differences in intrinsic 




properties of different subjects will be such that there will be hardly any concepts 
shared at all.  The worry is that this runs against a preference for generalisations in 
psychology, where the goal is to identify the concept of an X and generalise across 
the population, thereby ascribing that concept to all members of the population.
28
  
The objection then is that empirical psychology should be construed as identifying, 
say, the prototype BIRD, or a theory structure for WATER, which is ascribed to all 
subjects of the relevant population under study.  Thus, the objection to my account 
would be that it is too liberal in permitting subjects to possess different token BIRD 
prototypes in so far as the superficial properties they associate with the category are 
different.  However, I am not forced into holding a view at odds with psychology, as 
I will now explain. 
 
The first point to note is that it is not clear that psychology is committed to 
identifying a single prototype for each category that is ascribed to each individual.  
The approach to the individuation of prototypes is compatible with holding that 
subjects possess distinct prototypes in so far as they make different judgements of 
typicality.  For instance, applying the procedure for different individuals, we could 
get different results about what their concept BIRD represents.  In further support of 
this point, we can understand psychology as being concerned with the basic concrete 
conceptual structure and hence with how category information is represented by 
subjects.  This would facilitate the identification of conceptual structures, which 
would then allow significant generalisation across a population in terms of what kind 
of conceptual structure to attribute.  We should therefore understand pluralism as 
individuating concepts construed as concrete tokens of structural types like 
prototypes and theories.  When we talk about S’s prototype, it is a concrete token and 
it can differ from T’s by virtue of differences in the associated narrow content.  S and 
T’s prototypes are different tokens of the same structural type, namely prototype 
concepts.  Prototype concepts as a type encode information about typical features.  
This is perfectly consistent with some variation in content (the superficial properties 
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represented) among subjects who may otherwise share a type of prototype concept.  
This may fall short of attributing the exact same conceptual structure, however, there 
is no prima facie good reason to think that this is mandatory, and even externalists 
about concept individuation like Weiskopf (2007) appear to permit significant 
variation between the concepts of subjects. 
 
In Section 2.2.1 above, I introduced the dual view which contends that concepts may 
be both abstract and concrete entities in some sense.  While the response to the 
generalisations objection above could be pursued, the two-component theorist can 
appeal to wide and narrow contents and the dual view of concepts.  The advantage of 
this response is that it incorporates much of the externalist’s view, whilst preserving 
the centrality of narrow content. 
 
On the pluralist view, S and T’s WATER concepts are comprised of a variety of 
conceptual structures, and the constituents of their concepts may represent the same 
superficial properties.  What makes these constituents relate to an individual’s 
concept WATER is that they relate to the same thing.  Thus, where S’s WATER 
represents watery stuff, the constituent conceptual structures comprising her 
WATER concept are constituents of that concept because they relate to this higher-
level heterogeneous kind.  The kind watery stuff is individuated in part by its 
superficial properties.  Hence S’s token concept WATER is understood on the 
pluralist view as a complex comprised of constituents which relate to the kind watery 
stuff. 
 
With this in place, we can now say that S and T could have WATER concepts which 
represent the same kinds, and hence both possess tokens of a watery stuff concept.  
With regard to the wide contents of S and T’s WATER concepts, we might say that 
where S and T’s wide contents are the same, then they can be ascribed the same 
abstract concept, even where their concepts have different narrow contents.  Thus, 
while S and T may possess distinct token concrete watery stuff concepts, they may 
also both be ascribed the same abstract water concepts (such as where their wide 
contents both relate to H2O, or where both their narrow contents relate to the same 




kind).  This can be understood as appealing to an abstract concept as a way of 
making convenient psychological generalisations, for instance, despite variation in 
the concrete tokens, we can say that S and T both possess the concept of water, or of 
watery stuff, in so far as their wide and/or narrow contents relate to the same thing.  
However, it is important to distinguish this informal way of comparing and grouping 
individuals by way of an abstract view of concepts, from an account of the specific 
token concepts these subjects possess which will relate to each of their particular 
concrete conceptual structures. 
 
This abstract conception can serve as the public concept, which in turn relates to the 
public language meaning of the term ‘bird’.  While each subject has their own mental 
representation, we can talk meaningfully of speakers of English who intend to 
express the same public concept.  But we should not confuse this informal way of 
talking with subjects’ concepts construed as concrete mental representations.  This is 
reserved for the concrete view, which allows that talk of shared public concepts 
being grasped may belie substantive differences in the conceptual structures of S and 
T, even where their different structures ultimately relate to the representation of the 
same property. 
 
4. Cognitive content, conceptual role and perceptual templates 
In Section 3 I suggested that some of the conceptual structures that comprise a 
pluralist theory of concepts can be individuated by representational content that is a 
kind of narrow content.  As noted in Section 2, concepts have both representational 
content and cognitive content.  In Section 4 I develop an approach to narrow 
cognitive content suitable for the concept pluralist framework.  However, such a 
view faces a number of problems.  In particular, while some externalists about 
concept individuation allow that cognitive content may be a form of narrow content, 
Weiskopf (2007) provides an argument against equating cognitive content with 
narrow content based on the cognitive content of primitive concepts, the basic units 
which combine to form complex concepts.  If Weiskopf is right, then narrow content 
can’t play the role of cognitive content.  This would be a significant consequence, 
since many internalists and externalists tend to restrict the role of narrow content 




specifically to the role of cognitive content.  Thus, before developing the notion of 
narrow cognitive content, I consider Weiskopf’s argument.  I will show that it can be 
rejected, and that cognitive content is most plausibly a kind of narrow content.  I then 
develop the notion of narrow cognitive content in more detail and consider two 
possible objections to the view. 
 
4.1 Weiskopf against narrow cognitive content 
As noted in Section 2, Weiskopf’s (2007) rejection of narrow content on the basis of 
the Twin Earth argument can be rejected by highlighting how some narrow content 
relates to dispositional properties that are the same at possible worlds W1…Wn.  
However, Weiskopf provides an alternative argument intended to show that cognitive 
content can’t be narrow content.  Weiskopf’s argument relates to the nature of 
primitive concepts.
29
  The basic notion of a primitive concept can be understood as 
follows. Primitive concepts are what complex concepts are comprised of.  
Primitiveness relates to the idea that the concept cannot be further decomposed into 
more basic concepts.  Where a prototype concept like CAT represents a set of 
superficial properties, we may construe certain members of that set of superficial 
properties as relating to primitive concepts.  One such concept might be FURRY. 
 
Weiskopf’s argument is as follows.  The cognitive content (CC) of primitive 
concepts is given by their representational content (RC), that is, how they represent is 
given entirely by what they represent.  Now, according to Weiskopf, RC is typically 
a kind of wide content.  So, since CC = RC for primitives, and RC = wide content, 
then CC = wide content.  It follows that the CC of complexes composed of primitive 
concepts will also be wide content, since the CC of complexes derives from the CC 
of primitives, which is wide content.  The first response is to draw attention to 
Weiskopf’s (2007, p20) commitment to the assumption that narrow content can’t be 
RC, where he notes that “R-content is a form of wide content, as reference is usually 
taken to be”.  I have shown in Chapter 1 and Section 3 above that narrow content can 
be RC.  The RC of both prototypes and theory structures can be a kind of narrow 
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content, thus we should reject this assumption.  Given the account of narrow content 
developed above, it seems natural to hold that the RC of certain primitives will be 
narrow content.  Consider colour primitives.  The concept RED itself may not be a 
primitive concept, as it plausibly relates to the representation of a specific 
microphysical property.  REDNESS, on the other hand, relates to the primitive 
colour experience of redness.  Suppose then that the CC of REDNESS is given by its 
RC.  On the dispositional view of appearances, the RC is given by the dispositional 
property represented that can be understood as the disposition to cause experiences 
with a certain phenomenal character.  In order to generate Weiskopf’s conclusion, it 
would have to be the case that these properties relate to wide content and not narrow 
content, however, I have shown in Chapter 1 and Section 3 above that there are good 
reasons to think that dispositional properties relate to narrow content. 
 
The second point to make is that it is not clear why the CC of primitives must be 
given by RC.  CC tells us how a property is represented as being by a subject’s 
concept, thus it relates to something like Frege’s notion of a mode of presentation of 
the referent.  In Chapter 1 I noted that the mode of presentation can be understood in 
terms of a rule for determining reference or a condition that something must satisfy 
to be the referent.  Another feature of modes of presentation is to reflect the cognitive 
value or significance of an expression, thus modes of presentation also play a 
cognitive role in reflecting the way a subject thinks of the referent of an expression.  
While the Fregean view makes the mode of presentation play a role in determining 
what is represented, this semantic role does not itself tell us about the cognitive role 
of providing a way in which the referent is represented as being.  Thus, if we treat the 
CC of primitive concepts as relating only to RC, there is a worry that we have not 
been told anything about how the relevant property is represented as being, which is 
what we are mostly interested in when considering the CC of a primitive concept like 
REDNESS.  We should therefore distinguish what is represented (RC) from the 
cognitive role of the primitive concept (CC).  We can then deny that RC=CC for 
primitives (or that RC provides the CC of all primitives).  Considering REDNESS 
again, we can take the RC to be narrow content (the dispositional appearance 
property), without holding that the CC must strictly relate to what is represented.  




The RC relates to a dispositional property, whereas the CC (understood in terms of 
the mode of presentation of the relevant property) may relate only to how that 
property is represented subjectively as being.  This latter point would require only an 
account of the mode of presentation itself, i.e. the phenomenal character associated 
with experiences of red things, and not the property represented by the concept.  An 
internalist who holds that the mode of presentation of a property supervenes only on 
intrinsic properties could therefore deny that CC = RC for primitives and complexes. 
 
4.2 Conceptual role and perceptual templates 
Having shown that we can reject Weiskopf’s argument against narrow cognitive 
content, I turn now to how we should understand the cognitive content of prototype 
concepts.  I suggested that we should not focus on representational content in order 
to understand cognitive content.  This seems to cohere with the view of Laurence & 
Margolis (2007) who have suggested that cognitive content could be narrow content 
understood in terms of conceptual role semantics (CRS).  However, CRS has been 
rejected by internalists for being too abstract as an account of concepts (Prinz 2000), 
and being unable to account for the cognitive content of perceptually-based concepts 
(Loar 2003).  The first worry is that this leads to a highly abstract specification of a 
concept in terms of relations to other concepts.  In addition, CRS fails to account for 
representational content, since we are not told how a concept like CAT can be about 
cats if the concept is individuated by its conceptual role.   The problem I want to 
focus on here is Loar’s (2003) worry with CRS as a basis for cognitive content.  The 
problem here can be understood by considering what it would mean to account for 
cognitive content by conceptual role.  Conceptual role relates to the relations a 
concept has with other concepts, so that we are to understand the cognitive content of 
BIRD in terms of its relations to relevant concepts, such as WING, FEATHER, 
FLIES, and so on.  When S deploys her BIRD concept, the cognitive content of the 
concept is given by that concept’s relations to these other concepts.  According to 
Loar (2003) the worry with this approach is that this leaves something important out 
of cognitive content, in particular it doesn’t seem to tell us how S is thinking of the 
relevant property.  For instance, in citing the typical properties of the category bird, 
we are not told how these contribute to the way S is thinking of birds.  As already 




noted, it is useful to understand cognitive content in terms of Frege’s notion of the 
mode of presentation of the referent.  On a Fregean view, an expression like ‘bird’ 
has both sense and reference, where the sense relates to the mode of presentation of 
the referent, reflecting the cognitive value of ‘bird’.  The mode of presentation is 
how the referent is presented as being, thus we can understand cognitive content in 
terms of the way a subject is thinking of the referent of a concept.  What is therefore 
missing on CRS as an account of cognitive content is how the relations to other 
concepts contribute to the mode of presentation of the relevant kind represented.  The 
worry is that conceptual role alone is unable to tell us much about S’s perspective on 
the world. 
 
Loar’s (2003) suggestion was to appeal to phenomenal intentionality.  Phenomenal 
intentionality is the purported phenomenal character associated with intentionality, 
that is, a distinctive phenomenal character of a state’s being about or representing 
what it is about.  On Loar’s version of phenomenal intentionality, it relates to the 
phenomenal character of the intentionality of occurent perceptual experiences. 
30
  
However, this doesn’t seem to give us what we want in terms of the mode of 
presentation or cognitive content of concepts. 
 
An alternative approach to cognitive content that provides a more suitable notion of 
the mode of presentation of the kind represented can be developed by considering the 
relevant conceptual structures available to concept pluralists.  Returning to 
prototypes and the typicality experiments, it is held that subjects make their 
judgements about category membership on the basis of superficial properties such as 
appearance properties.  We can understand this in the following way.  S is presented 
with an object O, and forms relevant perceptual representations of O.  When S 
perceives or detects an O and classifies O as a C, this is based in part on the 
information encoded in memory which furnishes S with the relevant disposition to 
classify O’s under C.  Such information thereby relates directly to her prototype of 
C’s. 
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This model of prototypes provides an alternative basis for cognitive content to that of 
conceptual role.  Where conceptual role would account for cognitive content purely 
in terms of citing the relevant concepts that the focal concept was related to, with 
prototype structures we can appeal to the perceptual information stored in memory.  
Consider again the concept BIRD.  When S classifies an instance of the category, 
this judgement is based on the perceptual data from her perceptual representations 
matching the information encoded in memory.  S’s prototype encodes information 
about the various appearance properties of typical birds, such as those relating to the 
superficial properties of wings, beaks, feathers, and so on.  We can group this 
information together using the notion of a perceptual template.
 31
  The perceptual 
template for S’s BIRD prototype will thus encode all the typical appearance 
properties S associates with the category, which derive from her perceptual 
representations of those properties.  This perceptual information can then directly 
serve as the basis for the cognitive content of S’s prototype concept.  Perceptual 
templates are created when subjects form perceptual representations of various 
category features.  For instance, on encountering a robin, a perceptual template is 
created in memory which encodes information relating to the appearance properties 
detected.  On this view, the cognitive content of prototype concepts is understood in 
terms of the contents of perceptual templates.  Such content is at base perceptual or 
experiential, which coheres with prototypes being representations of appearance 
properties. 
 
In order for perceptual templates to provide a basis for a notion of narrow cognitive 
content, it needs to be shown that we can individuate the relevant templates narrowly, 
such that the resulting cognitive content supervenes on intrinsic properties.  Given 
the architectural relation between perceptual representations and the cognitive 
content of concepts through the mechanism of a perceptual template, there is a 
constitutive connection between how things appear in perceptual representations of a 
category and the cognitive content of a concept of that category.  The case for the 
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narrowness of cognitive content can be based on the claim that the cognitive content 
of perceptual templates and the relevant perceptual representations comes from the 
phenomenal character of those representations.  If phenomenal character is narrow, 
and this provides the mode of presentation associated with the perceptual 
representation, which then provides the basis for the mode of presentation associated 
with the perceptual templates, then at base the cognitive content of concepts will be 
narrow.  The argument for narrow cognitive content therefore depends on the truth of 
phenomenal internalism: the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intrinsic 
properties.  To this end, in Section 4.3 I motivate the case for phenomenal 
internalism. 
 
4.3 Perceptual templates and phenomenal internalism 
In Section 4.3 I do two things.  First, I make the case that the mode of presentation 
that derives from perceptual representations can be understood in terms of the mode 
of presentation related to the underlying perceptual experiences which plausibly 
supervene only on intrinsic properties, specifically in terms of phenomenal character.  
Second, I argue that nothing external fixes phenomenal character (or, hence, mode of 
presentation) other than causally, so mode of presentation (or cognitive content) 
cannot be identified with wide content. 
 
In Section 4.2 I outlined how to relate modes of presentation to prototypes through 
the mechanism of perceptual templates.  What needs to be shown is how the 
perceptual base can play the required role of modes of presentation, i.e. reflecting 
how things are represented as being.  The mode of presentation associated with 
perceptual templates can be associated with perceptual phenomenology because the 
phenomenal character of a given perceptual representation reflects what it is like to 
be in that state, i.e. how things seem to the subject subjectively.  This includes the 
kinds of experiences associated with vision, audition, and the other perceptual 
modalities.  Internalism about modes of presentation will then depend on whether 
phenomenal internalism is true, which is the thesis that the phenomenal character of 
perceptual representations supervenes on intrinsic properties.  That is, fixing intrinsic 
properties fixes the phenomenology of a given perceptual state. 




Phenomenal internalism enjoys considerable support in the literature on perception 
and representation.  Different forms of the thesis are traceable to proponents of 
qualia (the purportedly non-representational aspects of experience directly 
responsible for phenomenal character) who see qualia as intrinsic properties (e.g. 
Block 1990), as well as proponents of phenomenal intentionality who contend that 
there is a kind of representation that is based on phenomenology which is seen as a 
genuinely internalist kind of representation (Horgan & Tienson 2002; Loar 2003; 
Chalmers 2006a; Kriegel 2008; Farkas 2008a).  There are, of course, critics of the 
view such as Tye (2000) who deny that phenomenal character is intrinsic.  I consider 
Tye’s view in Section 4.4 below, but first I make the positive case for thinking that 
phenomenology supervenes on intrinsic properties of individuals and is a suitable 
basis for narrow cognitive content. 
 
Phenomenal internalism entails that any intrinsic duplicate of a subject S, who is 
currently in a perceptual state with a given phenomenal character E, will also be in a 
relevant state with E.  According to this view, nothing external, including differences 
in distal causes or embedding environments, can lead to any differences in S and her 
duplicate’s phenomenal character E.  Several cases appear to support this view.  
Consider a variation of the Twin Earth scenario involving Earth and Inverted Earth.  
On Earth, S perceives a red ball with the relevant objective microphysical properties 
that cause experiences of redness in S.  On Inverted Earth, T perceives a green ball 
with the relevant objective physical properties that would ordinarily cause 
experiences of greenness in S and T on Earth.  However, a peculiar feature of 
Inverted Earth is that there are atmospheric irregularities that when T perceives these 
objectively green objects, T is caused to be put into a perceptual state normally 
associated with experiences of red things.  Thus, S and T can be intrinsic duplicates, 
and have experiences as of a red ball in front of them, despite T’s state being caused 
by a ball that has the relevant objective microphysical properties of green objects.  It 
seems that given their status as intrinsic duplicates, it is natural to see S and T as 
being in states with identical phenomenal characters, since both are plausibly in 
states with a phenomenal character pertaining to a reddish ball.  The upshot is that 
what matters for phenomenal character is not what is causally responsible for putting 




a subject into a given state, but how that state translates to subjective experiences 
with a distinctive phenomenology. 
 
Suppose that S’s brain is duplicated molecule for molecule by a mad scientist who 
creates an intrinsic replica of S’s brain and stores it in a vat.  If S and the brain-in-a-
vat (BIV) are in identical states at time t, then when S enjoys a perceptual experience 
of an evening sunset, from the BIV’s perspective things will appear to be exactly the 
same as from S’s perspective.  When S focuses her eyes on the waning light, the BIV 
is caused by the mad scientist to have relevant experiences as of focusing its eyes in 
an identical way.  The upshot is that despite the BIV not having normal causal 
relations to an environment and having no perceptual system, it can still be in brain 
states that have the exact same phenomenal character as that of S’s perceptual states. 
 
What these cases show is that there is good reason to think that phenomenal 
character supervenes on intrinsic properties, and hence that phenomenal internalism 
is true, so that when intrinsic properties are fixed, the phenomenal character is also 
fixed.  What underlies support for this view is the intuition that what accounts for 
how things seem in perceptual experience are primarily the internal structures of the 
brain and perceptual system.  Thus, BIVs can be in states with a given phenomenal 
character despite having no perceptual contact with anything.  What matters for 
things seeming a certain way is only that the BIV’s brain is in a certain state.  This is 
true also of Inverted Earthers who are in the same internal state as Earthers, and 
enjoy similar subjective experiences, despite being put into that state by causal 
relations to objects with different objective microphysical properties.  On this view, 
what ultimately matters for things appearing a certain way in perception is how S’s 
head is at a certain time.  If this is right, then modes of presentation are narrow as 
they are provided by the phenomenal character of perceptual representations that 
supervene on intrinsic properties that are shared by intrinsic duplicates. 
 
What drives this position is the idea that intrinsic states are both necessary and 
sufficient for being in a state with a given phenomenal character.  Such states are 
necessary since having intrinsic states is required to facilitate phenomenology.  They 




are sufficient, since nothing external appears to be required to be in a state with a 
certain phenomenal character, other than causally.  This comprises an argument for 
the narrowness of the mode of presentation of perceptual representations: 
 
(1) Intrinsic properties are necessary to be in a state with phenomenal character 
(2) Intrinsic properties are sufficient, since nothing external is required to be in a 
state with phenomenal character, other than causally 
(3) Therefore, intrinsic states are both necessary and sufficient for phenomenal 
character, so phenomenology is narrow 
 
If the argument succeeds then externalism about modes of presentation based on 
perceptual phenomenology would be false.  One possible objection might be that a 
genuine mode of presentation must be a mode of presentation of something, so a BIV 
has no mode of presentation, and we should distinguish Inverted Earthers’ mode of 
presentation from Earthers’ mode of presentation.  The sufficiency claim would then 
be false because concepts only have modes of presentation if they are genuine 
representations, and hence the mode of presentation (cognitive content) of the 
relevant concept cannot be separated from the representational content of the relevant 
concept.  If this was true, then a BIV could not have a genuine mode of presentation, 
and the mode of presentation of an Inverted Earther would relate to the different 
representational content of her perceptual representation, namely the objectively 
green object.  However, the point to note in response is that given the account of 
narrow content developed in Chapter 1 and Section 3, an internalist can hold that 
Earthers and Inverted Earthers represent the same appearance properties.  The 
treatment of the BIV would be slightly different, since an internalist could say that 
the BIV fails to represent anything at all (or perhaps only features of the relevant 
simulation), so its states lack representational content, but can still have cognitive 
content.  Consequently, the argument can be accepted without serious difficulties 
arising. 
 
Before considering objections to the view developed in Section 3 and 4, I want to 
briefly explain how the defence of phenomenal internalism supports the view in 




Section 4.1 that the cognitive content of concepts is narrow.  The cognitive content 
of prototypes derives from the stored information in memory, which relates to the 
perceptual representations of the relevant properties.  Since the modes of 
presentation associated with the perceptual states relate to the phenomenology of 
these states, and the cognitive content associated with concepts derives directly from 
this information stored in memory, the cognitive content likewise supervenes on 
these intrinsic properties.  Consider the prototype BIRD.  When S encounters an 
instance of the category, S goes into a state with phenomenal character E, relating to 
the relevant appearance properties her perceptual system detects.  The mode of 
presentation of S’s perceptual state is given by E, and E is encoded into memory.  
When S deploys her prototype concept BIRD, thinking of typical appearance 
properties, she retrieves the relevant perceptual data, and this provides the 
mechanism which facilitates S thinking of the category in a certain way, her 
cognitive content. 
 
As noted in Section 2 and 3, the internalist account developed here is consistent with 
a two-component theory of content which allows that there is also wide content.  The 
proponent of narrow content can allow that perceptual experiences have wide content 
and narrow content, while holding that narrow content best reflects how things are 
represented as being to the subject and is therefore most suitable for playing the role 
of cognitive content.  Despite the plausibility of phenomenal internalism, some 
philosophers have tried to reject the supervenience claim and hold a view according 
to which phenomenal character partly supervenes on extrinsic properties.  Tye (2000) 
defends a version of this view and if correct, then the case for internalism about 
modes of presentation would be undermined, thus it is crucial to consider Tye’s 
position which I will do in Section 4.4. 
 
4.4 Phenomenal externalism 
A possible objection to phenomenal internalism is to contend that in some sense the 
phenomenal character of perceptual states is individuated broadly.  Tye (2000) has 
defended an externalist view of phenomenal character, and in this section I consider 
whether that view serves as a convincing objection to phenomenal internalism.  




According to Tye (2000), the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences is 
identical to the content of the relevant experience.  On this view, where content is 
wide, intrinsic duplicates will be in states with different phenomenal characters 
because the phenomenal characters of their identical internal states are individuated 
by the different wide content of their states.  Despite things being subjectively 
indistinguishable to such subjects, the fact of their being in identical internal states 
does not guarantee that the phenomenal characters of their states are identical.  If this 
view is correct, then phenomenal internalism is false because differences in the 
environment, here reflected in the different wide content, result in differences in the 
phenomenal character of duplicates’ states.  With regard to the argument above, 
Tye’s approach would involve rejecting point (2) on the sufficiency of intrinsic states, 
since if phenomenal character is identical to a kind of wide content, then intrinsic 
states are not sufficient because taking away the wide content would result, 
apparently, in there being no significant phenomenal character. 
 
The problem with this consequence is that it seems highly counterintuitive.  The 
view is too strong as it would rule out BIV’s enjoying states with phenomenal 
character as, it seems, they cannot be in states with wide content because they lack 
the required relations to the world.  Now, it might be possible to deny that the BIV 
enjoys the same kind of phenomenal character as a subject in a state with an 
associated wide content.  For instance, we could say that the BIV merely enjoys 
states that involve phenomenal goings on, which differ in some substantive way from 
what Tye means by phenomenal character.  The problem with this is that it highlights 
that Tye has developed a very specific theory of phenomenal character which needn’t 
be accepted.  As noted above in Section 4.2, some proponents of phenomenal 
internalism endorse the notion of qualia, which are non-representational components 
of perceptual states that provide the relevant phenomenal character of these states.  
Thus, where Tye contends that phenomenal character is fundamentally a content-
involving notion, qualia theorists deny this and take phenomenal character to be 
independent of content.  This discussion is outside the scope of this thesis.  For 
present purposes all I need to show is that the kind of objection that externalism 




about phenomenal character poses to my view has highly counterintuitive 




4.5 The complexity of narrow cognitive content 
A final objection to the account developed here might focus on the account of 
cognitive content defended in Section 4 above, upon which part of my internalist 
thesis rests.  The objection contends that this kind of account of narrow cognitive 
content renders cognitive content too complex.  The problem about complexity arises 
from Chapter 1 and Section 3 above where I held that narrow content relates to the 
representation of dispositional properties.  When we specify this content, so the 
objection might go, it would seem to be too conceptually sophisticated to reflect how 
subjects think of things as being, thus, it couldn’t play the role of cognitive content.  
In addition, the view of modes of presentation developed in Section 4 above is based 
on the phenomenology of perceptual representations, which requires that cognitive 
content reflects how things seem to the subject.  The problem is that when we state 
the narrow content in such a way that it represents a dispositional property, this 
might seem overly sophisticated or complex, and doesn’t reflect how the subject is 
thinking of the property represented, furthermore, it would seem implausible if such 
properties were reflected in the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of such 
properties.  For instance, it might be objected that S doesn’t think of the property 
redness in terms of its being a dispositional property.  As Vaughan (1989) has argued, 
such a view of narrow content seems problematic since if in stating the content of a 
concept we appeal to sophisticated notions like dispositional properties, then it is not 
clear that we are accurately reflecting how subjects represent things as being.
 33
  It 
may also be claimed that there is a tension with my account of mode of presentation 
in Section 4, where it rests only on the phenomenology of perceptual representations.  
Whether phenomenology could reflect that a dispositional property was being 
represented is not clear.  Thus, on the one hand, my account of the representational 
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 A proponent of phenomenal internalism does not need to deny that Tye’s positive account of 
phenomenal content as wide content could be correct to an extent.  That there is a kind of wide content 
that relates to perceptual experience is compatible with phenomenal character supervening on intrinsic 
properties.  A two-component theorist can accept that there are a range of contents associated with 
perceptual experience.  Again, these issues are outside the scope of this thesis. 
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 Vaughan’s objection was directed at Searle’s (1983) account of narrow content, but the objection 
applies generally. 




nature of narrow content seems too complex, since in representing dispositional 
properties it doesn’t seem to capture how S would think of such a property, and on 
the other, the account I gave of the mode of presentation associated with narrow 
content doesn’t seem consistent with the account of representational content. 
 
The solution is to make a distinction between how we specify what is represented, i.e. 
the representational content, and how such content relates to the mode of 
presentation or way in which S thinks of what is represented, the cognitive content.  
What this means here is that we need to distinguish how we specify the relevant 
properties represented, from how we understand the mode of presentation of these 
properties.  When we undertake the former project, we need to make reference to 
complex dispositional properties, which S may in fact be unaware that she is 
representing.  For instance, how things seem to S when she deploys her general 
concept RED, need not alone determine the representational content of her concept, 
especially if the account of individuation in Section 3 is right.  There, it was argued 
that S’s prototypes are individuated in part by S’s judgements about which 
superficial properties fall within a given category, and that S would likely make 
judgements based on dispositional appearance properties.  Now, S needn’t know she 
is doing this, and hence may be unaware that her responses relate to dispositional 
properties.  Nonetheless, her prototypes can plausibly represent such properties.  
Furthermore, S’s mode of presentation will be determined, as noted in Section 4, by 
the phenomenology of the relevant states, and this may mask which properties are 
represented by such states.  Consequently, there is no tension between the narrow 
representational and cognitive content associated with the relevant concepts. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter was to show that concept pluralism is consistent with 
individuating concepts by their narrow contents.  I suggested that the accounts of 
narrow content identified in Chapter 1 provide suitable representational contents for 
individuating prototype and theory structures.  In support of the internalist construal 
of pluralism I showed that internalist individuation of these structures is not 
inconsistent with psychological generalisations about concepts.  A second aim was to 




show that the cognitive content of concepts is narrow.  In particular, I showed that 
Weiskopf’s (2007) argument against narrow cognitive content can be rejected, and I 
outlined a suitable account of cognitive content for prototypes using the notion of 
perceptual templates.  Perceptual templates support narrow cognitive content by 
encoding perceptual information relating to the phenomenal character of perceptual 
representations, which I showed relates to phenomenal internalism.  The view 
developed here provides support to the account of narrow content in Chapter 1, 
where I assumed that mental representations come in a variety of structures.  There 
are two main ways that the internalist account of concepts and content might be 



































In this chapter I consider two approaches to individuating mental states which 
purport to have anti-internalist implications.  These represent two of the main ways 
externalists have tried to show that internalism and narrow content do not relate 
fundamentally to the individuation of mind.  I show that each view ultimately fails to 
have such implications, and hence that the view developed in Chapter 1 and 2 
withstands objections arising from these externalist positions.  The first part of the 
chapter considers a version of social externalism associated with Burge’s (1979) 
arguments for an externalist account of meaning and mind, as well as an argument 
from Goldberg (2002) regarding social externalism as a basis for a subject’s 
cognitive content.  The central thread of my critique of social externalism is that the 
claims about concepts and cognitive content can be rejected by considering the 
relevant arguments, and, importantly, showing that the social externalist proposals 
are at odds with the work in psychology cited in Chapter 2 and hence do not have the 
intended anti-internalist consequences for mental nature.  The second part considers 
accounts of perceptual psychology from Burge (1986a; 2009b; 2010) and Egan (2009; 
2010).  The main objection to these views is that the proposed anti-internalist 
conclusions can be rejected and so the basis for denying any role for narrow content 
in psychology may also be rejected. 
 
2. Social externalism and the ascription of propositional attitudes  
In Chapter 1 I considered Putnam’s (1975) view that certain natural kind terms have 
an externalist semantics.  On this view, externalism applies only to terms or concepts 
that represent natural kinds, which leaves open the possibility that concepts that 




represent other kinds or properties are not externalist.  Burge (1979) introduced an 
example that was intended to demonstrate that externalism may extend to most, if not 
all, terms/concepts.  One further intended consequence of Burge’s thesis is that 
externalism may have radical consequences for the individuation and nature of 
mental states.  Such a view poses a threat to the claims of Chapters 1 and 2, and in 
the rest of this section I consider Burge’s view in detail and raise several objections 
to it. 
 
2.1 Burge’s arthritis argument 
Social externalism is the view that social facts, most notably those relating to 
conventional linguistic meaning, play a constitutive role in the individuation and 
specification of mental states and mental content.  Burge generates radical social 
externalist consequences by means of his arthritis example.  The arthritis case 
involves a subject called ‘Alf’ who incorrectly believes that he has arthritis in his 
thigh.  One feature of the scenario is that Alf apparently has many true beliefs such 
as that his father had arthritis and that he has arthritis in his wrists and ankles.  
According to Burge, Alf meets minimal conditions on competence with the term 
since he can use it in these cases to talk about the condition and to express his true 
beliefs.  Furthermore, we can use ‘arthritis’ to express Alf’s true beliefs where 
‘arthritis’ occurs in the expression of Alf’s propositional attitudes, for instance we 
can report that ‘Alf believes that he has arthritis in his ankles’. 
 
The step to motivating social externalism involves considering a counterfactual 
scenario in which ‘arthritis’ is now used to talk about a broader condition which 
would apply to Alf’s thigh.  Suppose in this scenario Alf remains in the exact same 
physical state as in the former scenario.  The social externalist claims that Alf now 
has beliefs involving this other condition, which we may call ‘tharthritis’.  For 
instance Alf now believes that his father had tharthritis, and that he has tharthritis in 
his ankles.  A consequence of this scenario is that Alf now has a true belief that his 
tharthritis has spread to his thigh.  Taken literally, the relevant attitude ascriptions 
ascribe to Alf different beliefs in the two situations.  In the first scenario, Alf has 
beliefs concerning arthritis, and in the second has beliefs about tharthritis.  We may 




also say that different concepts are ascribed, since in the first situation Alf will grasp 
and be attributed the concept ARTHRITIS, whereas in the counterfactual scenario 
Alf grasps and is ascribed the concept THARTHRITIS. 
 
The key social externalist claim is that all of this follows from the fact that in each 
scenario the relevant linguistic communities apply the term ‘arthritis’ to slightly 
different conditions.  The resulting beliefs and concepts are therefore different by 
virtue of the different meaning of the term ‘arthritis’ in each linguistic community, 
since we get the appropriate belief/concept from the literal meaning of the term 
‘arthritis’ when ascribing the relevant beliefs/concepts.  Social externalists may 
therefore conclude that concepts are partly individuated by facts about the social or 
public meaning of words (as used in sentences we use to ascribe those 
concepts/beliefs), since this is the only difference between the two situations.  
Consequently, psychological internalism is false, since intrinsic duplicates need not 
be psychological duplicates, that is, propositional attitude content fails to supervene 
on intrinsic properties.  The radical nature of this view lies not only in its externalism, 
but in the way in which mentality appears to be intertwined with social facts about 
linguistic meaning.
34
  The main stages of Burge’s argument can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
(1) Alf has many true beliefs about arthritis, but falsely believes that he has 
arthritis in his thigh, as shown by his disposition to say things like ‘I have 
arthritis in my thigh’ 
(2) In a counterfactual scenario, ‘arthritis’ refers to a condition that also affects 
tissue outside of joints.  In this scenario, Alf’s belief expressed as ‘I have 
arthritis in my thigh’ is true 
(3) Thus, in the counterfactual scenario Alf does not believe that he has arthritis 
in his thigh, instead, he believes he has tharthritis in his thigh, since ‘arthritis’ 
has a different meaning in this scenario 
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in the arthritis case.  Thus, it is worth considering the view in some detail. 




If correct, Burge’s view could provide a problem for the account of narrow content 
developed in Chapter 1 as it would show that intrinsic duplicates S and T don’t share 
a kind of narrow content since what their words or concepts represent is fixed by 
facts about the linguistic environment.  This is sometimes cited as a way of showing 
that no terms are immune to the Twin Earth argument.  In Chapter 1, I suggested that 
non-natural kind terms like ‘clear’ and so on are not subject to the argument and thus 
there is no problem with expressing narrow contents.  If Burge’s argument succeeds, 
then this could put pressure on that response.  My aim then is to highlight some 
fundamental problems with Burge’s argument that show that the internalist is entitled 
to defend narrow content common to S and T which relates to a shared mental 
representation.  The internalist can accept that there may be a form of wide content 
relating to social externalism, however, this does not preclude narrow content, as I 
will now show. 
 
2.2 Responses to the argument 
Burge’s interpretation of the case is initially plausible, and Burge seems right that the 
example illustrates a pervasive phenomenon common to ordinary speakers’ practices.  
However, it is not so clear that the example accords with the theory of meaning in 
linguistics or with ascriptions of concepts in psychology.  In this section I raise three 
main responses to Burge’s social externalism 
35
 which show that the example cannot 
motivate the radical social externalist consequences. 
 
2.2.1 Assumption about natural language meaning 
The first response relates to the assumed view of natural language meaning required 
to generate Burge’s conclusions about the ascription of beliefs.  Burge’s view 
requires that natural language meaning is essentially social, and this idea drives the 
psychological externalist conclusions.  If, on the other hand, we have reason to think 
that meaning is not social, or at least that there is an aspect of meaning that doesn’t 
supervene on social facts, then this could block the externalist conclusions, or at least 
block the conclusion that there is no narrow content in this case. 
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Chapters 1 and 2. 




The importance for Burge’s social externalism of assuming that meaning is social 
relates to the way in which beliefs/concepts are ascribed on the basis of what the 
meaning of the relevant term is in the local linguistic community.  We are told that in 
scenario 1 ‘arthritis’ has its standard meaning, and in scenario 2 it has a broader 
meaning.  The meaning of the term is fixed by the conventions operative in the 
linguistic community, and the conventions are themselves fixed by agreement among 
the experts.  When we ascribe to Alf a belief/concept, this is done by taking the 
conventional meaning of the term, thereby identifying Alf’s concept by way of the 
appropriate meaning of the term in the local community. 
 
The worry I want to briefly raise here is that we are not given any independent 
reason to accept this account of linguistic meaning.  The problem for Burge is that, 
although such a view of meaning is accepted by others (for instance Ludlow 2005; 
Higginbotham 2006), the issue of the meaning of natural language expressions is an 
unresolved problem.  Helping himself to this view begs the question against a 
proponent of an alternative view of meaning.  For instance, some linguists and 
philosophers defend an internalist view of natural language meaning, according to 
which the meaning of expressions is determined psychologically, and not socially.  
That is, meaning supervenes on intrinsic properties of speakers.  On this view, what a 
speaker means with an expression is determined by their language faculty (for 
instance see Chomsky 2000) or concepts (e.g. Jackendoff 2002), and not by 
conventions fixed by relevant experts.  Supposing that this internalist view of 
meaning is viable, then we could reject the idea of reading-off the beliefs or concepts 
to ascribe to Alf on the basis of the conventional meaning of ‘arthritis’.  I will not 
consider this debate in any detail here as this would require a chapter of its own.  The 
point to draw from this debate is that Burge takes the example to independently 
demonstrate externalist principles about mentality, but this only follows if Burge is 
entitled to make assumptions about linguistic meaning.  No such justification has 
been provided, therefore an internalist who has reason to defend the psychological 
view of meaning will not be too concerned by the arthritis example. 
 




2.2.2 Reinterpretation of the thought experiment 
The second response is that the view makes substantive claims about the 
individuation of concepts which have not been independently motivated.  In 
particular, if Chapter 2 is right then the view is in conflict with concepts as treated in 
empirical psychology, and as a consequence we should reject the purported radical 
implications for the mind. 
 
Several internalists (for instance Crane 1991; Segal 2000) have responded to Burge 
by showing how the scenario is consistent with attributing to Alf a concept that 
relates to the condition from scenario 2.  On this view, we should ascribe to Alf the 
same concept in both cases because, irrespective of the meaning of ‘arthritis’ in the 
two scenarios, Alf understands the term to mean the same thing in both.  Burge (1979) 
considers the possibility of reinterpreting the example and attributing to Alf a 
concept that matches his understanding.  Burge allows that the term ‘tharthritis’ 
could be used to capture something about what Alf understands.  However, Burge 
urges us to resist such an interpretation: 
 
 Suppose we are to reinterpret the attribution of his erroneous belief that he 
 has arthritis in the thigh. We make up a term ‘tharthritis’ that covers arthritis 
 and whatever it is he has in his thigh. The appropriate restrictions on the 
 application of this term and of the patient’s supposed notion are unclear. Is 
 just any problem in the thigh that the patient wants to call ‘arthritis’ to count 
 as tharthritis? Are other ailments covered? What would decide? The problem 
 is that there are no recognized standards governing the application of the new 
 term. In such cases, the method is patently ad hoc. (Burge 1979, 22) 
 
The worry Burge highlights here is of genuine interest, since any kind of 
reinterpretation of Alf should be able to say something about what concept Alf 
possesses.  If there is no way to decide on the boundaries of Alf’s concept, then we 
would, presumably, be in a worse position than if we ascribe the standard concept of 
arthritis.  However, it’s far from obvious that a) there is no alternative way to state 
precisely what Alf’s concept is, and b) even if there was some doubt about how Alf 
applies the term, then we should opt for ascribing the standard concept. 
 




The first problem with Burge’s response, relating to a), is that given a view of 
concepts such as that developed in Chapter 2, ascribing a non-standard concept to 
Alf is not ad hoc, but independently motivated from the nature of concept 
individuation.  For instance, the account of prototypes provides a standard for 
determining what Alf would judge as falling within various categories.  This account 
of concept individuation actively draws on what subjects like Alf are disposed to 
judge as falling within a category, thus we could carry out the kind of tests involved 
in the typicality effect experiments, where subjects make category judgements based 
on properties deemed to be typical of the category, and record what properties Alf is 
disposed to judge as being typical of the category represented by ARTHRITIS.  With 
regard to b), suppose we were unsure about the data, so that Alf was so confused that 
we couldn’t get any clear handle on what property or kind he represented with 
ARTHRITIS.  Burge appears to urge us to accept the ascription of a standard public 
concept to Alf merely because there is no alternative.  However, if Alf really is 
confused, then it might be better to ascribe no specific concept at all.  This would 
seem to reflect Alf’s psychological position better than ascribing the standard 
concept of arthritis, since Alf does not meet normal conditions for ascription of a 
concept. 
 
We don’t have to decide in exactly which cases Alf is deeply confused or Alf 
possesses a different concept from the standard.  It is enough that in principle it is 
possible to identify, say, a prototype based on what Alf is disposed to classify under 
ARTHRITIS.  This is consistent with there being a scenario where no coherent 
prototype can be identified.  As Crane (1991) and Segal (2000) note, here we would 
just refrain from ascribing any concept, since Alf’s error relates to a serious 
confusion, which, we may imagine, fails to provide a stable basis for identifying any 
meaningful prototype. 
 
Burge considers the possibility of appealing to Alf’s dispositions, and appears to 
concede that there are cases where we could attribute a concept that fits with the 
subject’s behaviour and which captures his incomplete understanding.  However, 
Burge does not make it clear when this would be appropriate: 




 None of the forgoing is meant to deny that frequently when a person 
 incompletely understands an attitude content he has some other attitude 
 content that more or less captures his understanding…There are also cases in 
 which it is reasonable to say that, at least in a sense, a person has a notion that 
 is expressed by his dispositions to classify things in a certain way-even if 
 there is no conventional term in the person’s repertoire that neatly 
 corresponds to that “way.”... Certain animals as well as people may have 
 nonverbal notions of this sort. On the other hand, the fact that such 
 attributions are justifiable per se yields no reason to deny that the subject 
 (also) has object-level attitudes whose contents involve the relevant 
 incompletely understood notion. (Burge 1979, 23-24) 
 
Burge seems to accept that classifying behaviour could indicate the ‘notion’ (concept) 
grasped by the subject.  Following the account of prototype individuation outlined in 
Chapter 2, it could be argued that the classificatory or categorizing behaviour of a 
subject is central to the individuation of concepts.  These concessions are therefore 
enough for the internalist view to get off the ground.  Now, Burge’s basis for denying 
that the notion we identify in this way has the status of the subject’s concept appears 
to rely on the idea that we lack terms for saying what this notion is, hence the 
comparison with the notions of other animals. 
 
There is an important dialectical point to make regarding Burge’s set-up of the issues.  
On Burge’s view, we are limited to the social meaning of terms, fixed by the experts, 
to communicate and express the concepts of others.  Given this, there is no way to 
say what other non-standard concepts a subject like Alf may possess.  However, 
there are alternative stances on both of these issues.  Suppose that the meaning of 
‘arthritis’ is determined by an individual’s psychology.  While it may be true that 
most subjects associate the same, or a similar, meaning with the term ‘arthritis’, it 
would be wrong to take the view Burge does in assuming that how a subject thinks of 
things is not expressed by the terms they use.  For instance, suppose that terms 
always express what speakers intend them to express.  On this view, we might not be 
immediately aware of what Alf intends to express with his use of ‘arthritis’, but he 
expresses it nonetheless.  Thus, Burge is wrong in saying that there is no term in the 
individual’s repertoire that expresses the individual’s specific understanding of that 
term.  All we are entitled to say is that there is no simple reading-off from a term 




expressed by such an individual what they intend to express, and hence their 
understanding of the term. 
 
Burge’s assumption, noted in Chapter 2, that concepts are abstract entities is relevant 
here.  When we use ‘arthritis’ to talk about a concept of arthritis, we are really 
talking about the relevant abstract mental representation.  I don’t want to deny that 
we may ascribe a wide content along the lines indicated in the example.  The two-
component view allows such a position.  However, as noted in Chapter 2, it is not 
clear that the proponent of the abstract view would be able to defend the claim that 
the ascription relates to Alf’s concepts, since there is a commitment here to concepts 
as abstract rather than concrete entities, and it was noted that the dual view of 
concepts is not well motivated.  Again, as noted in Chapter 2, Burge would need to 
say more about why we can’t just opt for the concrete view of concepts and say that 
the wide content related to some other phenomena. 
 
The problem for Burge is that the various conceptual structures discussed in Chapter 
2 relate to the ways in which subjects categorize, which depends on the kinds of 
ways they think of categories, which are individual psychological capacities.  We do 
not start with a public concept to be grasped and decide whether Alf possesses that.  
Instead, we assess what concepts are, as mental structures, and see whether Alf has 
the standard prototype/theory for ARTHRITIS.  Since he doesn’t, we might say he is 
conceptually confused and doesn’t possess the concept, and Burge is wrong.  
However, if Alf’s mistake is systematic enough, then reinterpretation may be 
appropriate.  It all depends on the seriousness of the error.  We assume that subjects 
will generally possess, say, the same CAT prototype, but for ARTHRITIS it isn’t at 
all obvious that subjects will think alike, since it is less common and its features less 
well-known.  In fact, it would be odd to say that most possess the public/expert 
concept, if, as seems possible, that it is not common knowledge that arthritis is only a 
condition of the joints (something that can only be confirmed through enquiry of 
normal subjects). 
 




Concept pluralism is compatible with there being a variety of ways of 
conceptualizing arthritis, without there being a single standard concept.  This applies 
to other concepts as well, especially where differences between a scientific 
understanding and common sense conception are concerned.  In certain cases, it 
might be the case that some subjects have a complex theory structure about a certain 
property, whilst others only possess a prototype structure.  Furthermore, we are not 
lead to always having to reinterpret subjects who don’t completely master a relevant 
term since in many cases we individuate concepts by a set of properties, or by 
properties most central to the category.  This allows for some flexibility, so that if S 
thinks incorrectly that X’s have property P, then S still represents X’s because she 
associates enough of the actual properties of X’s with her concept.  However, 
pluralism allows that in principle we could distinguish the concepts of lay and expert 
subjects by virtue of their encoding enough different properties so as to really have 
different concepts that should be distinguished. 
 
2.2.3 The nature and use of attitude ascriptions 
The third response questions the role which attitude ascriptions play in establishing 
social externalism about subjects’ concepts.  Burge holds that the manner of 
ascribing beliefs/concepts in the example is standard practice.  Thus, ordinarily we 
ascribe to subjects the literal content of the terms that we use to talk about their 
beliefs, even when they lack complete mastery of the term.  For this to have radical 
conclusions concerning the nature of mental content, it must be shown that even if 
this reflects standard practice regarding how we talk about subjects like Alf, then this 
has significant consequences for the nature of the concepts ascribed.  Without this 
connection, then there may be something else going on in standard practice which 
does not have the radical implications. 
 
Before considering this point in more detail, I want to point out that as far as 
psychology is concerned we should reject the claim that concepts are ascribed in this 
way.  This is because, as noted in Chapter 2, theories of concepts like prototypes 
appeal to data generated from experiments, and so any intuition-based approach to 
concepts will not have consequences for how concepts are treated in psychology.  




Thus, we cannot move from the way ordinary speakers ascribe beliefs to a 
substantive theory of the concepts actually possessed by the ascribee. 
 
As already noted, Burge makes a plausible point in support of the social externalist 
view that the interpretation of Alf in the two scenarios is common place.  Standard 
practice involves ascribing the literal meaning of a term to true propositional 
attitudes in order to say what beliefs a subject has.  Since attributing literal content is 
standard practice, we say that Alf believes he has arthritis, not tharthritis, in his thigh.  
When Alf says that he thinks his arthritis has spread to his thigh, we might ordinarily 
say his belief is false.  Burge’s main point is that standard practice does not involve 
attributing something other than the standard concept associated with the relevant 
terms that occur in the propositional attitude ascribed, even when we discover, as in 
the case of Alf, that the subject only partially understands the meaning of the term.  
As Burge notes: 
 
 An attribution to someone of a true belief that he [has arthritis], is not 
 typically reformulated when it is learned that the subject had not fully 
 understood what [arthritis] is. (Burge 1979, 22) 
 
This point seems right as regards how we talk about belief.  For instance, even if we 
had reservations about saying Alf possessed the standard concept of arthritis, it 
seems wrong to say that we would want to say that Alf only had true beliefs 
involving a non-standard concept.  In Chapter 4 I will consider the nature and use of 
propositional attitude ascriptions in more detail.  In particular, I will highlight that 
attitude ascriptions are consistent with the ascription of narrow contents.  For now, 
the relevant issue is whether we must conclude from how lay speakers use attitude 
ascriptions that this has implications for the concepts subjects like Alf possess.  The 
worry for Burge is that even if we often do talk about subjects like Alf in this way, 
this does not commit us to the view that we have thereby ascribed to Alf the standard 
concept.  For instance, just because we say of Alf that he has true beliefs concerning 
arthritis, and do not say that he has true beliefs about tharthritis, this does not lend 
support to the social externalist thesis. 
 




Given the point made above in Section 2.2.2 on noting whether to ascribe a non-
standard concept or just say Alf is deeply confused, this suggests that standard 
practice may be more sensitive to subjects like Alf who reveal their confusion by 
saying things like ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’.  It seems reasonable then that an 
ordinary speaker might have reservations in continuing to ascribe Alf the concept of 
arthritis, even if they might not want to reformulate the propositional attitudes 
relating to Alf’s belief about the condition in his thigh.  All this suggests, however, is 
that ordinary speakers might be inconsistent in their ascriptions of belief and belief 
reporting practices.  This does not seem like an unreasonable position, since to 
expect ordinary speakers to have well developed thoughts on how to handle such 
cases doesn’t seem particularly plausible, especially given the wide range of 
intuitions elicited in the philosophical literature, which itself suggests that we don’t 
tend to have a ready response to these cases. 
 
2.2.4 Burge on reinterpreting the arthritis scenario 
Above, I appealed to several reinterpretations of the arthritis scenario, and to ways in 
which these reinterpretations can be supported.  However, Burge does consider 
several reinterpretations of the arthritis scenario and rejects all of them.  Two 
approaches to reinterpretation are relevant to this discussion.  On the first approach, 
we reinterpret Alf as possessing a true belief regarding tharthritis.  On this approach, 
we do not ascribe to Alf an incorrect belief that he has arthritis in his thigh, despite 
Alf apparently having several true beliefs about arthritis.  Instead, we reinterpret all 
such beliefs as relating to tharthritis, since this reflects more closely the concept 
actually possessed by Alf.  However, Burge is surely correct that that we don’t 
normally reinterpret subjects, especially since it is common for subjects to partially 
misunderstand many terms, and we do not normally reinterpret a speaker as 
possessing an idiosyncratic concept when they misapply a term.  On the second 
approach, we attribute a false metalinguistic belief that ‘arthritis’ is the correct term 
for the condition in his thigh.  Here, we do not say that Alf falsely believes that he 
has arthritis in his thigh, and instead note that Alf has a false belief that the correct 
term to apply to the condition in his thigh is ‘arthritis’.   In response, Burge notes that 
only ascribing a metalinguistic belief to Alf in this scenario is implausible, since his 




belief is not simply about worlds but about the condition in his thigh.  While Burge’s 
responses to these reinterpretations are plausible, as noted above, some internalists 
have responded by adopting variations of the reinterpretation approach.  However, 
there are weaknesses in these responses, and I shall suggest that the two-component 
view I have developed provides the basis for a stronger form of the reinterpretation 
of the scenarios which avoids Burge’s objections. 
 
Crane (1991) has suggested that we combine both approaches and that in doing so 
we can reject social externalism wholesale.  On this view, we reinterpret Alf as 
having a true belief about tharthritis, as well as a false metalinguistic belief that the 
term ‘arthritis’ is the correct term for the condition in his thigh.  While this may 
provide a coherent interpretation of the scenario, a problem for Crane is that Burge 
seems to have the upper hand regarding ordinary attitude ascriptions in so far as 
saying that Alf believes that he has arthritis in his thigh, and so Crane’s view is not 
strictly able to accommodate the intuitive interpretation of the scenario.  In contrast, 
on the view I have developed we can say that the wide content associated with social 
externalism relates to Alf’s false belief that he has arthritis in his thigh, and perhaps 
to the public concept that Alf incompletely masters.  We distinguish this from the 
narrow content relating to Alf’s concrete conceptual structure which represents the 
category tharthritis, and indeed his false metalinguistic belief regarding the correct 
usage of ‘arthritis’.  Thus, the two-component view has the advantage of being able 
to incorporate the idea that ordinary attitude ascriptions follow Burge’s interpretation, 
whilst also highlighting that narrow content can play a central role in such cases.  It 
is worth noting that Chalmers (2002) also supports the metalinguisitc interpretation, 
although on the approach he advocates Alf’s arthritis concept does not seem to have 
a narrow content that relates to tharthritis while Alf’s thoughts do have a wide 
content derived in the social externalist way.  However, this seems overly concessive 
given the view of concepts developed in Chapter 2, which lends support to the 
approach I have outlined. 
 
Burge does consider the combination of both reinterpretations, but he notes that this 
requires two things: establishing that the subject holds these two attitudes, and 




justification for the denial of ordinary attributions.  The two-component theorist 
needn’t commit to this latter point about denying ordinary attributions and I have 
suggested that we can attribute to Alf’s concept a wide content that relates to arthritis, 
hence that the ordinary attribution can be applied.  This is consistent with also 
holding that Alf’s concept has a narrow content that relates to tharthritis, and that this 
better reflects the nature of concepts construed as concrete mental entities.  What 
favours this two-component view is that it can incorporate Burge’s plausible claim 
that his account captures ordinary uses of attitude attributions, whilst also 
incorporating the highly plausible metalinguistic account and the reinterpretation of 
Alf’s conception as relating to tharthritis.  Indeed, as noted, Burge accepts that we 
may be able to identify Alf’s conception, thus it’s not clear why we should opt for 
Burge’s view over the two-component view, especially given the support for the 
concrete view of concepts in the psychological literature.  Hence, the internalist 
should combine both approaches as Crane has suggested, but also allow that Alf’s 
beliefs may relate to both arthritis and tharthritis via the wide and narrow contents of 
his concepts.  Thus, while Burge’s interpretation is plausible as an account of 
ordinary attitude ascribing practice in such cases, if we accept that ordinary 
ascriptions may relate to a kind of wide content, this does not preclude the 
combination of both approaches to reinterpretation and a central role for narrow 
content. 
 
3. Social externalism and the subject’s conceptions 
Goldberg (2002) develops and defends a view according to which social externalism 
can adequately capture a subject’s conceptions, that is, the subject’s way of thinking 
of X’s.  How S thinks of X’s is given by the mode of presentation of S’s concepts, 
thus, Goldberg’s claim can be understood as being that the mode of presentation of a 
subject’s concept can be given in terms of social externalist foundations.  A second 
facet of the view, to be expanded on below, is that the social externalist base 
provides a minimalist account of modes of presentation, which requires only that we 
cite the relevant term in natural language, which is sufficient to convey S’s mode of 
presentation.  In support of this minimalist view, Goldberg rejects a picture in which 
modes of presentation may often be (and perhaps always are) expressed descriptively, 




a view which, as noted previously, is supported by externalists like Putnam (1975), 
as well as internalists, including my own account developed in Chapter 2.  I will raise 
objections to all three points, and explain why modes of presentation may be both 
internalist and at least partially minimalist and descriptive. 
 
3.1 The minimalist account of conceptions 
Goldberg develops his case for social externalism about mode of presentation by 
appealing to the sofa example first introduced by Burge (1986b), which is itself a 
variation of Burge’s (1979) arthritis scenario discussed in Section 2.  The sofa 
example does not rest on a subject incompletely mastering a term or incompletely 
grasping a concept (as in the arthritis example), but instead involves a subject 
holding a non-standard theory about sofas whilst being aware of how others’ think of 
sofas.  We are to consider a subject, S, who is aware that sofas are thought of as 
pieces of furniture made for sitting, but comes to believe that they are in fact 
religious artefacts or works of art (for simplicity I will stick with the idea that they 
are taken by S to be religious artefacts).  S’s non-standard theory entails that S 
falsely believes that sofas are religious artefacts and that sofas are not pieces of 
furniture made for sitting.  In addition, S truly believes that other people believe 
sofas are pieces of furniture made for sitting.  We are then to consider a 
counterfactual situation where things are such that the objects called ‘sofas’ in S’s 
community really are religious artefacts and are not made for sitting (we can call 
these objects ‘safos’).  However, in this scenario, S also believes that people in his 
community think that safos are made for sitting, yet, we can suppose, his reasons for 
this are based on situations where people have merely been joking, and in fact they 
really do believe that safos are religious artefacts.  S then believes truly that safos are 
religious artefacts, but believes falsely that other people believe they are pieces of 
furniture made for sitting. 
 
Before considering Goldberg’s view of modes of presentation, it is useful to have in 
mind some background regarding the typical consequences externalists may take to 
follow from the scenario.  To recap, in the first scenario, S is aware of how others 
think of sofas, but has an idiosyncratic theory of sofas according to which they are 




fragile religious artefacts.  Social externalists might argue that, despite the 
idiosyncratic theory, S possesses the standard concept SOFA, and no other concept.  
As Sawyer (2007) contends, S’s idiosyncratic theory may be encoded into S’s mental 
file (a file comprised of all the information S associates with the term ‘sofa’), but the 
concept we should attribute to S is the public concept SOFA.  Sawyer is partly 
motivated by the claim that psychology requires generalizations to hold across the 
population, which requires that we ascribe the same concept, otherwise, her objection 
runs, there would be too few concepts of interest for psychology to study.  In Chapter 
2, I suggested that the relevant notion of generalizations does not require the same 
concept to be ascribed, since generalizations can be in terms of the conceptual 
structure type, such as prototypes, theories, and so on, without this requiring that all 
members of the population must be ascribed the same concept.  Consequently, 
variation in the properties represented by a prototype is compatible with concepts as 
conceived in psychology. 
 
With this background in place, the social externalist view of modes of presentation 
can be understood as being motivated by similar thoughts regarding the public 
meaning of ‘sofa’.  Where modes of presentation capture how a subject represents 
things as being from their perspective, for instance how they think of sofas as being, 
the social externalist contends this is reflected in the public meaning of the term 
‘sofa’.  Thus, where S believes sofas are religious artefacts and that others think that 
sofas are soft comfortable furnishings made for sitting, the social externalist contends 
that the way S thinks of sofas is nonetheless given by the conventional meaning of 
‘sofa’ in the relevant linguistic community.  Such a view conflicts with the view 
developed in Chapter 2 according to which the mode of presentation associated with 
concepts (or cognitive content) should be understood as deriving from perceptual 
templates of the associated concepts and underlying perceptual states associated with 
the properties represented by concepts.  On this view, we cannot read-off the mode 
of presentation of a subject’s concept by taking the public meaning of the relevant 
term that expresses the concept, since the subject’s mode of presentation relates 
specifically to the information they have encoded in long-term memory. 
 




An initial worry with Goldberg’s view is that it seems plausible, given S’s 
idiosyncratic theory, that S would think of sofas as being religious artefacts, hence 
Goldberg’s proposal fails to reflect how S really thinks of sofas.  This idea is 
compelling since if the information is encoded in S’s mental file, then activating this 
information seems sufficient for S to think of sofas in a way specific to his deviant 
theory.  I will consider below how this kind of approach provides a suitable response 
to Goldberg’s argument and is consistent with my own account of modes of 
presentation from Chapter 2.  Before that, I will consider Goldberg’s reasons for 
resisting this sort of view, since Goldberg is aware of this response and develops a 
case in support of the social externalist view. 
 
According to Goldberg, when S thinks of sofas, despite having a deviant theory, he 
thinks of them as sofas.  In support of this view, Goldberg contends that S’s way of 
thinking of sofas can be specified purely by using the term ‘sofa’, with its 
conventional meaning implied, so that when we report how S thinks of sofas as being 
by simply stating ‘as sofas’, we are stating that S thinks of sofas in the standard way.  
This comprises a minimalist account of the subject’s conceptions, or way of thinking 
of X’s.  Minimalism is therefore a claim about what we need to do to express how a 
subject conceives of things as being from his perspective. 
 
Goldberg’s defence of minimalism is related to the social externalist view of 
concepts noted above.  On that view, it was held that even though S believes sofas 
are religious artefacts, S possesses the standard concept of sofas.  In support of 
minimalism, Goldberg appeals to data regarding S’s judgements, and holds that it is 
plausible that S would be disposed to utter the following: 
 
I mean to be using ‘sofa’ literally, as expressing the concept English 
associates with ‘sofa’. I take it that this is precisely how my colinguals are 
using ‘sofa’. (Goldberg 2002, 604) 
 
One implication is that if we ask S how he thinks of sofas as being, then he is likely 
to respond with ‘as sofas’ which would then relate to the conventional meaning.  The 
obvious response is to ask whether S might have different dispositions, and question 




Goldberg’s suggestion.  It is not clear why we must hold that S would only be 
disposed to utter the above, since it appears to be just as plausible that S could have 
different dispositions to utter something like the following: I mean to be using ‘sofa’ 
in two different ways, such that when talking about what sofas really are I mean 





It seems possible that S may think of sofas in the standard way, as when thinking 
about how others think of sofas as being, and yet S may also think of sofas as 
religious artefacts when thinking about what he understands as the real nature of 
sofas.  On this view, S’s sofa concept would be associated with two distinct mode of 
presentation, relating to the two ways he can think of sofas as being.  One reason to 
favour this response from S is that in the scenario S is aware that how he thinks of 
sofas is different from how others think of sofas, and therefore we have reason to 
think that S can entertain both ways of conceiving of sofas.  The worry for resting 
minimalism on such issues is that intuitions can flow in both directions. 
 
Again, Goldberg has a response to this sort of worry, and provides two main reasons 
to reject this proposal.  First, Goldberg claims that all we need is a minimalistic 
account where citing ‘sofa’ is sufficient to reflect how S conceives of sofas.   
According to this proposal an account of modes of presentation can be trivial in the 
sense that it is not necessary to provide a specific description of the various 
properties that capture the way S thinks of things as being.  It should be noted that 
minimalism has some plausibility.  For instance, if we want to explain how S thinks 
of sofas, using the expression ‘as sofas’ tells us something that is likely to be true, 
since S is able to think of sofas as sofas, where the latter occurrence of ‘sofas’ has its 
conventional meaning, e.g. [soft comfortable furnishing].  However, holding that 
minimalism is always sufficient to capture how S thinks of sofas is not as obvious as 
Goldberg appears to think as I will show below. 
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 Segal (2007) discusses this case in response to Burge’s view.  He contends that we need to 
recognise two different ways in which a subject might think of an object.  I return to this point below. 




The second main reason Goldberg provides in support of minimalism relates 
specifically to the proposal just identified relating to providing descriptions of S’s 
mode of presentation rather than trivially citing the relevant term.  Goldberg notes 
that the view that we must find a description of S’s mode of presentation comprises 
the traditional view of mode of presentation.  On the traditional descriptive view, 
modes of presentation can be given in terms of a description which reflects the kinds 
of properties a subject associates with the thing represented.  For instance, the mode 
of presentation of WATER might be given in terms of the set of properties [clear, 
drinkable liquid that fills the lakes and rivers].  As already remarked, a descriptive 
account of how S thinks of sofas as being looks plausible given the scenario.  We are 
told that S believes that others wrongly think of sofas as soft comfortable furnishings 
and correctly believes that they are in fact fragile religious artefacts.  Put this way, 
we might be tempted to say that S thinks of sofas as [fragile religious artefacts]. 
 
Goldberg’s central contention is that the traditional view is committed to always 
providing a specific descriptive account of S’s conceptions, such that we must 
always provide a non-trivial specification.  Triviality here pertains to the fact that in 
using the term ‘sofa’ to reflect how S thinks of sofas, the minimalist account does not 
need to do any more work, thus a non-trivial account of S’s conceptions would 
involve describing in richer detail S’s non-standard theory of sofas.  The problem, 
according to Goldberg, is that this commitment should not be accepted, since there is 
no requirement that in all cases we need to provide a description to capture how S is 
thinking.  This point is worth dwelling on since it is initially a plausible view.  For 
instance, suppose on an occasion S is talking about sofas, but is not thinking of them 
in any particular way.  In response to the question ‘how is S thinking of sofas?’, 
simply stating ‘as sofas’ would seem to be sufficient.  In these cases it would be 
unnecessary, and potentially misleading, to provide a description which captured 
how S was thinking of sofas, since S might not be thinking of sofas in any specific 
manner that warrants a descriptive account.  Now, if the descriptive view is 
committed to always providing a description, then minimalism looks promising since 
the requirement to provide a description each time S thinks of X’s doesn’t seem 
sufficiently well motivated in the face of the plausibility that on certain occasions S 




is not strictly thinking of sofas in any particular way.  However, it’s not clear that 
Goldberg has correctly captured the position that a non-minimalist is committed to, 
and there are ways to resist minimalism without endorsing the descriptive view as 
outlined by Goldberg. 
 
3.2 Responses to minimalism 
I have identified three main parts of Goldberg’s thesis (dispositions to assent, the 
sufficiency of minimalism, and anti-descriptivism) which can be subjected to 
criticism.  In this section I show how each part can be rejected, and raise additional 




3.2.1 Subjects’ judgements about their conceptions 
Recall that Goldberg suggests S might be disposed to say that he intends to use ‘sofa’ 
to express the same concept others express.  It is possible to accept Goldberg’s claim 
about what S might be disposed to say in the sofa case, while holding that S’s 
concept SOFA, is associated with two modes of presentation.  The step from S’s 
dispositions to what his modes of presentation are like has not been made.  For 
instance, by accepting that S intends to be using ‘sofa’ to express the concept others 
express, S might mean that the meaning of his term ‘sofa’ is intended to conform 
with normal usage.  This does not entail that the mode of presentation is fixed by the 
public concept S intends to express.  Furthermore, as was noted above, it seems 
compatible with the scenario that S is just as likely to report that he is using ‘sofa’ to 
mean what he now believes it to mean, i.e. that it refers to religious artefacts.  S 
might even have a more sophisticated response, relating to his awareness that 
although he knows how standard English speakers use the term, he thinks that it 
correctly applies to religious artefacts.  The main worry then with resting the case for 
social externalism about conceptions on what S might say is that short of conducting 
a much larger study on what subjects think of their conceptions, we can debate 
whether S would only have the dispositions Goldberg has identified. 
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 Bach & Elugardo (2003) develop an alternative critique of Goldberg’s view. 




One reason why an externalist might be tempted to restrict S’s possible replies to 
what ‘sofa’ means in English is the assumption noted in Section 2 regarding the 
social basis of natural language meaning.  If ‘sofa’ only has meaning by virtue of 
public conventions, then it would make little sense for S to say that his use of ‘sofa’ 
could possibly have another meaning.  But if we resist that view, there is space to 
allow that S may be using the term differently, and so be disposed to say something 
different.  Most importantly perhaps is that it only really makes sense to hold that 
this entails anything about minimalism because S would think of sofas only in terms 
of the conventional meaning of the term.  But this has not been shown to be the case. 
 
3.2.2 The cogency of the minimalist account 
The second response is that a proponent of a descriptive view need not be committed 
to S always thinking non-trivially of X’s.  A descriptivist could hold that sometimes 
we need to use a description to capture how S thinks of X’s, such as when S is 
thinking of X’s in a particular manner.  If minimalism is associated with the view 
that sometimes S does not think of X’s in any particular way, then this is consistent 
with also holding that sometimes S does think of X’s in a way which requires a 
descriptive reconstruction.  However, this is not Goldberg’s view, since he contends 
that minimalism is always sufficient to capture S’s conceptions.  A worry with this 
combination of minimal and descriptive conceptions is that minimalism may in fact 
presuppose a descriptive foundation.  The central idea of minimalism is that we can 
capture S’s mode of presentation by citing the relevant term, such as ‘sofa’.  
However, any mode of presentation generated by citing ‘sofa’ seems to derive from 
the associated conventional meaning of the term in the linguistic community e.g. 
[soft comfortable furnishing made for sitting], and hence there is a mode of 
presentation provided by the minimal view only because of this descriptive 
conventional meaning.  Unless we can make sense of how S thinks of sofas by 
glossing ‘sofa’ in terms of some sort of descriptive conception, there is no obvious 
way to get a handle on how S is thinking at all, since citing ‘sofa’ without the prior 
knowledge of the conventional meaning would fail to express any mode of 
presentation. 
 




3.2.3 The architectural basis of conceptions 
The final response relates to the social externalist foundations of the view.  As noted 
above, the social externalist can grant that there is information encoded in S’s mental 
file that reflects S’s idiosyncratic theory of sofas.  On Goldberg’s account, S’s mode 
of presentation relates to the conventional meaning of the term in the linguistic 
community.  Now, in order for S’s mode of presentation to relate to the conventional 
meaning of ‘sofa’, it is plausible that this must relate to S having also encoded the 
relevant information in the mental file for SOFA, otherwise, it might be argued, there 
is no connection between mode of presentation and S’s concepts construed as 
psychological entities associated with mental files.  The point here relates to the 
architectural basis of mode of presentation outlined in Chapter 2.  There I developed 
the view that the mode of presentation of concepts, construed as concrete 
psychological entities, derives directly from encoded information in long-term 
memory.  The capacity to think of X’s as being a certain way requires having such 
information stored in memory. 
 
If this view is correct, then there are two consequences for Goldberg’s view.  First, 
we should allow that S associates two modes of presentation with SOFA, relating to 
information encoded in long-term memory (or his mental file).  Second, the only 
reason that S can think of sofas as sofas (i.e. associate the standard conception of 
sofas with ‘sofa’), is because of this information in memory.  It is possible that S 
may fail to think of any specific properties of a category when deploying a given 
concept.  For instance, upon introspection, S does not focus on any particular 
properties of sofas.  In this case, S may use the concept without thinking of the 
category in any particular way.  This seems a reasonable assumption to make, and is 
compatible with pluralism which allows that some conceptual structures may lack 
distinctive cognitive content (for instance, as Weiskopf (2007) notes, prototypes are 
good candidates for having cognitive content, which suggests others might lack 
cognitive content).  Here, a minimal account of S’s conceptions would seem 
appropriate, and citing ‘sofa’ without implying any specific mode of presentation 
would perhaps be reasonable.  However, the architecture supports the idea that in 
other cases S can think of a category in terms of, say, the prototypical properties S 




associates with the category.  At the very least, the scenario described suggests that S 
is likely to think of sofas in both ways. 
 
The point to note here is that were Goldberg to challenge this approach to concepts 
and cognitive content, say, by holding that concepts are abstract entities, not concrete, 
then the same objections raised against Burge in Section 2 will apply.  The problem 
with holding that social externalism, and the relevant social basis of linguistic 
meaning, plays a role in individuating either concepts or cognitive content, is that 
this view appears to be at odds with work in psychology which treats concepts and 
their cognitive content as concrete psychological entities.  Without first showing that 
the social externalist is entitled to hold such a view, or that a version of the dual view 
of concepts can be happily defended, then neither the arthritis nor sofa examples 
should be taken to have externalist implications for concepts and cognitive content.  
This is not to deny that there may be some kind of wide content associated with both 
examples.  
 
3.2.4 Concluding remarks 
Before moving on, it is worth summarising the criticism of Goldberg.  While 
Goldberg can accept that S may think of sofas as religious artefacts (such as where 
S’s deviant theory of sofas allows S to entertain the thought that sofas are religious 
artefacts), Goldberg’s view is that citing ‘sofa’ adequately captures how S thinks of, 
or conceives of, sofas.  The obvious problem here is that from the scenario it seems 
that S can think of, or conceive of, sofas in at least two distinct ways.  This makes the 
minimalist claim a bit odd, and it is why Goldberg brings in the critique of the 
descriptive view.  Thus, combining the claim that ‘sofa’ is adequate with the claim 
that the descriptive view is too strong, Goldberg intends to support the minimalist 
claim.  Following Segal (2007), we can introduce a distinction between the two ways 
S can think of sofas, as soft comfortable furnishings made for sitting (sofa1) and 
religious artefacts (sofa2).  Nothing Goldberg says explains what is wrong with this, 
and the view developed in Chapter 2 provides a systematic basis for identifying these 
differences with difference conceptual structures.  Pursuing this further, the 
minimalist view commits to an odd view of cognitive content.  Cognitive content 




reflects how the subject represents the world as being.  If we were to say that the 
cognitive content of S’s SOFA was just given by the standard meaning of ‘sofa’, or 
simply cited ‘sofa’, this would seem to be inadequate as an account of S’s cognitive 
content since S can think of sofas in at least two distinct ways.  When S thinks of 
sofas under sofa1, then the standard conception is appropriate, but when she thinks of 
them under sofa2, we need to draw on S’s idiosyncratic theory of sofas to properly 
reflect the cognitive content associated with this way of thinking of sofas. 
 
Now, I do not need to reject the minimalist view entirely.  In fact, it seems plausible 
with regard to ordinary language and how we might talk about S’s conceptions.  
However, this does not show that we can do without a richer account of cognitive 
content which reconstructs the subject’s conceptions or way of thinking about the 
world in terms of a description which more accurately captures their specific 
cognitive content.  Supporting a two-component picture avoids the problems with 
opting for either view exclusively, and appears to better account for the data in these 
cases, i.e. intuitions about ordinary attitude ascribing practice, and concepts as 
understood in the psychological literature.  The worry for Goldberg, according to the 
view of concepts and cognitive content I have developed, is that we cannot neatly 
distinguish between S’s (public) concept of sofas, and her theoretical beliefs relating 
to sofas, since on my view these are intimately related.  Furthermore, S’s cognitive 
content associated with SOFA is related to this information, which we can use 
descriptions to capture, and to distinguish between sofa1 and sofa2. 
 
4. Externalist individuation in perceptual psychology 
In the second part of Chapter 3 I will consider two versions of the view that 
perceptual psychology is fundamentally at odds with internalism.  The challenge 
these views pose to internalism and narrow content is two-fold.  First, on one view 
narrow content is not required in perceptual psychology.  On another, the ascription 
of narrow content is deemed problematic.  One possible consequence of these views 
is that they may imply, or motivate, general anti-internalism in psychology.  This 
would put pressure on the position developed in Chapter 2 where I argued that the 




conceptual structures from psychology have, and may be individuated by, narrow 
contents. 
 
I begin, in Section 4, by considering Burge’s view that psychology presupposes an 
externalist view of psychological individuation.  Should this view be correct, it 
stands as a direct competitor to the internalist view I developed in Chapter 2, since if 
the relevant states are individuated broadly, then mental content will be wide, 
supposing that such states are individuated by their contents.  Burge’s case for 
externalism about psychology rests on his interpretation of certain theories and 
phenomena in perceptual psychology.  In response, I will show that a proponent of 
narrow content can accept that some states and processes may have wide contents but 
that this does not show that there is no useful notion of narrow content for both 
perception and thought. 
 
4.1 Burge on the individuation of perceptual representations 
In several works, Burge (1986a; 2007; 2009b; 2010) makes the case for externalism 
about the individuation of perceptual representations based on claims about how such 
representations are individuated in psychology.  The challenge this approach raises to 
proponents of narrow content is that it purports to demonstrate fundamental 
externalist principles operative in psychology which give no role to narrow content.  
Burge’s central thesis is summarised as follows: 
 
…the natures of…perceptual states are what they are through a systematic 
network of causal relations between instances of the environmental attributes 
and processes that entered into the formation of the specific kinds of 
perceptual states that an individual is capable of being in and that are as of 
(and even specify) those environmental attributes. (Burge 2010, 85) 
 
On this view, a given perceptual representation is what it is by virtue of its bearing 
patterns of causal relations to objects and properties at the subject’s actual 
environment, and these relations are constitutive of the state’s status as a particular 
type of perceptual representation.    For instance, a perceptual representation of some 
object O is a representation of O by virtue of constitutive relations between S and O 
at S’s actual world.  If this claim is right, then the perceptual representations of 




intrinsic duplicates S and T, whose perceptual states were formed on Earth and Twin 
Earth respectively, will be type-distinct because each subject’s representations are 
individuated by constitutive relations to the relevant kinds at their respective 
environments. 
 
At this juncture it is worth pointing out that perceptual representations are 
understood as accurate representations of specific distal objects/properties, and as 
such the relevant states are construed as essentially wide states because successful or 
accurate perception presupposes both relata.  For instance, for the statement ‘S 
perceives O’ to be true, it is necessary for S to stand in the right kind of relation to O.  
If S were to merely hallucinate that there is an O, then S perceives O would be false.  
A proponent of narrow content can accept that perceptual states such as S’s 
perception of O are wide mental states.  In Chapters 1 and 2 I defended the view that 
the content of general concepts is narrow and that this is compatible with accepting 
that singular thoughts have wide content.  In order for Burge’s account of perceptual 
psychology to raise doubts about the relevance of the notion of narrow content in 
psychology, Burge would need to show that there is no equivalent notion of general 
narrow content in perceptual psychology, and/or that individuation in psychology is 
in principle opposed to individuation by narrow contents. 
 
Now that we have Burge’s view in focus, I will consider two examples Burge draws 
on to demonstrate that perceptual psychology is fundamentally externalist.  In work 
that prompted an extensive debate between externalists and internalists, Burge 
(1986a) aimed to show that a contemporaneous computational theory of human 
visual perception developed by Marr (1982) could be interpreted as presupposing a 
version of externalism.  More recently, Burge (2009b; 2010) has made the same 
claims about perceptual psychology in general, and one example he appeals to is the 
phenomenon of colour constancy.  I will consider these two cases and assess whether 
Burge’s case for externalism shows that there is no suitable role for narrow content 
in perceptual psychology. 
 




4.1.1 Marr’s theory of vision 
The first example comes from Burge’s (1986a) interpretation of Marr’s (1982) 
computational theory of vision. Marr’s project was to provide an account of visual 
representation that explained the construction of a three-dimensional representation 
of objects from two-dimensional retinal images.  Burge quotes a passage from Marr 
(1982) which he takes to show that Marr’s account of perceptual representations 
presupposes externalist individuation: 
 
The purpose of these representations is to provide useful descriptions of 
aspects of the real world. The structure of the real world therefore plays an 
important role in determining both the nature of the representations that are 
used and the nature of the processes that derive and maintain them. An 
important part of the theoretical analysis is to make explicit the physical 
constraints and assumptions that have been used in the design of the 
representations and processes...It is of critical importance that the tokens 
[representational particulars] one obtains [in the theoretical analysis] 
correspond to real physical changes on the viewed surface; the blobs, lines, 
edges, groups, and so forth that we shall use must not be artefacts of the 
imaging process, or else inferences made from their structure backwards to 
the structures of the surface will be meaningless. (Marr 1982, 43-44) 
 
From this passage, Burge (1986a, 27) makes the following point: 
 
Marr's claim that the structure of the real world figures in determining the 
nature of the representations that are attributed in the theory is tantamount to 
the chief point about representation or reference that generates our non-
individualist thought experiments… (Burge 1986a, 27) 
 
The important point for Burge’s interpretation is where the real world plays a 
determining role in the nature of the representations attributed.  With this in mind, 
Burge (1986a) considers a Twin Earth scenario involving a subject on Earth, call her 
‘Visua’
38
, and another intrinsically identical subject, Twin Visua, on Twin Earth.  On 
Earth, Visua perceives certain shadows and sometimes misperceives visually 
indistinguishable cracks as shadows.  On Twin Earth, there are no shadows, and so 
Visua only ever perceives cracks.  Visua and Twin Visua’s perceptual experiences 
are subjectively indistinguishable, that is, things seem the same from each subject’s 
perspective.  According to Burge, however, Visua would represent shadows as 
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shadows as well as cracks as shadows, whilst Twin Visua would represent the cracks 
as cracks.  This is taken to follow as a consequence of the reading of Marr which 
says that attributions of representations are made by reference to the normal distal 
objects detected, and which are causally responsible for the formation of those states. 
 
The importance of this consequence for Burge is that despite Visua and Twin Visua 
being in identical internal states, and things being subjectively indistinguishable, 
their perceptual representations are type distinct.  If Burge is correct, then the 
contents of perceptual representations will be wide, relating to the specific properties 
represented by internally identical, but type distinct, perceptual states. 
 
4.1.2 Colour constancy 
A second example that Burge uses to support this view is that of colour constancy 
(Burge, 2010).  Colour constancy is the phenomenon that the perceptual system can 
represent the colour of objects as being the same even through changes in ambient 
lighting which affect the appearance of the object.  For instance, consider the 
representation of a red wall where the perceptual system keeps track of the property 
red.  If a different coloured light was projected onto the wall, then despite the change 
affecting the phenomenology of the perceiver’s perceptual experience of the wall, the 
perceptual system keeps track of the objective colour of the wall and represents the 
same property, red.  Consequently, the property represented is constant through 
changes in ambient lighting which may affect the phenomenology of the relevant 
state.  According to Burge this shows that perceptual representations are 
fundamentally externalist in that they represent specific environmental properties. 
 
A common theme can be identified in these two cases.  In the Marr example, Visua 
and Twin Visua had subjectively identical experiences, and yet were held to 
represent different properties.  In colour constancy, what is represented is likewise 
not explicitly tied to how things seem subjectively in experience, as perceptual 
representation relates to specific features of the local environment.  What this 
suggests is that perceptual content does not relate to subjective features of experience, 
such as phenomenal character.  Burge specifically notes that the relevant cases in 




perceptual psychology make no reference to phenomenology, apparently holding that 
all mental content is wide.  On the face of it, this would rule out the account of 
narrow content developed in Chapter 2 since this was based partly on the 
phenomenal properties of perceptual states. 
 
4.2 Responses to the examples 
In this section I will consider two responses to Burge’s case for externalism, and 
show that narrow content is consistent with psychology. 
 
4.2.1 Computational content and the contents of experience 
The first point to note is that there is still debate about the consequences of Marr’s 
theory for the notion of content.  Segal (1988) and Prinz (2000) have outlined 
internalist construals of Marr’s theory which aim to show that the theory is 
compatible with ascribing narrow representational content.  Both Segal and Prinz 
contend that Visua and Twin Visua could plausibly represent the same heterogeneous 
property, aptly named ‘crackdow’ by Segal, to reflect that Visua cannot distinguish 
between the property of being a shadow or a crack.  This property is shared by 
shadows and cracks, and relates to the way in which both properties appear 
subjectively indistinguishable to Visua.  Such a view would stand as a counter to 
Burge’s claim that Marr and other perceptual psychologists appeal to the specific 
properties at the relevant environment in order to individuate the relevant 
representations.  A different approach is taken by Egan (1992; 1995; 2009; 2010) 
who has defended the view that computational processes are not individuated by 
their contents.  If this view is right, then Marr’s representations should not be 




I do not consider any of these positions in detail here, as this would require much 
more space than is available.  Instead, I want to suggest a way that narrow content 
can be motivated even if we accept much of Burge’s position.  Suppose that Burge is 
right about Marr and that perceptual psychologists typically construe computational 
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representations as fundamentally externalist.  Rather than arguing that perceptual 
psychologists should attribute heterogeneous narrow contents to computational 
representations, a different kind of point stemming from the issues discussed by 
Segal and Prinz can be raised.  What seems to drive their accounts of the Visua 
scenario is that an important feature of the scenario relates to the fact that Visua and 
Twin Visua enjoy states that are subjectively indistinguishable.  By introducing a 
common narrow content that represents a more generic property, crackdow, shared 
by shadows and cracks, this approach aims to capture the sense in which things are 
subjectively indistinguishable to Visua and Twin Visua.  However, what may cause a 
problem for this proposal in relation to the Marr debate is that it’s not obvious that at 
the computational level there is a need to introduce narrow contents.  In addition, the 
proponent of narrow content needn’t aim to refute all bases for wide content, which 
has typically been the approach pursued in the literature.  However, this is not to 
accept that there is no interesting notion of narrow perceptual content. 
 
A different approach would be to distinguish computational perceptual contents, 
which might be wide, from other possible contents of perceptual states and 
representations.
40
  In particular, suppose that perceptual experiences have their own 
contents, distinguishable from the content associated with computational states or 
processes.  This is plausible in the colour constancy scenario, where a subject may 
keep track of the objective colour of the wall, whilst undergoing experiences with 
different phenomenal characters.  In Chapter 2 I introduced Tye’s (2000) account of 
phenomenal character according to which it is identical to a kind of representational 
content.  It is then possible to distinguish two contents in the colour constancy case: 
the content associated with objective perceptual representations involved in colour 
constancy, and the content associated with the changing perceptual experiences 
undergone by the subject.  Assuming that perceptual experiences have content, we 
can draw on the account of phenomenal internalism defended in Chapter 2 to show 
that colour constancy is consistent with narrow contents.  Thus, even granting that 
some strand of perceptual psychology may interpret certain states as representations 
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of specific properties at the local environment, this does not rule out narrow contents 
entirely.  What this could mean is that there are two kinds of perceptual content, 
relating to different aspects of perceptual representational states.  Wide content 
reflects the representation of the specific environmental property, whilst narrow 
content could reflect the phenomenal character of the relevant perceptual experience. 
 
In response to this bifurcation of perceptual content, Burge could hold that the 
supposed narrow content is not really content, as it merely reflects phenomenology 
and doesn’t represent anything.  This response is a version of a common objection 
raised against accounts of narrow content.  The point to make in response is that the 
narrow content of experience can be representational.  In Chapters 1 and 2 I drew on 
Shoemaker’s (2006) account of appearances to show that there is a kind of property 
that relates to the narrow content of certain concepts.  On Shoemaker’s view, objects 
have multiple phenomenal characters, since phenomenal characters are held to be 
properties of objects, relating to dispositions to cause experiences in perceivers.  It is 
possible to alter the view so that the contents associated with phenomenal character 
are the dispositional properties themselves while phenomenal character is a property 
of the subject’s experience, relating only to how things seem subjectively to the 
subject.  Thus, we can understand appearance properties in terms of the dispositional 
properties of objects to cause states with a given phenomenal character in the subject.  
Allowing perceptual experiences to represent appearances is a plausible account of 
the contents of experience.  Returning to the colour constancy example, where S 
undergoes a perceptual experience relating to the projected colour on the red wall, 
S’s experience may represent a dispositional property construed as a disposition of 
the wall together with the light source to produce the relevant phenomenal character 
of S’s experience.  Consequently, narrow content can be representational and of 
interest in psychology. 
 
4.2.2 Concepts and content 
The second main response is to reject the implication that psychology in general is 
fundamentally externalist.  Burge’s externalist construal of psychology seems to arise 
predominantly from reliance on the idea that perceptual representations must be 




individuated by wide contents.  If this view was generalized to psychology, then an 
externalist might hold that the view of concept individuation outlined in Chapter 2 is 
incorrect.  For instance, where computational representations and colour constancy 
mechanisms represent properties at a subject’s actual environment, the same point 
may be taken to hold of concepts.  However, I showed above that it is consistent to 
hold that computational and other perceptual representations may have wide contents, 
whilst also holding that the contents of perceptual experiences are narrow.  When we 
consider the treatment of concepts in psychology, externalism seems even less 
central. 
 
The problem in applying Burge’s strategy to the individuation of concepts is that 
when we consider the range of concepts discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, such as 
appearance, artefact, and functional concepts, then wide contents seem less suitable 
than narrow contents.  Take a subject’s ALGORITHM concept.  It is intuitive to hold 
that whatever is represented is common to possible worlds W1…Wn since differences 
in the relevant natural kind properties at these worlds will make no difference to the 
content of the concept ALGORITHM, as it will represent the same functional 
property irrespective of the relevant world.  Similarly, concepts that relate to 
appearance properties (such as those associated with colour perception) may have 
narrow contents that relate to the representation of dispositional properties, serving 
as suitable contents for both perceptual experience and general concepts of 
appearances.  Consequently, Burge’s construal of perceptual psychology can largely 
be accepted, without this posing a threat to narrow content, and more importantly to 
my claim that general concepts may be individuated by their narrow contents. 
 
5. Computational psychology and the case against narrow content 
In this section I evaluate Egan’s case for rejecting narrow content in perceptual 
psychology. 
 
5.1 Egan on computational individualism and mathematical content 
In Section 4 I noted that Burge’s construal of Marr’s theory is challenged by Egan.  
Egan (1992; 1995; 2009; 2010) contends that computational perceptual 




representations are specified without talking about what they represent, and that 
content ascriptions are based on pragmatic considerations to do with our interests in 
what a computational system functions to detect at its normal environment.  Egan’s 
central claim is as follows: 
 
 It would be a mistake…to conclude that the structures posited in 
 computational vision theories must (even in the gloss) represent their normal 
 distal cause, and to find in these accounts support for a causal or information-
 theoretic theory of content…Even within a single content assignment 
 (cognitive interpretation), no single, privileged relation is assumed to hold 
 between posited structures and the elements to which they are mapped. The 
 choice of a cognitive gloss is governed by explanatory considerations, which 
 we can, following Chomsky, characterize as ‘informal motivation’. (Egan 
 2010, 257) 
 
Egan therefore contends that the notion of content plays no role in the theories of 
scientific psychology.  The idea is that a theory like Marr’s is informally motivated 
by considering how visual perception works and how it allows external objects to be 
represented three-dimensionally.  The scientific theory, however, only deals with 
internal properties of the representational system, and talk about representational 
content amounts to a semantic interpretation of the device based on informal 
motivation and our parochial interests in what computational mechanisms may 
represent at their normal environments.  Thus, according to Egan (2009; 2010), 
representational content does not play a part in the central aims of computational 
perceptual psychology, which are to explicate the computational processes involved 
in perception.  Instead, computational psychology is individualistic, so that the kinds 
of perceptual states of interest in psychology should be individuated purely in terms 
of the computational processes themselves.  The status of the computational structure 
as a representation is therefore different from the sense in which Burge and others 




While Egan places content outside of serious scientific theory, she holds that the 
informal contents ascribed will be wide, not narrow.  The central reason for this is 
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that, as noted, pragmatically ascribing content to a given computational process 
relates to the informal motivations of the theory.  The idea is that we consider what 
initial questions motivate cognitive scientists to seek a computational description of a 
given process.  In the case of Marr’s theory the informal motivation can be 
understood as how a three-dimensional representation of some particular distal 
stimuli, such as a ball, can be constructed from a two-dimensional image constructed 
from light impacting on the retina.  Once the computational description is complete, 
we semantically interpret the relevant computational process by reference to what 
motivated the search for an account in the first place.  Consequently, the semantic 
gloss relates to the actual distal objects, and the content ascribed is wide. 
 
5.2 The case against narrow content 
To show why we should prefer wide content ascriptions over narrow content 
ascriptions for computational representations, Egan considers a version of the Twin 
Earth scenario.  The scenario aims to motivate the ascription of wide content by 
showing that ascriptions of narrow contents are problematic, and that our interests 
tend to relate to the actual local causes of perceptual representations.  On Earth, 
Visua is a mechanism that functions to detect changes in depth (property C1), and 
hence is a component in a larger perceptual system in an organism.  Twin Visua is 
internally identical and is said to spontaneously appear on Twin Earth as part of a 
fundamentally different organism, and detects a different unspecified property (C2), 
which Egan says is a function of local light, surfaces, and local optical laws (hence it 
is a perceptual property of some kind).  By considering what an account of narrow 
content is committed to in this scenario, the preference for wide content follows from 
showing a) that narrow content is problematic, and b) that wide content is preferable. 
 
Egan considers and rejects two possible versions of narrow content in this scenario.  
On the first version, Visua represents a set of properties which includes C1 and C2, as 
well as many other properties (C1…Cn) which would cause Visua to go into state S at 
possible worlds W1…Wn.  This view treats the content as either disjunctive (C1 OR 
C2 OR…) or conjunctive (C1 & C2 &…).  An initial problem for this kind of view is 
that disjunction makes content indeterminate, whereas if we are considering Visua 




only at W1 it is initially plausible that Visua would represent a single property, and 
conjunction makes content significantly bloated, and again we might prefer 
determinacy of content. 
 
The second view avoids these sorts of worries and takes Visua to represent an 
intermediate property, C3, which subsumes both properties C1 and C2.  The content 
ascribed to Visua and Twin Visua would relate to this single property C3.  Again, this 
view is familiar from Chapter 1 and Section 4 above, having the same form as the 
property crackdow.  However, Egan contends that attributing C3 to Visua and Twin 
Visua would be strange.  The reason it would be strange seems to be a consequence 
of the fact that ascribing C1 on Earth and C2 on Twin Earth is more natural than 
introducing an apparently ad hoc property C3, in part because C1 and C2 are, by 
hypothesis, such wildly different properties.  Any property C3 that subsumed C1 and 
C2 would be less natural than either C1 or C2, because C1 and C2 are specific 
environmental properties that could in principle be detected by scientific 
investigation, whereas C3 is not.  If C3 related to these different properties, it would 
be strange because, so the intuition goes, C1 and C2 just don’t seem to have anything 
in common.  This point seems plausible when taken for perceptual mechanisms like 
Visua which are understood to detect specific environmental properties. 
 
Egan supplements this criticism of narrow content by asking us to consider a 
publisher being commissioned to produce a textbook for users of the device, and the 
decision of whether to create world-specific textbooks which explain what Visua 
would represent at each world, or a single textbook which ascribes to Visua a narrow 
content which is either disjunctive/conjunctive or subsuming (C3).  Egan’s case for 
wide content being more useful is that having to hand a description of what Visua 
represents at a specific world is much more useful than a description that says Visua 
will detect any of C1…Cn, or instead C3.  This is because users would likely be 
interested only in the specific distal property at their environment.  Being told what 
other properties may be detected or that a more general property would be detected 
would therefore be less useful, perhaps irrelevant, to users of the textbook. 
 




5.3 In defence of narrow content 
There are three main responses to Egan’s case against narrow content that I will 
consider here.  First, Egan’s scenario may not relate to the internalist’s supervenience 
claim outlined in Chapter 1, which would mean that her critique of narrow content 
can be ignored.  Second, the mechanisms in the scenario are not cognitive subjects, 
and so the contents of these mechanisms may be subpersonal, as such, wide content 
may be appropriate whereas narrow content may be more suitable for personal level 
contents attributed to subjects.  Finally, the critique of subsuming narrow content 
may be successful in the particular example, but when we consider the contents of 
perception and thought, subsuming contents are much more plausible, thus the 
example fails to show that all applications of such narrow content would be ad hoc.  I 
consider each of these responses in more detail in the rest of Section 5. 
 
5.3.1 Supervenience and kinds of narrow content 
Egan’s main focus is in showing why narrow content can’t be representational.  
However, the internalist needn’t be worried about this for two reasons.  First, 
consider the nature of narrow content as intra-world narrow.  Twins share content 
within a world, or at worlds that are nomologically similar such that things seem the 
same at the relevant worlds.  In these cases, Twins will be in states with the same 
narrow content.  It is not clear how Egan’s scenario fits into this picture.  Since we 
are not considering whole subjects, we cannot tell whether things would seem the 
same despite the different environmental properties being represented.  Consequently, 
it is possible to hold that Visua in each scenario may have a certain kind of narrow 
content that does not relate to how things appear to the subject or to real world 
properties that are represented.  This leads to the second point.  The case at hand may 
best be understood by appealing to a version of narrow content as functional or 
conceptual role as articulated by Block (1988) and Loar (1988).  Such narrow 
content is not representational, but relates instead to an abstract account of a state’s 
relations to other states.  This may be suitable in the case of Visua where the 
perceptual subsystem will bear relations to other perceptual states, playing a 
systematic functional role in that system.  This would lead to a further addition to the 
pluralist view, allowing the distinction between narrow contents that relate to 




abstract functional roles, and those which relate to cognitive content and are 
genuinely representational. 
 
Two further related issues are relevant at this juncture.  Noting the peculiarities of the 
example, where Visua is a device within a larger perceptual system, this raises a 
question of what sort of content devices within perceptual mechanisms bear.  
Furthermore, when considering Egan’s criticism of narrow content as a general 
attack on narrow content, it may be appropriate in the specific example to hold that 
narrow contents are problematic.  However, as already indicated above, when we 
consider normal subjects it is plausible that there are various kinds of properties that 
they can represent, not all of which will relate to specific environmental properties of 
the kind Visua is taken to detect.  I consider these two remaining points in more 
detail below. 
 
5.3.2 Personal and subpersonal content 
A fundamental issue of interest is what sort of device Visua is and what sort of 
content it should be attributed.  Evans (1982), and more recently Bermudez (2009), 
hold that the content of certain subpersonal states are not consciously accessible by 
subjects, although such content may play a relevant role in cognitive tasks.  In 
contrast, personal level states will have content that is consciously accessible.  An 
example of consciously accessible content relates to states with phenomenal 
character.  For instance, a perceptual experience of a red ball will have phenomenally 
conscious content relating to the redness of the experience.  In light of this, states that 
have such content might include mechanisms involved in perceptual processing, 
which may also relate in some way to states which we lack conscious access to.  For 
example, we do not have conscious access to all of the kinds of representations 
attributed to the visual system by a theory like Marr’s, and consequently many of 
these perceptual representations will be subpersonal, however, we do have access to 
the content of other representations, i.e. the ones with personal level content.  In 
terms of the subpersonal/personal distinction, Egan’s example may fail to support her 




point since a case can be made that even if some subpersonal content is wide, we 




One reason to think that the mechanisms in Egan’s example are good candidates for 
possessing subpersonal content is because Visua and Twin Visua’s contents do not 
seem to be accessible to consciousness. Such content could be wide content, relating 
to the distal properties represented by each mechanism at the relevant world.  
Granting this, however, does not cause problems for proponents of narrow content. 
 
Recall from Chapter 2 and Section 4 above, where I held that there is a kind of 
narrow content relating to perceptual experience and to phenomenal character in 
particular.  We can assume that the contents of Visua and Twin Visua will not share 
phenomenal character, since by hypothesis C1 and C2 are wildly different properties.  
Thus, we should assume that they would not cause states with the same phenomenal 
character.  This is a problem for Egan’s contention that we should reject narrow 
content on the basis of her example. 
 
I have noted a distinction between personal and subpersonal content, and conceded 
that some subpersonal level content may be wide, while narrow content is perhaps 
best placed to play the role of personal level content as it reflects how things are 
represented as being.  However, both subpersonal and personal states could have 
narrow contents and I do not need to speculate here on their connection, if any.  Thus, 
while Visua may have subpersonal narrow content, which does not relate to how 
things appear to be or to real-world properties, such content may be purely functional 
in nature. 
 
A problem for Egan is that her scenario is very unclear, both as it stands and for the 
implications it purports to have for whole perceptual systems and subpersonal and 
personal level content.  If we suppose that Visua lacks cognitive content, being 
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simply a subpersonal system that detects changes in something other than an 
appearance property, then the two-component view can coherently hold that Visua 
has a wide content that represents the relevant property at the actual world, and 
perhaps a narrow content that reflects the functional role of Visua within the wider 
perceptual system of the organism she is a part of.  However, this poses no threat to 
the cognitive and representational role of narrow content when we consider different 
scenarios involving the narrow states and contents of whole perceptual systems and 
subjects.  Consequently, Egan’s scenario and interpretation pose no threat to the 
nature and role of narrow content, and as I have noted there is a case that some form 
of narrow content may play a role within her scenario. 
 
Consider the standard Twin Earth scenario.  Take S’s prototype concept WATER 
that represents the same set of superficial properties as T’s prototype concept.  
Suppose that S and T’s states also have a kind of wide content, relating to the 
externalist’s notion of content where S represents H2O only, and T XYZ.  When we 
are considering the contents of S’s mental representations, from S’s perspective she 
may be unaware that at some level of description there is a kind of content that 
relates exclusively to H2O, and similarly for T and XYZ.  Such content would 
apparently not be consciously accessible, that is, it would be subpersonal content. 
The narrow contents of S’s prototype, on the other hand, will likely be personal 
content as it is consciously accessible to S.  This can be understood in terms of the 
basis of this narrow content in the appearances of the properties represented, which 
relate directly to how S and T represent things as being from their perspectives. 
 
Returning to Egan’s scenario, Visua and Twin Visua are taken to represent different 
properties.  Suppose that C1 and C2 do appear the same to the relevant organisms.  In 
this case, then there could be a kind of narrow content relating to appearance 
properties.  If they do not appear the same, then the contents are likely subpersonal, 
since if Visua and Twin Visua are intrinsic duplicates, then by hypothesis things 
must appear the same to them if they bear contents that are at the personal level, 
since, as I argued in Chapter 2, phenomenal character supervenes on intrinsic 
properties.  Consequently, an internalist can accept that Visua and Twin Visua would 




have wide contents, because the paradigmatic narrow content developed in Chapters 
1 and 2 seem closer to the notion of personal content, reflecting how subjects 
represent things as being from their perspective.  This suggests that an internalist 
might not even need to argue against Egan that Visua and Twin Visua would bear 
wide content.  Again, the example suffers from not being particularly clear, 
especially with regard to implications for the content of the perceptual 
representations of normal subjects, and the content of concepts. 
 
5.3.3 The contents of perception and thought 
A final point to note then is that when we consider the contents of perceptual 
representations and concepts of normal subjects, the example fails to show that any 
of the varieties of narrow content considered are problematic.  I have already granted 
that in the specific case of Visua and Twin Visua representing C1 and C2, the 
internalist can accept that representing C3 or conjunctive/disjunctive contents would 
be implausible and ascribing wide contents more useful.  However, these kinds of 
narrow contents are much more palatable in the case of perceptual representations 
and the contents of certain concepts. 
 
As discussed in Section 4, perceptual representations seem to be capable of having a 
range of contents that are not restricted to the specific distal causes of those states.  
For instance, it is plausible that dispositional properties are represented in so far as 
perceptual states might have general, as opposed to singular, contents.  A perceptual 
state S might have a wide content relating to the distal cause of that state, such as red, 
yet S might also represent a more general property of appearing red, which is a kind 
of dispositional property that relates to narrow content.  As I also indicated above, a 
representational theory for general concepts may countenance more properties than 
basic scientific properties like changes in depth (C1).   Certain properties are 
plausibly identical at worlds W1…Wn, and many of them subsume different 
underlying natural kind properties.  Take the property of being an algorithm that does 
not depend on the specific fundamental properties at W1…Wn.  Representation of 
such a property may not be suitable for a device like Visua, which merely tracks 
specific environmental properties, but is a typical property represented by general 




concepts.  Returning to the property of appearing red, this property is sharable by 
kinds with different fundamental properties but which cause in S and her intrinsic 
duplicates experiences with the same phenomenal character.  Dispositional redness 
would therefore be similar to C3 in being a more general property than the underlying 
fundamental properties, and in a sense subsumes them.  In Egan’s example, the 
proposed subsuming properties do appear strange.  This strangeness, however, is 
only because Egan’s scenario makes them so, and some of the properties represented 
by human perception and thought can be understood as subsuming different natural 
kind properties without naturalness being a problem. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In Chapter 3 I considered two approaches to putting pressure on internalism and 
narrow content.  Social externalism purports to show that concepts and cognitive 
content can relate directly to facts about the linguistic community.  In response, I 
showed that Burge’s arthritis argument and Goldberg’s minimalist view face several 
difficulties.  Most importantly, they appear to be at odds with work in psychology.  
The second approach appeals to work in perceptual psychology and purports to show 
either that the science is fundamentally externalist, or that the ascription of narrow 
content is highly problematic.  Against Burge I showed that his construal of the 
science is consistent with the ascription of narrow contents, thus a two-component 
theorist could endorse both wide and narrow contents.  I also suggested that his case 
for perceptual externalism doesn’t provide support for externalism about concepts.  
Against Egan’s critique of narrow content I noted that at the computational level 
there is a case that some forms of narrow content may not be required, but that Egan 
fails to rule-out all narrow content, and that her case does not provide a basis for 
rejecting narrow contents more generally, such as for general concepts.  Having 
shown that the view developed in Chapters 1 and 2 is not threatened by social 
externalism or approaches to individuation in perceptual psychology, in the next two 
















In Chapters 1 and 3 I outlined how Putnam (1975) and Burge’s (1979) arguments for 
externalism partly rely on assumptions about propositional attitude ascriptions.  From 
these cases externalist conclusions were drawn by highlighting which beliefs 
(concepts) are ascribed to subjects in Twin Earth, and other, scenarios.  In Chapter 4 
I consider the nature of propositional attitude ascriptions in more detail with a view 
to showing what is wrong with basing a case for externalism on attitude ascriptions, 
and that narrow content plays an important semantic role.  To this end, I show how 
the account of narrow content developed in Chapters 1 and 2 is consistent with a 
Fregean theory of attitude ascriptions according to which the truth conditions of 
some attitude ascriptions relate to the narrow contents ascribed.  Such a view faces a 
number of objections and I consider two of the main objections raised against 
Fregean accounts, with particular attention to how an internalist may respond. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows.  In Section 2, I highlight problematic 
assumptions about propositional attitude ascriptions as construed by Putnam and 
Burge.  I then outline an internalist alternative, which shows that acceptance of 
externalist conclusions from cases involving attitude ascriptions is not mandatory.  In 
Section 3 I show that internalists may hold that narrow content plays a semantic role 
in ordinary attitude ascriptions in so far as Fregeanism about attitude ascriptions is 
true.  In linking the role of narrow content to Fregean accounts, it is necessary to 
consider the debate between Fregeans and Millians.  In defence of a Fregean account 
as a basis for narrow content, I consider two objections.  First, I respond to Travis’ 
(2008) objection to the role of opacity in Fregean attitude ascriptions.  Second, in 




Section 4, I consider Soames’ (2002) externalist and minimalist account of attitude 
ascriptions, which, if correct, would show that Fregean accounts are wrong about the 
semantics of attitude ascriptions.  Finally, in Section 5, I contrast my account with 
existing internalist accounts from Segal (2007) and Chalmers (2007), and explain 
how my approach provides an alternative way to respond to an objection raised by 
Soames’ (2002) against the role of narrow content in attitude ascriptions. 
 
2. Externalist arguments and the semantics of attitude ascriptions 
The Twin Earth and arthritis cases Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979) use to drive 
their externalist conclusions rest partly on the role and nature of attitude ascriptions.  
If we have reason to resist the accounts of attitude ascriptions in these scenarios, then 
we can resist the conclusions and thereby provide further support to the internalist 
responses considered in Chapters 1 and 2.  In this section I explain how the 
externalist accounts are partially motivated by assumptions about natural language 
meaning and the concepts expressed by terms in public language, and then draw on 
Chapters 1 and 2 in order to cast doubt on the assumptions.  In addition, I will show 
that the externalist cases are consistent with ascribing attitude contents which relate 
to the account of concepts and narrow content developed in Chapters 1 and 2. 
 
2.1 Externalist arguments and attitude ascriptions 
Consider once more Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario.  We are to consider a subject on 
Earth, Oscar, and his intrinsic duplicate Twin Oscar on Twin Earth.  At their 
respective worlds the watery substance is H2O and XYZ.  Attitude ascriptions are 
used as one way to contrast what intrinsic duplicates believe and how we talk about 
their beliefs.  For instance, we are urged to accept that an utterance of (1) is true, 
while (2), which uses the same sentence to attribute a belief to Twin Oscar, is false: 
 
(1) Oscar believes that water is wet 
(2) Twin Oscar believes that water is wet 
 
Read literally, (1) and (2) would appear to attribute the same belief to Oscar and 
Twin Oscar that the kind referred to with ‘water’, by the speaker, is wet.  However, 




by hypothesis we cannot use ‘water’ to express Twin Oscar’s belief because ‘water’ 
in our mouths refers to H2O.  Thus, it is held that we need to use ‘twin water’ to 
report a true belief of Twin Oscar’s.  Note that Twin Earthers can use ‘water’ to truly 
report on Twin Oscar’s beliefs about twin water, but can’t use ‘water’ to say true 
things about Oscar’s water beliefs, since in their language ‘water’ refers to twin 
water.  Consequently, given the meaning of ‘water’ in English, if we want to report 
Twin Oscar’s belief, we should say something like ‘Twin Oscar believes that twin 
water is wet’. 
 
Putnam’s thesis was about the meaning of ‘water’ in natural language.  Two 
important assumptions can be highlighted at this juncture.  The first assumption is 
that when a speaker uses an attitude ascribing sentence like (1), terms like ‘water’ are 
natural kind terms that pick out the local natural kind properties that the speaker is 
acquainted with. The problem here is that Putnam has not provided independent 
support for this treatment of natural language semantics.  As noted in Chapter 1, it is 
plausible that ‘water’ or WATER may represent a non-natural kind.  Suppose then 
that ‘water’ needn’t refer exclusively to H2O.  Where a concept like WATER is 
individuated by narrow content, what the attitude ascribing sentence may express 
relates in part to the relevant narrow content of the speaker’s concepts.  This allows 
that if the speaker’s WATER concept represents a set of non-natural kind properties, 
then using ‘water’ in (1) would not be restricted to the notion of a natural kind term, 




The second assumption builds on this point about the concepts of both speaker and 
ascribee.  Note that the position assumes that Oscar and Twin Oscar have beliefs 
about different properties (H2O, XYZ), however, in Chapters 1 and 2 I made the case 
that such subjects may share concepts that represent the same properties, for instance 
superficial appearance properties.  Two other possible concepts were identified, 
where Oscar might represent a heterogeneous kind that subsumes both H2O and 
XYZ, and where Oscar represents the local natural kind by way of a description.  
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Hence both assumptions can be resisted.  Consequently, we can deny that intrinsic 
duplicates in Twin Earth scenarios must be ascribed beliefs (and concepts) about the 
specific kinds and properties at their actual worlds.  Rejecting these two assumptions 
would allow for internalist readings of (1) and (2), as I will show below. 
 
Before developing an internalist proposal in more detail it is worth highlighting the 
similar assumptions at work in Burge’s (1979) case for semantic externalism as this 
likewise revolves around assumptions about attitude ascriptions.  As noted in 
Chapter 3, Burge’s (1979) argument for psychological externalism rests on ascribing 
propositional attitudes to a subject, Alf, who has incomplete mastery of the term 
‘arthritis’.  The standard case involves Alf incorrectly believing that his arthritis has 
begun to afflict his thigh.  Burge contends that it is part of our ordinary attitude 
ascribing practices to use (3) to reflect Alf’s propositional attitude in this case: 
 
(3) Alf believes that he has arthritis in his thigh 
 
Motivation for (3) is given by noting that Alf has many true beliefs involving the 
term ‘arthritis’, such as that his father had arthritis, that arthritis is a painful condition, 
and that he has arthritis in his wrists and ankles.  An utterance of (3) is then taken to 
be appropriate since Alf apparently has sufficient competence with the term in order 
for (3) to accurately report what he believes.  The case for externalism is established 
by comparing Alf in a counterfactual scenario in which ‘arthritis’ is used by the 
linguistic community to refer to a broader condition that may also afflict the thigh, 
which we can call ‘tharthritis’.  In this counterfactual situation, (3) would be a true 
ascription since ‘arthritis’ refers to the broader condition and Alf is correct that he 
has this condition in his thigh.  Externalism follows since Alf remains internally 
identical in each situation, and the relevant difference in his propositional attitude 
stems from the meaning of the attitude ascribing sentences used to express his beliefs 
as determined in the local linguistic community.  Consequently, social externalism 
about propositional attitudes is true, since we cannot express the content of Alf’s 
thoughts without recourse to the specific linguistic facts in the subject’s actual 




linguistic community which directly affect our attitude ascribing practices, and, 
crucially, the contents of the propositional attitudes. 
 
Various reinterpretations of Burge’s thought experiment have been proposed (e.g. 
Crane 1991; Segal 2000), many of which focus on the idea that it is wrong to say that 
(3) adequately reflects what Alf believes, and so reject the view that Alf has a false 
belief concerning the concept of arthritis in the first scenario.  Instead, it is held that 
in both cases Alf thinks of the condition in his thigh in exactly the same way, as 
something more like tharthritis, and so has the same true belief in each scenario 
reflected by (4): 
 
(4) Alf believes that he has tharthritis in his thigh 
 
As noted in Section 2 of Chapter 3, Burge rejects the view that we can identify such 
a concept, by resisting the kind of view associated with prototypes where concepts 
are individuated in part by a subject’s dispositions to classify kinds into certain 
categories.  I showed that this is at odds with work on concepts in psychology and as 
such we have reason to resist Burge’s social externalist view of mental individuation.  
In addition, Burge’s position is similar to Putnam’s approach where Putnam held that 
‘water’ in natural language on Earth represents H2O, whereas the term means 
something else in a counterfactual scenario, and differences in belief follow from 
differences in the semantics of the attitude ascribing sentence.  Hence, the same 
points raised against Putnam apply here. 
 
What seems right about Burge’s view, as noted in Chapter 3, is that we don’t seem to 
reinterpret a subject whenever they appear to have a non-standard concept.  However, 
I showed that in the arthritis case there is sufficient reason to deny that Alf meets 
minimal conditions on possessing a concept that represents arthritis exclusively.  
Instead, Alf plausibly has a concept that represents the more heterogeneous kind 
tharthritis.  Since English doesn’t have the term ‘tharthritis’, a normal speaker of 
English will not have access to a relevant term, and may need to qualify the attitude 
ascription, since (4) would only be an option as a result of philosophers introducing 




the term ‘tharthritis’ into the language.  However, the lack of a relevant term should 
not mislead us into holding that since an ordinary speaker might utter (3), then we 
can generate the externalist conclusion.  Like Putnam, Burge commits to the 
assumptions that the relevant attitude ascribing sentences have a fixed externalist 
semantics, and that the relevant subjects represent different properties.  Resisting 
both these assumptions allows us to block the externalist conclusions.  Before 
showing how attitude ascriptions are compatible with the account of narrow content 
developed in Chapters 1 and 2, there is a third assumption worth highlighting. 
 
2.2 The naïve view of attitude ascriptions 
What is crucial for the externalist conclusions in these cases is that attitude 
ascriptions are reliable indicators of the beliefs and concepts of the ascribees in the 
relevant scenarios.  Thus, for the conclusions about differences in belief to follow 
from the nature of the attitude ascribing sentence, it must be the case that attitude 
ascriptions genuinely ascribe a subject’s belief or concept.  Such a position relies on 
what I will call the ‘naïve view’ of propositional attitude ascriptions: 
 
(Naïve view) True attitude ascribing sentences ascribe the specific propositional  
  attitude of the ascribee 
 
Bach (1997) has argued against something very close to the naïve view, which he 
calls the specification assumption.  This is the idea that attitude ascriptions specify 
the precise content of a subject’s belief or other propositional attitude.  On such a 
view, the truth of an attitude ascription depends on whether the proposition expressed 
is identical to the content of the subject’s relevant propositional attitude.  The basis 
of the specification assumption is the relational view of propositional attitudes, 
according to which, for example, Oscar’s belief expressed as ‘water is wet’ consists 
in Oscar’s standing in the belief relation to the relevant proposition expressed by 









The problem Bach identified for the standard account revolves around a variation of 
a puzzle about belief introduced by Kripke (1979) through the case of Peter and his 
beliefs about Paderewski. The worry is that an utterance of (5) may not specify the 
specific belief of Peter’s: 
 
(5) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent 
 
For instance, if Peter hears the name ‘Paderewski’ while listening to a performance 
on the radio, (5) might under-specify Peter’s belief which we might want to represent 
as (6): 
 
(6) Peter believes that Paderewski, the pianist, has musical talent 
 
Again, the same thing might occur if Peter believes something even closer to (7): 
 
(7) Peter believes that Paderewski, the pianist he heard on the radio, has musical 
talent 
 
On the standard view, the truth of the ascription depends on whether the content 
expressed by the embedded sentence specifies the subject’s attitude content.  
However, given the problem of under-specification of what subjects like Peter 
believe, Bach contends that the proposition expressed by the ascribing sentence need 
not specify the content exactly, but rather the subject’s belief must be such that it 
depends on the truth of the expressed proposition.  Thus, so long as (5), (6), and (7) 
express something the truth of which is required for Peter’s belief to be true, then 
they each may adequately describe a true belief of Peter’s, without fully specifying 
his belief.  From Bach, we can conclude that ascriptions may not properly specify 
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content in many (if not all) cases since the specific way a subject believes a given 
content might not be easily expressible, or knowable to the speaker. 
 
Given the rejection of the two externalist assumptions above, Bach’s criticism of the 
standard view may not be strong enough.  Where our interest is in what S represents, 
and how S represents things as being, then we need to be careful not to make 
externalist assumptions about natural language and about the concepts of the subject 
whose beliefs we are talking about.  Bach held that attitude ascriptions don’t strictly 
specify what is believed, but can nonetheless be true.  Here, we may need to be more 
careful, since the ascription ‘Oscar believes water is wet’ may not express something 
which describes Oscar’s belief in Bach’s sense.  Where the externalist contends that 
this ascription does accurately reflect Oscar’s belief, Oscar is taken to have a belief 
relating to H2O being wet.  However, if Chapters 1 and 2 are accepted, then this may 
not accurately reflect what is believed, nor express something the truth of which is 
crucial for Oscar’s belief.  This is because if Oscar’s WATER prototype represents 
watery stuff (a set of superficial watery properties common to H2O, XYZ, and so on), 
then the standard wide content does not reflect the relevant content of Oscar’s belief, 
as this wide content pertains only to H2O. 
 
The objection to raise against the naïve view is that in addition to the underlying 
belief of the ascribee potentially being more complex than the attitude ascribing 
sentence, we need to be careful not to assume that the terms we use to talk about 
belief are restricted to an externalist semantics.  I noted above that an internalist may 
respond to Putnam’s and Burge’s views by drawing attention to the way that 
subjects’ concepts may represent a set of non-natural kind properties.  What I did not 
say is that we must always try to use language in such a way that we specify these 
properties precisely.  The internalist can therefore accept Burge’s point that we don’t 
normally reinterpret, since this is consistent with rejecting the naïve view and with 
holding that a speaker may use the standard attitude ascribing sentence without using 
it to ascribe a wide content to the ascribee. 
 




It’s time to take stock.  On the one hand, I have suggested that we should resist the 
assumptions that attitude ascribing sentences have an externalist semantics, that the 
subjects in the relevant cases must represent different properties, and the naïve view 
of attitude ascriptions.  On the other hand, I have noted that Burge is correct in that 
we don’t normally introduce new terminology and utter sentences like (4) to try to 
reinterpret precisely what a subject believes.  This latter point may look like a 
problem for the internalist who wishes to allow that attitude ascriptions can relate to 
a subject’s narrow contents and narrowly individuated concepts.  In the next section I 
outline what an internalist alternative might look like which accepts that we 
shouldn’t aim to try to produce sentences like (4). 
 
2.3 An internalist alternative 
An internalist alternative can be outlined which allows that uses of attitude ascribing 
sentences like ‘Oscar believes that water is wet’, may be used in such a way to 
express the ascribee’s idiosyncratic concepts and narrow contents, without requiring 
the speaker to introduce novel terminology.  In Chapter 2 I noted alternatives to the 
view that Oscar possesses a natural kind concept that refers exclusively to H2O.  
Furthermore, I have noted that there is insufficient support for the view that ‘water’ 
in English functions exclusively as a natural kind term that rigidly refers to H2O in 
all possible worlds.  Consequently, sentences like (1) and (2) might be used in order 
to express beliefs which do not relate to natural kind concepts possessed by Oscar 
and Twin Oscar.  Suppose then that we want to express the way in which Oscar and 
Twin Oscar think of their respective watery substances in the same way.  Used in this 
way, (1) and (2) could be used to truly report on the beliefs shared by Oscar and 
Twin Oscar.  Given the range of concepts identified in Chapter 2, a speaker who 
utters (1) may have several different things in mind as being what they intend to 
communicate about Oscar’s belief.  In order to make this content explicit, we could 
introduce sentences which use terms closer to what the speaker has in mind.  Thus, if 
a speaker intends to reflect Oscar’s prototype concept WATER, roughly equivalent 
to water’s being a kind of watery substance (being a clear, colourless liquid, etc), (8) 
could reflect the proposition intended to be expressed: 
 




(8) Oscar believes that the clear, colourless liquid that falls as rain is wet 
 
Alternatively, we could substitute ‘watery stuff’ for the description, which can then 
be used to say something true of Twin Oscar as well, giving (9) and (10): 
 
(9) Oscar believes that the watery stuff is wet 
(10) Twin Oscar believes that the watery stuff is wet 
 
It’s worth noting that where ‘watery stuff’ picks out the set of superficial watery 
properties, then this may include being wet.  This would apparently render (9) and 
(10) trivially true, in effect that Oscar believes, for instance, that the wet stuff is wet.  
However, what is important here is the general position, since we can change the 
case to make it non-trivial.  For example, in (4), Alf is said to believe that he has 
tharthritis in his thigh, where ‘tharthritis’ is again a short-hand for a more complex 
description of the properties he associates with ‘arthritis’.  Here, the report is not 
trivial, since having this condition in one’s thigh is not part of the meaning of 
‘arthritis’ as understood by Alf. 
 
As noted above, the internalist does not have to rely on using novel terminology in 
order to express a proposition that relates to the shared narrow content of Oscar’s and 
Twin Oscar’s beliefs.  (9) and (10) (like (4) above) are intended to reflect only what a 
speaker may intend to express, while the sentence they actually use may just be (1) 
and (2), involving the term ‘water’.  Given the rejection of the assumptions that were 
operative in Putnam’s and Burge’s accounts, this position is available to the 
internalist since we do not have to agree with the externalist that the attitude 
ascribing sentence must be read with an externalist semantics (such as taking ‘water’ 
to pick out H2O).  If ‘water’ can be used to refer to watery stuff, i.e. the set 
instantiating the watery properties, then (1) and (2) are consistent with a version of 
internalism. 
 
I have considered the case where Oscar and Twin Oscar’s concepts relate to 
superficial properties.  However, in Chapters 1 and 2 I allowed that there is a kind of 




narrow content that relates to natural kind properties and to subsuming 
heterogeneous kind properties.  In the case of natural kind concepts, Oscar and Twin 
Oscar will represent different properties.  The question remains as to whether an 
utterance of (1) and (2) can be used to express something that Oscar and Twin Oscar 
both believe. 
 
One way to show this is to appeal to the notion of relativized propositions developed 
in Chapter 1.  Relativized propositions are such that different thinkers can entertain 
the same proposition, but once we consider the proposition at the relevant context of 
assessment thinkers may represent different properties picked out by the proposition.  
For instance, suppose there is a relativized proposition associated with ‘water is wet’ 
comprised of place-holders for ‘water’ and ‘wet’ which we can represent as an empty 
or un-filled proposition.  The relativized proposition is associated with a mode of 
presentation, determined by the subject’s underlying conceptual structures associated 
with ‘water’ and ‘wet’.  The mode of presentation relates to how the subject 
represents things as being, as given by the cognitive content of their concepts.  The 
modes of presentation function to pick out the relevant natural kinds at a relevant 
context that relate to how the subject represents things as being.  Where Oscar and 
Twin Oscar both represent the natural kind property associated with ‘water’ in terms 
of superficial, predominantly appearance, properties, their modes of presentation will 
pick out whatever natural kinds have these properties at the relevant context.  Thus, 
Oscar and Twin Oscar can believe the same relativized proposition expressed by 
‘water is wet’, and in doing so represent different properties, where on Earth ‘water’ 
picks out the property of H2O, and on Twin Earth the property of XYZ. 
 
If this is right, then we should allow that what is expressed by an attitude ascription 
can depend on what the speaker intends, which can range over the kinds of water 
concepts identified in Chapter 2 (watery stuff as a functional-appearance kind, water 
as a natural kind or a heterogeneous kind, and a scientific description of water as 
composed of H2O).  When we consider the case where Oscar and Twin Oscar share a 
mental representation of watery stuff as a heterogeneous kind that subsumes different 
natural kind properties, the attitude ascription will relate to the same content, and as 




in the case of superficial properties, there is no need to introduce relativized 
propositions. 
 
I have outlined the basic framework of what an internalist account might look like.  
However, the literature on attitude ascriptions is rich, and there is very little 
discussion relating to wide and narrow contents.  Thus, an externalist may contend 
that the proper treatment of attitude ascriptions is at odds with this internalist picture.  
In order to sharpen the debate, in Section 3 I will introduce the debate between 
Fregeans and Millians, and show how the internalist view comports with a version of 
Fregeanism.  The case against the internalist account can therefore be put partly in 
terms of whether Fregeanism is true.  To this end, after outlining the Fregean/Millian 
debate and showing how narrow content fits into the Fregean picture, I then consider 
an initial objection to Fregeanism, before considering a more detailed Millian 
alternative in Section 4 which threatens the Fregean internalist account developed in 
Section 3. 
 
3. Frege’s puzzle, opacity and transparency 
In this section I show how narrow content naturally fits within a Fregean account of 
attitude ascriptions, and consider an objection to Fregeanism from Travis (2008) 
which would raise doubts about the plausibility of attitude ascriptions expressing 
narrow contents. 
 
3.1 Frege’s puzzle 
The referential theory of names (hereby referred to as the ‘Millian’ theory) holds that 
the meaning or semantic content of a name is the individual the name refers to whilst 
the semantic content of a predicate is the property referred to.  The semantic content 
of the sentence ‘Superman flies’ can then be understood as deriving from the 
contents of its parts which can be represented by a proposition which contains both 
the individual referred to and the property attributed to the referent. 
 




A feature of a Millian semantic theory is that co-referring names should be 
substitutable whilst preserving the truth value of sentences in which they occur, so 
that (11) and (12) are both true: 
 
(11) Superman flies 
(12) Clark Kent flies 
 
This follows because each sentence expresses the same proposition since ‘Superman’ 
and ‘Clark Kent’ refer to the same individual and the same property is attributed to 
that individual.  Frege (2000) introduced the notion of sense partly as a response to 
the apparent failure of a Millian semantic theory to preserve truth value in belief 
contexts when co-referring names are substituted.  The problem for the Millian view 
is that it appears that (13) can be true whilst (14) false: 
 
(13) Lois believes that Superman can fly 
(14) Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly 
 
A further worry for a Millian semantic theory is that (15) would be literally false, 
while it appears to say something true about Lois: 
 
(15) Lois does not believe that Clark Kent can fly 
 
The question of the proper treatment of such attitude ascriptions is the focus of a 
recent debate between Fregeans and Millians.  Since Kripke’s (1980) critique of 
Frege’s notion of sense, the standard Fregean treatment of attitude ascriptions 
accepts the Millian view that the meaning of a name is its referent, and that this holds 
in attitude contexts, yet Fregeans contend that the truth conditions of attitude 
ascriptions depend in part on the senses, or modes of presentation, associated with 
the ascribing sentence.  On the Fregean account, we preserve Frege’s judgements of 
truth values in cases like (13) and (14) by claiming that modes of presentation are 
part of the semantic content of the attitude ascription which may affect the truth 
conditions of the ascription. 




One way to understand the debate between Fregeans and Millians is in terms of 
whether attitude ascriptions are opaque or transparent.  Attitude ascriptions are 
opaque when the truth conditions depend in part on the associated mode of 
presentation, and transparent when the truth conditions depend only on the Millian 
semantic content.  Opacity alters the truth value of a sentence by virtue of the name 
expressing or implying a mode of presentation that affects the truth conditions of the 
attitude ascription.  In such cases, the semantic contribution of the name includes the 
mode of presentation in addition to its referent.  Some Millians accept opacity in 
certain cases, and there is some disagreement among Millians as to the implications 
of opacity.  For instance, Braun (2006) denies that opacity ever affects truth value, 
while Soames (2002) argues that Millians should recognise two kinds of propositions 
in opaque contexts and so two kinds of truth conditions associated with transparent 
and opaque readings of an attitude ascribing sentence (these kinds of Millian 
responses will be discussed below).  As a result of opacity, Fregean truth conditions 
(TCs) can be expressed as follows: 
 
(Fregean TCs)  The utterance ‘S believes that X is F’ is true if and only if S 
   stands in the relation of belief to the proposition {X, F} and 




Similarly, Millian truth conditions for belief can be expressed as: 
 
(Millian TCs)  The utterance ‘S believes that X is F’ is true if and only if S 
   stands in the relation of belief to the proposition {X, F} 
 
If modes of presentation are expressed in certain attitude ascriptions, then 
Fregeanism is true.  However, as noted, some Millians either reject opacity 
completely, or deny that attitude ascriptions are ever entirely opaque.  Before 
considering both of these objections, in the next section I will show how the Fregean 
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 Again, it’s worth noting that some Fregeans take the constituents of propositions to be senses or 
modes of presentation, rather than individuals and properties.  However, the view I develop relates to 
the latter view, and it is that kind of account that I will focus on throughout. 




account provides the basis for a semantic role for narrow content in attitude 
ascriptions.  
 
3.2 Fregeanism and narrow content 
If attitude ascriptions express modes of presentation, then there is a possible role for 
narrow content in terms of playing a semantic role in attitude ascriptions and 
reflecting the subject’s manner of representing the relevant referent.  Consequently, 
the fate of narrow content in attitude ascriptions can be linked to the case for a 
Fregean theory of attitude ascriptions.  Such an approach for providing a role for 
narrow content has been suggested by Recanati (1993) and more recently Chalmers 
(2007).  I will return to alternative internalist accounts in Section 5, where I explain 
the advantages of the view I develop below.  Before that, I will consider a general 
approach to Fregean attitude ascriptions. 
 
One of the most prominent Fregean accounts has been developed by Richard (2006a) 
who argues that attitude ascriptions express linguistically enhanced propositions that 
are comprised of a Millian proposition and the uttered sentence itself.  On this view 
of propositions, the content of a proposition is given by the referents of the uttered 
sentence, so the content of an utterance of ‘X is F’ is given by what those words refer 
to, which includes the individual X, the property F and the relation that F bears to X. 
 
Consider an attitude ascription of the form ‘S believes that X is F’.  The Millian 
proposition provides the content of the belief being ascribed to the subject, S, whilst 
the sentence translates, or stands proxy for, the subject’s mental representation which 
realizes the particular belief (or it represents a sentence the subject would endorse as 
expressing something they believe).  The truth of the ascription depends on whether 
S has a mental representation suitably translated by the ascribing sentence.  Thus, on 
this view, an attitude ascription relates to both the belief content and the subject’s 
mental representation which realizes the belief.  Richard does not construe modes of 
presentation in anything like the manner discussed in Chapter 2.  However, a natural 
position for an internalist to take is that the attitude ascribing sentence relates to the 
Fregean notion of a mode of presentation, which relates to the cognitive content of 




the subject’s concepts.  Where modes of presentation are expressed, the resulting 
mode of presentation reflects the way a subject represents things as being. 
 
An internalist needn’t accept Richard’s position that a Millian proposition is always 
expressed by an attitude ascription which provides the content of the ascription.  It’s 
worth noting that Chalmers (2007) seems to defend an internalist version of 
Richard’s approach and holds that a kind of wide content associated with Millian 
propositions is always expressed.  However, it is possible for a semantic internalist to 
reject this view and contend that there are cases where only narrow content expresses 
the content of the ascribee’s belief, even though the attitude ascribing sentence may 
also express a wide content.  For instance, I have conceded that names have a kind of 
wide content.  Thus, where an attitude ascription picks out an ascribee, the attitude 
ascribing sentence will have a wide content relating to the ascribee.  However, the 
remainder of the utterance might only express a narrow content relating to the 
content of the relevant belief.  To see this, note that an utterance of ‘Oscar believes 
that water is wet’, could express a wide content associated with ‘Oscar’, but ‘water is 
wet’ could relate entirely to the narrow content of Oscar’s belief.  Nothing that I say 
in what follows requires commitment to this stronger view, since in order for narrow 
content to play a semantic role in attitude ascriptions, it is sufficient to show that 
narrow content is semantically expressed.  Hence, I will focus on the Fregean notion 
of the mode of presentation associated with the referent of a name.  Thus, where 
Lois’ concept SUPERMAN has a mode of presentation that differs from that 
associated with her concept CLARK KENT, the case for narrow content being 
expressed by the attitude ascription will rely on the attitude ascription being opaque, 
and hence for the mode of presentation to be relevant to the semantic content of the 
ascription. 
 
3.3 Travis’ challenge to opacity 
Two objections can be raised against such a Fregean theory which would prevent a 
role for narrow content in the semantics of attitude ascriptions.  The first objection I 
consider is based on concerns about opacity voiced by Travis (2008) who has 
rejected opacity on the basis of a lack of criteria to determine whether attitude 




ascriptions are ever genuinely opaque.  In Section 3 I consider this issue in more 
detail.  I consider a second objection from Soames (2002) in Section 4. 
 
3.3.1 Opacity and semantic intuitions 
To recap, Fregeans contend that the truth of an opaque attitude ascription depends on 
whether the ascribing sentence expresses a mode of presentation that suitably reflects 
the subject’s way of representing the referent.  Where (5) above is taken by Fregeans 
to express something true, some Millians contend that it would be literally false, 
since Lois believes the referent of ‘Clark Kent’ can fly.  A sentence like (16) can be 
introduced to attempt to lend further credibility to an opaque reading: 
 
(16) Lois does not believe that the reporter of her acquaintance, Clark Kent, can fly 
 
If it is not obvious from the context that the speaker is referring to Lois’ way of 
thinking of Clark Kent, we may emphasise this by using certain linguistic cues, such 
as adding additional descriptive information (further properties associated with the 
referent) which add to the plausibility of the opaque reading.  For instance, instead of 
adding ‘of her acquaintance’ to (16), we could say ‘the geeky reporter she knows as 
Clark Kent’.  Such cues may suggest that the speaker intends to use the sentence 
opaquely so that the truth-value depends on Lois’ mode of presentation.  As noted, 
Millians suggest that (5) is literally false, and could also dig their heels in and say 
that (16) was also strictly speaking false.  I will return to this sort of response to 
opacity below.  What is important here is that Frege introduced modes of 
presentation on the basis of the apparent failure of a Millian semantics to account for 
intuitions that sentences like (5) and (16) would be true.  The resulting view entails 
that certain attitude ascriptions are opaque, and that their truth conditions depend in 
part on the relevant mode of presentation expressed.  It is therefore crucial for 
Fregeanism that the notion of opacity can be reasonably well articulated. 
 
Where (16) aimed to support opacity by introducing further descriptive information, 
it is also possible to draw attention to other features of the context to support the idea 
of opaque attitude ascriptions.  For instance, Recanati (1993, 358) considers cases 




where the context is such that the hearer is aware that the speaker intends to reflect 
the subject’s way of representing things (the mode of presentation the subject 
associates with the name).  Suppose that John truly believes that Tully was wealthy 
but does not believe that Tully is Cicero.  In uttering an ascription like (17), a 
speaker can express the ascribee’s perspective in a context where speaker and hearer 
are both aware that Cicero was wealthy: 
 
(17) John believes that Cicero was poor 
 
From the context, since speaker and hearer are aware that John has a true belief that 
Tully is wealthy, and does not believe that Tully and Cicero are the same individual, 
then uttering (17) could draw attention to John’s representation or mode of 
presentation associated with ‘Cicero’.  A strict Millian or transparent reading of (17) 
would be odd in this context, since speaker and hearer both know that John 
associates distinct representations with ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’.  The strict reading 
would say something false of John, but given the context, it certainly appears to say 
something true, and would be intended by the speaker to say something true.  
 
3.3.2 Travis’ objection 
In this way, opaque uses of attitude ascriptions may depend on features of the 
context, in this case the shared knowledge of speaker and hearer.  However, whether 
these kinds of moves genuinely support opacity is an important issue.  Travis (2008) 
has recently argued that the notion of opacity and the issue of determining when an 
ascription is opaque are both highly problematic.  Travis is concerned with a view 
held by some Fregeans that opaque attitude ascriptions can’t be construed as having a 
transparent reading.  Some Fregeans appear to endorse such a view, such as certain 
readings of (4) where they contend that the transparent reading is not available.  
Where Fregeans allow both opaque and transparent readings, Travis’ objection is not 
as forceful, although it may still put pressure on the Fregean view since if the 
standard sorts of attitude ascriptions are not univocally opaque, then modes of 
presentation will not affect the truth conditions of the ascriptions.  Consequently, 
narrow content might not contribute to truth conditions, thus a response to Travis-




type concerns needs to be provided.  What a Fregean can accept is that Travis is 
surely right that it is not always clear when an ascription is supposed to be opaque, 
and that the form of the attitude ascribing sentence provides no such basis for 
opacity.  In this section, after considering Travis’ worry in some detail, I will explain 
how a Fregean who allows both opaque and transparent readings can highlight when 
an opaque reading is appropriate, and explain on what basis we can identify an 
opaque reading as the correct reading of a given attitude ascription.  Thus, if we can 
say why in certain cases a transparent reading is to some extent not relevant, then 
even if there is available a transparent reading, the Fregean will be able to say that it 
should not provide the semantic content of the attitude ascription. 
 
Travis’ central thesis is that we don’t have a good handle on what opacity consists in 
and hence no basis for identifying when an ascription would be opaque.  What 
motivates Travis’ case against opacity is the general concern that “…issues of 
opacity are typically much cloudier than they are taken to be” (Travis 2008, 189).  
Travis asks us to consider a subject, Brangwyn, who knows of an individual under 
the name ‘Grant’ but does not know that the individual also goes by the name of 
‘Gustaf’.  We are then to consider an attitude ascription like the following: 
 
(18) Brangwyn believes that Grant was at Harrod's but she does not believe that 
Gustaf was at Harrod's 
 
Travis identifies two related problems for (18) being opaque.  First, (18) is not 
something speakers would normally say.  The problem is that “it is abnormal to use 
two different names in such close proximity to name the same person” (Travis 2008, 
194).  Just why this should be the case is not clear.  Note that Millians might do 
something similar where they hold that Brangwyn believes that Grant was at 
Harrod’s and she believes that Gustaf was at Harrod’s, which would be a similar 
abnormal use of two co-referring names in a sentence.  The second point provides a 
possible explanation why this is a problem for opacity, where Travis thinks that a 
reasonable response to an utterance of (18) would pick up on the second part of the 
sentence and induce a hearer to ask a question such as “But I thought you just said 




she did think he was there” (Travis 2008, 194).  The situation imagined is where 
speaker and hearer both know that ‘Grant’ and ‘Gustaf’ refer to the same individual.  
The problem with Travis’ appeal to intuitions about what ordinary speakers may or 
may not judge is that we can conceive of situations in which the form of (18) would 
not be implausible.  For instance, we can change the example to (19): 
 
(19) Lois believes that Superman can fly but does not believe that Clark Kent can 
fly 
 
It seems perfectly plausible that (19) might be uttered by someone explaining the 
story of Superman to someone who hasn’t heard it before.  The use of both names in 
close proximity doesn’t seem problematic in this case.  Furthermore, the same point 
seems to apply with regard to real historical figures.  Returning to the above 
example, John knows of a famous Roman orator via the name ‘Cicero’, but does not 
know that Cicero was also called ‘Tully’, and John falsely believes that Cicero was 
poor.  (20) would again be unproblematic, and appears to induce opacity: 
 
(20) John believes that Cicero was poor but does not believe that Tully was poor 
 
If the emphasis is placed on ‘Tully’, then this can be read in such a way that the 
speaker could be highlighting two errors John makes in thinking that Cicero was 
poor, and in not recognising that Cicero is identical to Tully.  The truth conditions 
thus relate to the relevant mode of presentation.  When we set out the relevant 
background, the opaque reading appears plausible, and we generate a semantic 
content enriched by the relevant mode of presentation. 
 
A further worry with Travis’ objection is that in rejecting opacity every attitude 
ascription must be transparent, and the resulting truth condition relates only to the 
Millian content.  This produces the kinds of problems that motivated Frege’s notion 
of sense in the first place. For instance, where John knows the names ‘Tully’ and 
‘Cicero’ but does not know they refer to the same individual we get (21): 
 




(21)  John does not believe that Cicero was wealthy 
 
Intuitively, (21) is true, because John does not associate the name ‘Cicero’ with an 
individual who is poor.  However, since John does believe of Cicero that he is 
wealthy, albeit under the name ‘Tully’, then there is sense in which (21) is false.  
However, only permitting transparent readings of (21) would appear to require 
rejecting intuitions that support opacity.  This is a problem for Travis, since his 
rejection of opacity, as in (18), is motivated by intuitions about what attitude 
ascriptions would be used to express in various contexts.  Consequently, if intuitions 
are to play a role in deciding whether attitude ascriptions are ever opaque, then 
intuitions about (21) are just as relevant as intuitions about (18). 
 
3.3.3 The basis of opacity in the speaker’s intentions 
While Travis’ concerns about opacity can be allayed, a further variation of 
Recanati’s (1993) example shows that even those who defend opacity might disagree 
on which sentences are opaque.  For instance, Recanati (1993, 333) contends that an 
utterance of (22) need not be opaque, since if it was uttered in a context where 
speaker and hearer are both aware that Cicero was wealthy, then using ‘wealthy’ 
need not serve as a cue that the speaker is referring to John’s mode of presentation: 
 
(22) John believes that the wealthy Cicero was poor 
 
Instead, Recanati contends that the sentence could be used to highlight the error in 
John’s belief, where mentioning the ‘wealthy Cicero’ conflicts with John’s belief that 
Cicero is poor.  However, it’s not obvious that an utterance of (22) couldn’t be used 
to express John’s mode of presentation.  An utterance of (22) could be read opaquely 
in so far as the speaker is drawing attention to the conflict between the way Cicero is 
and the way John believes Cicero to be.  Suppose that the context is as before, so that 
both speaker and hearer are interested in John’s perspective.  An utterance of (22) 
seems capable of being used opaquely.  One might worry that (22) cannot be opaque 
because the truth conditions do not require that the sentence expresses John’s mode 
of presentation.  For instance, the sentence’s truth depends on the falsity of 




associating the property of being poor with the referent of ‘Cicero’.  Yet the sentence 
is not obviously transparent either.  If read transparently, the sentence would appear 
to literally state that John attributed contradictory properties to the same individual, 
i.e. that Cicero is both wealthy and poor.  This suggests that whether ascriptions are 
used opaquely or transparently is not as clear as often suggested, and so Travis’ 
worry about opacity applies equally to transparency.  However, an utterance of (22) 
can perhaps best be understood by contrast with an utterance of (21) in which the 
speaker aims to reflect the subject’s perspective.  We can understand (22) as 
reflecting the speaker’s perspective on the world, with ‘wealthy’ reflecting the 
speaker’s and hearer’s knowledge of the facts of history.  Yet (22) is not straight 
forwardly transparent, since if read in the literal Millian manner, then it expresses a 
contradictory belief, and this is not what a use of (22) would be intended to do. 
 
One way around this problem is to adopt a more complex account of attitude 
ascriptions, which allows a single attitude ascription to be capable of being used to 
express a variety of perspectives, depending on how the ascription is used, as in (22).  
What this suggests is that whether an ascription is opaque or transparent depends in 
part on the intentions of the speaker and perhaps the shared knowledge between 
speaker and hearer.  Thus, it seems that Travis (2008) is right that opacity is not very 
well understood, but wrong not to draw the same conclusion about transparency. 
 
If opacity is linked to what the speaker intends to express then we can make sense of 
the view developed in Section 2 above.  There, I held that an utterance of ‘Oscar 
believes that water is wet’, could relate to Oscar’s narrow contents, without 
introducing novel terminology.  We can now say that when a speaker intends to 
express Oscar’s mode of presentation, then on the Fregean account the ascription is 
opaque, and the truth conditions relate to the relevant mode of presentation (and 
hence narrow content).  Thus, extending the insights of opacity of names to the 
externalist scenarios, we can hold that attitude ascriptions that relate to kinds and 
properties may also be opaque, and that the truth conditions depend on the mode of 
presentation the subject associates with the relevant kinds/properties represented. 
 




In linking opacity to the use of an attitude ascription, it is worth noting that Fregeans 
can allow that there are transparent uses of attitude ascriptions.  For instance, an 
utterance of (3) can be transparent, for instance where Lois’ mode of presentation is 
irrelevant to the truth of the ascription.  Yet, it could also be opaque, if the context 
was such that how Lois is thinking of Superman was part of what the speaker 
intended to communicate.  A transparent use of (3) is compatible with Fregeanism, 
and can be accounted for using the same components identified above.  For instance, 
if a speaker intended to communicate only the point that Lois associates the property 
of flying with Superman, without any intention to reflect how Lois believes this, then 
the ascription can be used transparently.  On transparent uses, the truth conditions are 
identical to those proposed by Millians, since the subject’s modes of presentation are 
irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the utterance.  However, although (4) and (16) 
could in some context be read transparently (in the context of a philosophy paper, for 
instance), it seems unlikely that anyone would use (4) or (16) transparently since in 
most contexts in which speaker and hearer are discussing what Lois believes, both 
will be aware that (4) and (16) would be highly misleading.  Nonetheless, transparent 
uses are available, and with Recanati (1993) we can agree that an utterance of (17) 
could be used transparently to report that John associates the property of being poor 
with Cicero, without the speaker intending to communicate anything about the 
specific way in which John believes this, as they are interested primarily in reflecting 
the speaker’s and hearer’s perspective on the facts of history.  However, if the 
stronger internalist view, outlined in Section 2 above, is defended, then transparent 
uses might not relate to Millian contents, since the terms occurring in the attitude 
ascription might all relate to narrow contents, with the exception of names.  Again, I 
do not commit to this stronger view here. 
 
There is one final objection to consider against Fregean semantics for attitude 
ascriptions.  Where I have defended the Fregean view that opacity affects the 
semantic content of an opaque attitude ascription, some Millians deny that Fregean 
content is semantic content, even if it can be what a speaker intends to communicate.  
One way in which Millians have defended this view is by holding that the literal 
semantic content of the sentence type in natural language is fixed.  Thus, even if 




there is an opaque reading, there is always a standard transparent reading that 
provides the semantic content of the ascription.  This would be true even where the 
speaker primarily intended to talk about the subject’s mode of presentation, hence 
where an opaque use was intended rather than a transparent use.  This would provide 
the Millian with a basis for defending the transparent reading without denying that 
there are opaque readings.  Thus, where we have a response to Travis that opacity is 
not as difficult to induce as he contends, a Millian can still argue that there is always 
a transparent reading, and that this provides the semantic content of the utterance.  
This is a natural basis for Millianism, since if we can read-off the semantics from the 
literal meaning of the terms used, then transparency could be the default position by 
virtue of every utterance of a relevant attitude ascribing sentence having a default 
Millian semantic content.  Soames (2002) has defended such a view of attitude 
ascriptions, and I consider this view in Section 4. 
 
4. Millianism and semantic minimalism 
In Section 3 I showed how opacity can be defended by drawing attention to uses of 
attitude ascriptions where the speaker explicitly intends to express the ascribee’s 
mode of presentation, and where this semantically enriches the relevant truth 
conditions.  Another challenge to Fregean semantics is the proposal that semantic 
content is always Millian, as determined by the literal meaning of the attitude 
ascribing sentence.  The problem for Fregeanism is that a Millian can accept that 
modes of presentation are indeed intended to be expressed, but that the semantic 
content is determined entirely by the Millian content of the attitude ascription.  The 
threat this poses to Fregeanism is that if the Millian content is the semantic content of 
the utterance, then modes of presentation are not semantically relevant, even if the 
speaker intends to express the mode of presentation.  Consequently, if modes of 
presentation do not affect the semantics of attitude ascriptions, then neither will 
narrow content.  In this section I consider Soames’ (2002) Millian account of attitude 
ascriptions which defends a version of this view.  I show that Soames’ position can 
be understood as being based on semantic minimalism, and I outline three 
alternatives to this view.  Although none of these responses provide an argument 
against minimalism, the point is that the rejection of Fregean semantics by Soames 




can be resisted by highlighting relevant semantic foundations that contrast with 
Soames’ preferred semantic framework. 
 
4.1 Semantic minimalism and Millian attitude ascriptions 
As noted, some Millians concede to Fregean intuitions that an utterance of (4) might 
imply something false, such as that Lois associates the name ‘Clark Kent’ with the 
property of flying.  Different explanations have been provided in the literature.  One 
such view is developed by Soames (2002) who accepts that certain uses of attitude 
ascriptions may involve a Fregean mode of presentation, but he denies that this is 
ever semantically expressed.  Instead, at most there are uses of attitude ascriptions 
that are pragmatically enriched with a mode of presentation, but the semantic content 
is always given by the Millian content of the attitude ascribing sentence. 
 
Soames (2002) agrees with Fregeans that we should allow that an utterance which 
aims to reflect the subject’s mode of presentation can depend for its truth on whether 
the mode of presentation reflects a way the subject takes things to be, and that this 
may be the more appropriate truth condition of the utterance in a given context.  
However, Soames contends that given the nature of semantics, the literal Millian 
semantic content of sentences like (4) is always expressed, whether or not an 
utterance of (4) also pragmatically implies something false and which the speaker 
primarily intended to communicate.  Soames’ strategy is to make a distinction 
between the proposition semantically expressed by an ascription and the propositions 
that may be pragmatically conveyed/imparted by an utterance of the sentence in a 
given context.  Thus, on Soames’ view we must recognise two propositions: the 
semantically expressed proposition tied to the literal meaning of the sentence (the 
Millian content), and the asserted proposition which may be descriptively enriched 
with a relevant mode of presentation (the Fregean content).  The semantically 
expressed content of the sentence is always the same irrespective of the context or 
speaker, while the asserted content may vary from context to context. 
 
Soames’ view can be illustrated with an example similar to (4) which he takes to 
show that Fregeans get the semantics of attitude ascriptions wrong.  Suppose that 




Tom, Dick, and Harry know an elderly gentleman they call ‘Peter Hempel’ and are 
aware of the philosopher called ‘Carl Hempel’, yet are unaware that Peter Hempel 
the elderly gentleman of their acquaintance is Carl Hempel the philosopher.  Harry 
forms the belief that Carl Hempel died last week, and Tom may report this belief to 
Dick by uttering (23): 
 
(23) Harry believes that Carl Hempel died last week 
 
Soames (2002, 212-215) contends that an utterance of (23) may be intended to 
communicate a proposition that is descriptively enriched with information common 
to Tom, Dick, and Harry, for instance (24): 
 
(24) Harry believes that the philosopher Carl Hempel died last week 
 
This descriptively enriched proposition may more closely reflect what Harry 
believes, capturing the relevant mode of presentation with the term ‘philosopher’, 
and so would be true.  Thus, (23) might be uttered in order to communicate a 
descriptively enriched proposition like (24), which may be closer to the way in which 
Harry represents things as being.  It is worth noting the similarity with the internalist 
view outlined in Section 2, where the descriptively enriched proposition expressed 
by ‘Oscar believes the watery stuff is wet’, was taken to more closely reflect what a 
speaker may intend to express with ‘Oscar believes water is wet’.  In this way 
Soames aims to incorporate Fregean views about what a speaker may intend to 
express when using an attitude ascription, including the descriptive information 
which reflects the subject’s mode of presentation of the referent.  The trouble for 
Fregeans arises when we consider (25): 
 
(25) Harry believes that Peter Hempel died last week 
 
According to Soames, Tom would utter (25) only if he wanted to convey something 
like the descriptively enriched proposition (26): 
 




(26) Harry believes that the elderly gentleman of our acquaintance, Peter Hempel, 
died last week 
 
Supposing that Harry does not believe (26), Soames allows that an utterance of (26) 
would assert something false.  However, since (23) and (25) express the same 
proposition and have the same semantic content, they each express something true 
since the one is true only if the other is true.  Consequently, Soames holds that 
substituting co-referring names does not alter the proposition semantically expressed 
or the semantically determined truth conditions.  Thus, strictly speaking, utterances 
of (25) and (26) would be literally true since Harry believes of Peter Hempel that he 
died last week.  This may not be what Tom primarily intends to communicate, but 
given the Millian semantics operative in these cases, these sentences nonetheless 
express true propositions. 
 
4.2 Objections to semantic minimalism 
In this section I will raise three lines of objection that put pressure on this view, and 
ultimately provide a foundation for a Fregean semantics that rejects Soames’ claim 
that Millian content is always semantically expressed.  Soames’ central claim is that 
Fregean views get the semantics of attitude ascriptions wrong.  This is because in 
treating cases like the Hempel example as having only one truth condition tied to the 
opaque reading, they fail to properly respect the sense in which sentences have a 
fixed semantic content determined by relevant features of a Millian semantic 
framework.  On this view, across all contexts a sentence makes the same semantic 
contribution.  This position is the essence of semantic minimalism, the view that 
there is a fixed minimal semantic content for each expression of natural language.  
Soames (2002) contends that much of natural language can be understood in terms of 
a directly referential theory, in the spirit of Kripke’s (1980) theory of names.  On this 
view the semantic content of a name like ‘Aristotle’ is its referent.  The same point 
applies to kind terms like ‘water’, where the semantic content is the referent of 
‘water’, which according to Soames is determined along externalist lines.  Thus, 
whether Soames’ critique of Fregean semantics succeeds depends on whether his 
semantic framework is correct.  If the semantics of natural language is not directly 




referential in this way, or not fundamentally externalist, then Soames’ critique of 
Fregeanism will fail.  Consequently, modes of presentation, and hence narrow 
contents, may be semantically expressed. 
 
The following three rival semantic frameworks take a different stance on what the 
semantic content of an utterance is.  First, semantic contextualism (e.g. Recanati 
2010) is a direct competitor to semantic minimalism, and there is a rich debate 
between minimalists and contextualists.  Second, conceptual semantics (e.g. 
Jackendoff 2002) contends that the semantic content of expressions of natural 
language relate to the speaker’s conceptualization of the world, and thus the semantic 
content is not a variety of representational content, relating to reference.  Third, the 
account of concepts and narrow content developed in Chapters 1 and 2, together with 
the claim in Section 2 above that a speaker may intend to express narrow content 
with a given attitude ascribing sentence, provides the basis for the view that the 
speaker’s semantic content is fully determined by the narrow content of her concepts.  
I will consider each position in turn. 
 
While a full treatment of the debate between semantic contextualists and minimalists 
is beyond the scope of this discussion, it is important to highlight because Soames’ 
case against Fregeanism turns on his semantic framework.  Without this framework, 
the examples above fail to motivate the view that we must recognise two 
propositions.    According to semantic contextualism, pragmatic processes contribute 
to the semantic content of certain expressions.  Consider the sentence ‘it’s raining’.  
According to Recanati (2002) the proposition expressed by an utterance of this 
sentence contains unarticulated constituents, relating to the fact that it must be 
raining at a certain place and time.  Since rain must occur at a place and time, then 
the relevant constituents of the proposition are unarticulated, although tacitly 
expressed by an utterance of ‘it’s raining’.  Proponents of semantic minimalism such 
as Cappelen & Lepore (2005) reject this view.  However, my point here is not to 
address this debate directly.  Instead, I wish to point out how the contextualist 
approach may provide a basis for defending the Fregean framework.   




In support of the view that (25) could semantically express (26), a contextualist 
might appeal to something similar to unarticulated constituents.  For instance, where 
Tom may implicitly intend to communicate the content of (26) when uttering (25) 
which lacks explicit reference to this additional content, the descriptive information 
is an unarticulated constituent of his utterance of (25).  The semantic content of (25) 
would be given by (26) since the additional semantic content is not articulated by 
Tom.  If this is right, then the contention that (23) and (25) semantically express the 
same proposition may be false, since if there are unarticulated constituents that 
contribute to the proposition semantically expressed, then (23) and (25) are uttered in 
order to semantically express the pragmatically enriched propositions (24) and (26).  
Rather than seek to adjudicate this debate, it is enough to point out that there are a 
range of views on these issues, which turn on the minimalism/contextualism debate.  
The point to note here is that we needn’t accept Soames’ pragmatic/semantic 
proposition distinction, since the case against Fregeanism presupposes the distinction.  
If we restrict the discussion to the data relating to attitude ascriptions and Frege’s 
puzzle we are not forced to adopt the Millian view which turns on issues outside the 
scope of this chapter.  Consequently, Soames’ claim that Fregeans get the semantics 
wrong rests on a debate outside of the discussion relating to attitude ascriptions, and 
Fregeans may simply reject the relevant semantic framework that supports Soames’ 
position.  
 
Two specifically semantically internalist views are also worth considering.  
Conceptual semantics (Jackendoff 2002) is a fully internalist semantic theory, which 
construes semantic content in a non-representational manner. On this view, both 
pragmatic and semantic content derive from information stored in long-term memory 
such that the semantic content of an utterance is determined entirely by features of 
the speaker’s conceptual system.  What is important on this view is that there is no 
distinction between semantic content and pragmatic content.  According to 
Jackendoff (2002), pragmatic enrichment contributes to semantic content.  Hence, if 
this view is right, then there would be no basis for Soames’ distinction between 
semantically expressing and pragmatically asserting different propositions, and 
instead we could say that the content expressed reflected the semantic content the 




speaker intended to express, as determined by the speaker’s conceptual system.  For 
instance, the semantic content of (14) ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly’ would 
be fully determined by the speaker’s concepts.  Consequently, were the speaker to 
intend to express Lois’ mode of presentation, then the semantic content would be 
fixed by the speaker’s concepts, giving rise to the Fregeans’ semantic claim that 
there is just one truth condition in this case.  Such a view would clearly block 
Soames’ dual proposition approach, and is a direct competitor to Soames’ semantic 
minimalism.  This response is stronger than the contextualist’s view, drawing on a 
radically internalist approach to semantics that relates semantic content to an 
individual’s concepts understood as non-representational.  The main point to note, 
again, is that there is a way to resist semantic minimalism and the semantics / 
pragmatics distinction as Soames considers it to be. 
 
Finally, a second, less radical, internalist account can be outlined by combining the 
account of concepts from Chapters 1 and 2, together with the claim in Section 3 that 
opacity relates to what the speaker intends to express with a given attitude ascribing 
sentence.  Such a view does not need to reject externalism, since it is compatible with 
allowing wide content for certain expressions, as well as for general terms, but with 
prioritizing narrow content in some way.  Like conceptual semantics, this approach 
holds that an utterance of (14) may have a kind of semantic content determined 
entirely by the speaker’s concepts (in particular by the relevant narrow content of 
those concepts).  However, in Chapters 1 and 2 narrow content was taken to be 
genuinely representational, hence the relevant narrow content of the utterance may 
relate to real individuals and kinds in the world.  I noted in Section 2 that in this 
chapter I am only concerned with defending the weaker version of internalism which 
concedes that attitude ascriptions may express wide contents, such as those relating 
to the term ‘Lois’.  This is consistent with allowing that what the speaker intends to 
express provides the semantic content of the utterance.  For instance, the proposition 
expressed may include a combination of wide and narrow contents.  The point to 
note is that without presupposing minimalism, we are not forced to hold that an 
utterance of (14) must have Millian semantic content, since if the semantic content 
can be determined by what the speaker intends to express, as determined by the 




contents of the concepts she deploys, then the Fregean account can withstand 
Soames’ criticism. 
 
Given the three responses provided, we can put pressure on the general idea that 
what an attitude ascription semantically expresses is tied to the Millian content rather 
than the content associated with what the speaker intends to express.  If any of the 
views outlined above are correct, then rather than two propositions associated with 
semantic and pragmatic contents, there might be a single semantic content relating to 
a descriptively enriched proposition that reflects the intuitive truth conditions of the 
ascription and is what the speaker intends to communicate in that context. 
 
What I have not shown, however, is that any of these views are correct accounts of 
the semantics of natural language.  This requires much more space than is available 
here, and may turn on empirical issues in linguistics and the philosophical study of 
the semantics of natural languages.  However, if we reject Soames’ semantic theory, 
then a central feature of Soames’ case for rejecting Fregeanism is thereby blocked. 
This is a relevant dialectical point to highlight, since Soames’ examples only get 
their force when combined together with his semantic theory, so we can’t take his 
examples as theory-neutral data to be used against the Fregean view. Only by 
interpreting his example via his semantic theory do we get anti-Fregean implications.  
Hence, the reason I note that Fregeans may wish to reject Soames’ semantic 
framework is that without that as a background for interpreting his examples, then 
his conclusions do not follow, since we only get semantic and pragmatic contents 
associated with attitude ascribing sentences with that picture in place.  Thus, the 
interpretation of these cases is only really a worry if we have independent reason to 
think that the semantic picture is correct, and this is something that Fregeans, or 
opponents to Soames’ semantic theory, may wish to criticise.  The alternative 
accounts of semantic content I outlined in this section are just a sample of the 
accounts which would not have the anti-Fregean implications for attitude ascriptions 
which Soames’ examples purport to have.  What I hope to have shown is that a 
Fregean account can be linked to any of these views, and, importantly, that there are 
several ways in which Soames’ rejection of Fregean semantics can be resisted. 




5. Internalism and the Perfect Earth objection 
In this final section I outline some of the advantages of the view developed in this 
chapter over existing internalist accounts in the literature.  I then show how the view 
provides a response to Soames’ (2002) Perfect Earth argument against two 
dimensional accounts of narrow content. 
 
5.1 Comparison with other internalist accounts 
Two of the main internalist accounts of attitude ascriptions in the literature come 
from Segal (2007) and Chalmers (2011), who, as noted in Chapter 1, provide very 
different accounts of narrow content and suitably different accounts of attitude 
ascriptions.  To recap the view developed so far, if the Fregean view is correct, and 
attitude ascriptions can express modes of presentation, then we can motivate narrow 
content by noting that the modes of presentation expressed are equivalent to narrow 
content (as argued in Chapter 2).  This is consistent with allowing that the content of 
transparent uses relates to wide content. 
 
Segal (2007) develops a Fregean account of attitude ascriptions that draws on 
Davidson’s (1968) account of how we report on what another has said.  On Segal’s 
(2007) view, what the speaker expresses is related to his own way of putting things.  
In particular, the speaker aims at relating the subject to what the speaker expresses by 
the belief report, and according to Segal the truth of the ascription depends on 
whether the content expressed by the speaker is sufficiently similar to a content of 
the ascribee.  Thus, take the sentence ‘S believes that x’, uttered by T.  On Segal’s 
account, it has the form: that x. S believes that.  The first sentence states what T has 
said, and the second states that S believes what T has said. 
 
While this approach is consistent with the account of narrow content developed in 
Chapter 2, the advantage of the Fregean view is that there is an established 
framework, and pitching narrow content to opacity requires less work than showing 
that attitude ascriptions have the peculiar form attributed to them by Segal.  
Chalmers (2007) avoids the worry with Segal’s non-standard approach to attitude 
ascriptions and defends an overtly Fregean view.  On Chalmers’ view, attitude 




ascriptions express both Fregean and Russellian contents associated with narrow and 
wide contents.  Chalmers’ account has much in common with Richard’s (2006a) 
which was that attitude ascriptions express linguistically enhanced propositions.  The 
difference is that where for Richard the uttered sentence that translates the ascribee’s 
mode of presentation is part of what is specified, Chalmers takes this to be narrow 
content as understood in terms of epistemic space – a set of epistemically possible 
scenarios that reflect the subject’s idealized a priori knowledge.  Furthermore, 
Chalmers rejects the notion of translation (or standing proxy for the ascribee’s mode 
of presentation), and uses the notion of coordination instead, such that an attitude 
ascription is true if the sentence uttered expresses a narrow content that is coordinate 
with the ascribee’s narrow content.  Coordination is to be understood in terms of a 
similarity between epistemic spaces, so that the epistemic space of the speaker bears 
sufficient similarity to the ascribee’s. 
 
There is a superficial similarity with my view.  I accept that both wide and narrow 
contents may be expressed by attitude ascriptions, however, where Chalmers appeals 
to coordination between narrow contents, my account makes more of the differences 
in the mental representations of speaker and hearer which the ascribing sentence 
aims to pick out.  In particular, I note that ‘water’ might be associated with a range of 
mental representations that relate to different kinds of narrow content.  So, where 
Chalmers tends to make the mode of presentation expressed relate to epistemic 
space, my view draws on work on concepts to allow that the truth conditions may 
relate to different conceptual structures, and the different narrow contents these are 
associated with.  My view is not dependent on the success or failure of the epistemic 
framework.  My appeal to a variety of narrow contents provides a further advantage 
of the view, as I will show in Section 5.2. 
 
5.2 Soames’ Perfect Earth objection to two dimensionalism 
The account developed in this chapter provides an alternative response to Soames’ 
(2002) Perfect Earth objection that is raised against two dimensional accounts of 
attitude ascriptions.  In particular, I show how Soames might respond to Kallestrup’s 




(2011a) defence of the two-dimensionalist view and how my view provides a 
different way of avoiding Soames’ objection. 
 
Soames (2002) develops an example intended to show that certain semantic 
internalist accounts are unable to account for attitude ascriptions in relation to the 
subject Perfect Mary.  While Soames directs his critique at two dimensional 
semantics, it also applies to any descriptive account of narrow content such as that 
outlined in Chapter 1 where narrow content relates to the representation of natural 
kind properties at a subject’s actual environment.  Take the descriptive account of 
natural kind concepts where ‘water’ represents a natural kind property at the 
subject’s actual environment.  On this account, we can use ‘Oscar believes that water 
is wet’ to talk about Oscar’s belief about H2O.  According to Jackson’s (2003a) 
version of the view, ‘water’ is substituted with ‘the actual watery stuff’.  Soames 
asks us to consider the case of Perfect Mary on Perfect Earth.  The objection Soames 
raises is that on the descriptive view a subject on Earth is unable to account for 
Perfect Mary’s belief, since if ‘water’ represents the actual watery stuff, then an 
Earth speaker will effectively claim that Perfect Mary’s beliefs are about the actual 
world, and not Perfect Earth, since ‘actual’, when uttered by us, represents the actual 
watery stuff on Earth.  Thus, a speaker of English will utter (27): 
 
(27) Perfect Mary believes that water is wet 
 
However, on the descriptivist view, this is understood as: 
 
(28) Perfect Mary believes that the actual watery stuff is wet 
 
The problem is that on the descriptive view we can never truly report what Perfect 
Mary believes, that is, in the sense of relating Perfect Mary’s belief to the watery 
stuff on Perfect Earth.  Kallestrup (2011a) responds to Soames’ argument by noting 
that ‘actual’ functions as an indexical on the descriptive view.  Thus, when we use 
‘water’ in an attitude ascription and this functions to pick out the actual watery stuff, 
the implicit term ‘actual’ functions to indexically pick out the watery stuff at the 




ascribee’s actual world.  Thus, the speaker uses ‘water’ to tacitly represent the watery 
stuff at the ascribee’s actual world, and hence ‘actual’ is sensitive to the context of 
the ascribee, and needn’t relate to the speaker’s actual environment. 
 
As is stands this looks like an effective response to Soames.  However, Soames may 
respond in the following way.  Recall Soames’ semantic minimalism, where there is 
a fixed semantics for natural language which determines the semantic content of each 
expression of natural language.  On this view, the semantic content of ‘actual’ could 
be fixed in English.  Thus, when a speaker of English utters ‘actual’, or implicitly 
asserts ‘actual’, the content always relates to Earth, the speaker’s actual world.  What 
can be remarked here, however, is that we can object to Soames’ minimalism on the 
basis of the three lines of objection noted in Section 4.2 above relating to different 
semantic frameworks.  Such views may allow that the semantic content of ‘actual’ is 
not fixed in the way required by Soames.  Thus, while Soames could make this 
response to the descriptive view, there is ample scope for a reply which rejects 
Soames’ semantic framework and assumptions about the semantics of ‘actual’ in 
English.  However, I will not consider here the proper treatment of ‘actual’ in 
English.  What is important here is that Soames has a response to the indexical 
account of ‘actual’. 
 
The approach to narrow content developed in this thesis provides an alternative 
response to Soames’ scenario.  Recall from Chapter 1 that there is reason to hold that 
narrow content may come in more than one form.  In particular, in addition to 
descriptive representation of local natural kind properties, it was suggested that we 
should allow for representation of non-natural kind properties.  Thus, where a 
speaker utters (27), this needn’t be taken to relate to (28) that contains a description, 
but instead relates ‘watery stuff’ to a heterogeneous kind that takes as its extension 
the heterogeneous property common to H2O, XYZ, and so on, all of which satisfy the 
relevant description.  Alternatively, on the relational view, the heterogeneous kind 
may be represented by considering what did or would trigger Perfect Mary’s 
WATER concept. 
 




The proponent of this view should not be concerned by the claim that this entails that 
Perfect Mary has specific beliefs about the natural kind on Earth and other possible 
worlds unconnected with Perfect Earth.  As noted previously, in relating ‘water’ to 
the actual or possible triggers of S’s WATER, the view does not entail that S’s 
concept takes as its content a massive disjunction of different natural kinds.  The 
property view of representation relates concepts to the properties they represent.  On 
this view, since the concept WATER fails to represent a unique natural kind, it takes 
as a property a heterogeneous kind. 
 
As the cases above show, it is also possible to construe ‘water’ as being used to pick 
out a set of superficial properties via relations to the relevant properties.  In this case, 
where we talk of Perfect Mary’s belief, we needn’t accept with Soames that the 
speaker must relate Perfect Mary to a local natural kind property.  Instead, as for 
Oscar, the speaker may relate Perfect Mary to a set of superficial properties 
instantiated on Earth, Twin Earth, Perfect Earth, and so on.  In addition, in Chapter 1 
and 2 I suggested that the descriptive view is not particularly well supported as a 
general account of the narrow content of non-natural kind concepts, although it is 
consistent with concept pluralism.  Therefore, if we pay attention to the variety of 
concepts through which subjects like Perfect Mary represent the world, this opens up 
the possibility that there are a range of possible truth conditions for attitude 
ascriptions expressed by the same sentence token (27).  Thus, the ascription should 
not automatically be taken to relate to a belief regarding a unique natural kind 
denoted by ‘water’, since, as I have been urging, the ascribing sentence might not 
neatly match the concepts through which the subject has the relevant belief.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Chapter 4 had two main aims, one negative and one positive.  As externalism is 
sometimes based in part on claims about propositional attitude ascriptions, the first 
part of the chapter aimed to highlight key assumptions that can be rejected, in 
particular, that the terms we use to express propositional attitudes like belief only 
express wide contents.  In support of a positive role for narrow content in attitude 
ascriptions, I outlined a Fregean account and then responded to two objections to 




Fregeanism from Travis and Soames.  Finally, I showed how the Fregean account, 
together with the response to Soames’ minimalism, provides a way to respond to 
Soames’ case against narrow content’s role in propositional attitude ascriptions in the 
Perfect Earth case.  Consequently, narrow content should be understood as having a 
semantic role in propositional attitude ascriptions by providing a range of truth 







































In Chapter 4 I developed and defended the role of narrow content in propositional 
attitude ascriptions.  Narrow content has also been taken to play a role in 
psychological explanations of behaviour.  However, there is no standard account of 
what this role consists in, furthermore, existing accounts face serious objections 
raised by externalists.  The most common approach is to relate narrow contents to 
proximal causes which are taken to be essential for any account of behaviour which 
appeals to psychological states like belief.  However, two of the most prominent 
accounts from Fodor (1991) and Jackson & Pettit (1988) face objections that 
externalists can raise in response.  The most important objection contends that 
proximal causes, and so narrow contents, are causally irrelevant to psychological 
explanations, since wide belief states (or wide contents) are sufficient.  I contend that 
the best response to this objection is to find an alternative explanatory role for 
narrow content.  To this end, I develop and defend a connection between narrow 
content and the rational role of reasons in providing psychological explanations of 
behaviour, and I show how this provides a suitable response to the most pressing 
objection facing internalist explanations of behaviour. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows.  In Section 2 I outline the nature of 
psychological explanations of behaviour and the issues at stake in the 
internalism/externalism debate. In particular, I explain the challenge faced by 
internalists who aim to defend a role for narrow states or narrow contents while 
accepting wide intentional explanations of behaviour as genuinely relating to 
different behaviours in Twin Earth-type scenarios.  In Section 3 I consider the two 




internalist proposals identified above.  I show that there are important objections 
which cause serious problems for the views, specifically in relation to the reliance on 
proximal causes and narrow states (Burge 1989; 1995), and objections concerning 
explanatory generality and causal relevance (Yablo 2003).  In Section 4 I develop an 
alternative basis for an explanatory role for narrow content by noting that a 
satisfactory account of psychological explanation must pay attention to the roles of 
reasons and rationality.  I show how linking the role of narrow content to the 
explanatory role of reasons, as understood by Davidson (1963) and McDowell 
(2006), provides a way to respond to the objections from generality and causal 
relevance.  Finally, I show how this account provides a response to Fodor’s (1994) 
externalist approach to Frege cases according to which a kind of wide content is 
explanatorily sufficient for explaining behaviour. 
 
2. Psychological explanations of behaviour 
In this section I outline three approaches to psychological explanations of behaviour 
and highlight the central problem for internalism.  In particular, I introduce the basic 
framework of belief-desire psychology and accounting for behaviour in terms of 
mental causation, Davidson’s appeal to reasons as rational and causal explanations of 
action, and the role of modes of presentation in explaining behaviour in Frege cases.  
While these approaches have tended to be discussed separately, the issues are inter-
related, and this will be important in the view I develop in Section 4.  Also in this 
section, I explain the central features of the debate between externalists and 
internalists regarding the causal relevance of wide and narrow states.  I then show 
that the central problem for internalism is that the descriptions we use to explain 
behaviour are glossed in terms of wide belief states.  As such, the challenge facing 
the internalist is to provide a central explanatory role to narrow states or narrow 
contents. 
 
2.1 Belief-desire psychology, reasons for action and Frege cases 
When a subject S goes to the fridge to get a cola, we can understand such behaviour 
in terms of S’s desire to drink cola and her belief that there is cola in the fridge.  
Such explanations permeate our talk about why subjects behave in certain ways.  




That is, we typically appeal to beliefs and desires to explain or rationalize why S did 
what she did.  According to Fodor (1987), we use belief-desire psychology to make 
useful generalizations about behaviour, such that if S believes that there is cola in the 
fridge and desires a cola, then all things being equal, S will get a cola from the fridge.  
Underlying this view of commonsense psychological explanations of behaviour is 
the idea of mental causation where mental states like belief provide causal 
explanations of behaviour.  S’s mental states, her belief-desire pair, explain why S 
does A (e.g. gets a cola from the fridge) by virtue of the causation of behaviour by 
mental states.  Thus, belief-desire pairs are taken to be causes of behaviour, such that 
when we provide a description of why S did A, we are citing the cause of A.  On this 
view, causal explanations of behaviour track causation of behaviour. However, some 
philosophers think that there are varieties of causal explanation that do not relate to 
the causation of behaviour, but are still causal explanations of behaviour.  A version 
of this view is considered below. 
 
Following Davidson (1963), we can understand S’s belief-desire pair as providing 
S’s reason for performing the relevant action
46
, A.    As with commonsense belief-
desire psychology, on Davidson’s view, reasons serve as causes of actions, thus 
reason-giving explanations are fundamentally causal explanations of behaviour.  
What Davidson’s approach adds to the mental causation debate is that in giving S’s 
reasons for doing A, we must be able to pick out something about the reason that 
provides insight as to why S did A.  For Davidson, a key point is that: 
 
A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the agent 
saw, or thought he saw, in his action.  (Davidson 1963, 23) 
 
Thus, in terms of S’s belief-desire pair, the description we use should tell us how S 
conceived of her own action.  Davidson provides two further conditions on a reason, 
R, providing a rationalization of S’s action: 
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aspects of S’s behaviour.  While some philosophers clearly distinguish between actions and 
behaviour, the differences will not be relevant to my discussion.  Any objections to the terminology 
could be responded to by re-casting the Davidsonian approach in terms of behaviour. 




R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the 
description [D] only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards 
actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the 
description [D], has that property. (Davidson 1963, 25) 
 
The notion of having a pro attitude is to be favourably disposed to actions of that 
type.  For instance, in the vocabulary of belief-desire psychology we might say that 
in addition to S’s belief that there is water, S also has the desire to drink some water.  
S therefore has a pro attitude to actions involving S drinking water.  Davidson is 
saying that R rationally explains S’s action only if R relates to S having a favourable 
attitude to an action with a certain property captured by the description D, and where 
S has a belief that the action has the relevant property captured by description D.  
Davidson contends that we don’t need to specify the primary reason itself, since to 
do so would be ‘fatuous’, as it is implied by the descriptions we tend to use.  
However, the description’s causally explaining A does depend on its picking out in 
some sense S’s primary reason. 
 
One way of understanding Davidson’s point about what the agent saw in her action is 
the notion of a mode of presentation.  The notion of a mode of presentation of a 
referent was discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 where they were associated with concepts 
and their cognitive content.  Cognitive content reflects how S represents things as 
being from her perspective.  A natural understanding of Davidson’s point is therefore 
that the reason we provide for S doing A must tell us in some sense how S thinks of 
things as being, and we may use the notion of a mode of presentation or cognitive 
content for this purpose.  The explanatory role of modes of presentation in behaviour 
is central to the debate revolving around Frege cases.  Consider a case from Segal 
(2009b), where Oedipus wants to go to Hesperus, believes that a flight to 
Phosphorous is about to leave, but does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorous.  It 
is intuitively plausible that given Oedipus’ beliefs and desire, then Oedipus would 
not board the flight, since he does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorous.  
According to Fregeans, the mode of presentation, or cognitive content of S’s concept, 
is crucial to the explanation of why S does A, in part because it is the cognitive 
content that reflects how S thinks of things as being.  For it to follow that S would 




not board the flight to Phosphorous, the Fregean appears to assume that cognitive 
content plays an explanatory role in behaviour, such that S does A because of the 
cognitive content of her relevant beliefs/concepts. Some philosophers (e.g. Braun 
1995; Fodor 1994) deny that we need to appeal to modes of presentation, and 
contend that wide content is explanatorily sufficient for psychological 
generalizations.  In response, internalists may argue that wide content explanations 
fail to explain the relevant Frege cases.  I return to these cases in Section 4.4.   
 
The three approaches above all relate to the psychological explanation of behaviour, 
yet they focus on different issues.  The debate between externalists and internalists 
has tended to focus on the first and third set of issues relating to mental causation and 
Frege cases, although these debates are kept apart.  However, the issues discussed so 
far are not mutually exclusive, and I will draw on aspects of each of these three 
approaches in the following discussion. 
 
2.2 Wide behaviour and the problem for internalism 
As noted, a subject’s behaviour is explained by providing a description that cites one 
of S’s beliefs together with a desire.  Typically, the behaviour is intentionally 
described, that is, it relates to the specific objects or environmental properties 
interacted with.  Consider the following belief-desire pair: S is thirsty and believes 
there is water in the cup.  When S picks up the cup and drinks the water, her 
behaviour relates to water.  When we change the scenario to where the cup contains 
twin water, we would say S picks up the cup and drinks twin water, which is a 
different behaviour.  The problem for internalism is that such descriptions invoke 
wide belief states.  For instance, in the first scenario, an explanation of S’s drinking 
water will be glossed as S believes there is water in the cup, while the second 
scenario will be glossed as S believes there is twin water in the cup.  Such 
psychological explanations of S’s behaviour thereby appear to be fundamentally 
externalist.  If we accept that the behaviours are different in these scenarios, and that 
the intentional descriptions relate to wide beliefs states, then internalists must explain 
what role, if any, narrow belief states or narrow contents play. 
 




Internalists have tended to focus on two of the approaches outlined in Section 2.1.  A 
first approach appeals to Frege cases and the explanatory role of modes of 
presentation.  Where the internalist holds that modes of presentation relate to narrow 
contents, the case for an internalist account of behaviour involves defending the 
Fregean thesis (for instance Segal (2009b)).  For present purposes I will set the 
elements of this view aside, as a complete discussion of this approach would require 
more space than is available here.  What will be relevant below is the appeal to the 
mode of presentation associated with S’s beliefs or concepts, and the role this plays 
in explaining behaviour. 
 
A second approach has been developed by Fodor (1991) who provides an argument 
for the explanatory role of narrow content based on the idea that the notion of 
causation in psychology relates to proximal or local causes at the level of internal 
states.  Fodor accepts that the intentionally described behaviours are different, but 
contends that the explanation of behaviour cannot rely on the wide belief states.  If 
this is correct, then the challenge this poses to the externalist is to explain how wide 
belief states can causally explain S’s behaviour, since in the water and twin water 
scenarios S’s proximal causes can be the same, whilst her wide belief states are 
different.  I will consider Fodor’s view, and a response the externalist can make, in 
more detail in Section 3 below.  Jackson & Pettit (1988) defend a hybrid account of 
psychological explanations of behaviour.  While they agree with Fodor that at one 
level proximal causes are central to causally explaining behaviour, they aim to show 
how this can be so whilst wide belief states are also causally relevant.  On this view, 
wide belief states are causally relevant because they state that one of a range of 
narrow proximal states was causally responsible for S’s behaviour.  However, Yablo 
(2003) has provided a defence of the causal relevance of wide states which would 
threaten to undermine the hybrid view by making the narrow states causally 
irrelevant.  If successful, this objection would again leave the internalist in the 
position of having to explain why narrow states or contents were relevant to 
psychological explanations of behaviour. 
 




The third approach identified above, relating to the rational role of reasons in 
causally explaining actions has not featured in internalist accounts of behaviour.  I 
will show in Section 4 that this provides a more promising defence of internalism in 
psychological explanations of behaviour, and that it provides a clear response to 
Yablo’s objection to internalist accounts.  Before developing that view, I consider the 
views of Fodor, Jackson & Pettit in more detail, and explain that externalists have 
effective responses to these views which provide the internalist with motivation to 
look elsewhere for a role for narrow states or contents in explaining behaviour. 
 
3. Proximal causes, generality and causal relevance 
Section 3 provides a critical overview of two of the main internalist accounts of 
behaviour and highlights the main problems they face. 
 
3.1 Proximal causes and causal powers 
As noted in Section 2, Fodor highlights the centrality of proximal causes in mental 
causation and commonsense explanations of behaviour.  In subsequent work, Fodor 
(1991) presents an argument for narrow content which contends that psychology 
classifies mental states by their causal powers which supervene on intrinsic 
properties, and that this serves as the basis for identifying a central role for narrow 
content.  Central to Fodor’s view is the idea that taxonomy in psychology, as in 
science generally, is by causal powers.  On this view, we should individuate mental 
states by their causal powers.  According to Fodor, the relevant notion of a causal 
power relates to intrinsic properties.  For instance, what determines the causal 
powers of S’s causally efficacious mental states are S’s intrinsic properties.  The 
underlying conception of causation relates to proximal or local causation.  We can 
understand this notion in terms of object causation.  For instance, where S kicks a 
ball into a window, the ball’s breaking the window is causally responsible for the 
window breaking.  The relevant causal power of the ball relates to its solidity (an 
intrinsic property relating to the air pressure inside the ball) so that when it impacts 
on the window, it will cause the window to break, thus the football causes the break 
by virtue of its intrinsic properties.  Note that other properties of the ball are 
explanatorily irrelevant, such as the colour or price of the ball.  Fodor applies this 




model of causation to mental states.  For instance, suppose S is thirsty and believes 
there is a cup of water in front of S, so that S picks up the cup and drinks the water.  
The causally relevant properties of S’s belief are intrinsic properties, relating to the 
internal states of her body/brain.  Thus, what causes S to lift the cup and drink the 
water are her internal, narrow, bodily states. 
 
This provides a solution to the problem relating to wide intentional descriptions of 
behaviour.  Suppose we consider a Twin Earth scenario where S is thirsty, but this 
time there is twin water in the cup.  Our wide intentional description might explain 
S’s behaviour of lifting the cup and drinking the twin water in terms of Twin S’s 
belief that there is twin water in the cup.  The problem for the internalist is that S and 
her Twin are intrinsically identical, and hence the same proximal causes are in play 
in each scenario, but the descriptions we use invoke different wide beliefs, relating to 
water and twin water.  On Fodor’s view, although intrinsic duplicates perform 
different behaviours on Earth and Twin Earth, drinking water and drinking twin 
water, the same proximal causes are ultimately what explain these actions at each 
world.  Assuming that psychology is interested in proximal causation for mental 
taxonomy, we should therefore say that intrinsic duplicates share a causally 
efficacious mental state, which at different worlds can result in different behaviours
47
.  
Hence, we can identify a notion of a narrow mental state (or narrow mental content) 
which relates to the identity in causal powers of duplicates’ intrinsic states.  What 
seems right about Fodor’s account is that there is an important role for proximal 
causes on an object view of causation, and the worry for wide intentional 
descriptions is that they are incapable of providing an adequate account of this form 
of mental causation. 
 
                                                          
47
 An internalist could individuate behaviour narrowly so that intrinsic duplicates perform the same 
behaviour.  This would avoid the need to accept the claim that we need to account for different wide 
behaviours.  While there is plausibly a kind of behaviour shared by intrinsic duplicates, such as bodily 
movements, the worry with this is that the externalist may accept this but hold that wide behaviour is 
more important to psychology, since behaviour is typically glossed in intentional terms.  Thus, in 
order to show that narrow content is of central importance in both cases, the internalist should not 
simply rely on sameness of narrow behaviour as the basis for the explanatory role of narrow content in 
psychological explanations of behaviour. 




An important assumption in Fodor’s account is that mental states are individuated by 
their causal powers, where causal powers are understood as relating only to proximal 
causation.  The case for narrow mental states succeeds only if causal powers 
supervene on intrinsic properties, and that intrinsic duplicates should be classified as 
having the same kind of mental states because their states share causal powers.  If, on 
the other hand, there is a case that the causal powers of intrinsic duplicates might 
differ, or that there is some other way for wide intentional descriptions to take 
priority without dismissing proximal causation, then Fodor’s argument will be 
undermined.  In response to Fodor, in Section 3.2 I consider Burge’s view that causal 
powers can be construed widely, and show that this provides a serious worry for 
Fodor’s defence of internalism. 
 
3.2 Wide causal powers 
Externalists can accept that proximal causation is necessary at some level of 
description of causation, however, Fodor’s claim is that taxonomy of mental states is 
by causal powers that relate to these proximal causes.  The problem with this is that it 
is possible to understand causal powers as in some sense being wide, so that where 
the behaviours of duplicates are different, their causal powers are also different, 
which would thereby undermine the case for the explanatory role of narrow states.  
According to Burge (1989; 1995), intentional explanations of behaviour are 
fundamentally externalist.  In contrast to Fodor’s view of causal powers as 
supervening on intrinsic properties, Burge considers cases which he takes to show 
that there is an externalist notion of causal power and that this is operative in 
psychology.  If this claim is right, then much of Fodor’s view will be blocked. 
 
Burge’s case for wide causal powers involves noting how externalism is assumed in 
the approach to individuating states in empirical psychology.  One example involves 
the individuation of hearts.  According to Burge, hearts are a biological kind.  
Biological kinds are typically individuated in part by appealing to evolutionary origin 
and natural function, hence being a heart involves a pattern of causal relations to 
various other kinds in the environment in which the organ evolved.  When we 
consider the causal powers of such kinds, Burge is suggesting that we need to 




consider the organ within the evolutionary environment in which it evolved, so that 
we relate the causal powers to the specific kinds with which the organ typically, and 
historically, has had causal commerce with.  Such a view marks a striking contrast 
with Fodor’s species of narrow proximal causal powers.  While Fodor connects 
narrow causes to his case for narrowly individuated mental states, Burge can utilise 
his broad causal powers in the service of externalist individuation of mental states.  
As the case for mental state individuation is not of concern in this chapter, I will 
restrict the discussion to the accounts of behaviour and the appeal to narrow and 
wide causes. 
 
When we consider the Twin Earth cases, the same point can be made.  Where S 
drinks water and her twin T drinks twin water, their states have different causal 
powers in so far as S’s states have causal powers that relate to water and T’s to twin 
water.  The challenge to Fodor’s position, and hence to the defence of internalism, is 
that the notion of a causal power isn’t restricted to proximal causation.  If it is right 
that scientifically interesting kinds like hearts and beliefs can be taken to possess 
causal powers that are individuated externalistically, then citing wide intentional 
descriptions would be sufficient for explaining behaviour since this is the right level 
of description for behaviours characterized intentionally. 
 
It is worth noting that Burge does not need to deny that proximal causation is 
necessary.  Both hearts and beliefs will require relevant internal/proximal causes.  
The issue, however, is that the notion of a causal power is not particularly well-
defined, and there seems to be a notion of a wide causal power available to the 
externalist that seems plausible.  The problem for the internalist then is that an 
externalist can hold that although proximal causes might be relevant, wide causes are 
what are causally relevant to psychological explanations of behaviour.  Thus, as 
Burge contends, for taxonomic purposes intentional psychology can run mental states 
and behaviours together without denying that at some level causation must be 
proximal.  The worry for internalism is that in terms of mental causation, there is no 
problem with wide states being causally relevant to causing actions intentionally 
described.  Thus, the externalist can allow that at some level causation is proximal, 




relating to bodily states, however, in terms of psychological explanations of 
behaviour, wide belief states are causally relevant.  On the Burge-type view, they are 
causally relevant because the relevant causal powers are wide, so S’s behaviour is 
causally explained by the wide belief state relating to water, while T’s causal powers 
relate to twin water and hence her behaviour is causally explained by a different wide 
belief state. 
 
It is worth flagging here that a two-component theory could accept that there are two 
kinds of behaviour connected to narrow and wide causes.  However, although a two-
component theorist could accommodate wide and narrow behaviour there seems to 
be something important about narrow causes – even on Burge’s picture – since at 
some level systems must have proximal causes that do explanatory work.  With 
regard to the differences between Fodor and Burge, a case can be made that there is a 
stand-off in the debate about wide and narrow causes.  In so far as externalist 
individuation of kinds like hearts is viable, which the two-component picture can 
grant, simply appealing to narrow proximal causation does not seem like the best 
approach to demonstrate the explanatory primacy of narrow causes or narrow 
contents.  Furthermore, there is a worry that in focusing on proximal causation 
Fodor’s account fails to tell us anything about the rational role of beliefs in 
explaining behaviour.  As noted in Section 2, belief-desire psychology was supposed 
to relate to commonsense explanations which, according to Davidson, are reason-
giving explanations.  Focusing only on proximal causes moves away from this key 
aspect of explanations of behaviour, and does not provide insight into the reasons 
why S did A since we are not given any account of why the relevant belief-desire 
pair provides a rational explanation of S’s behaviour.  Thus, in the rest of this chapter 
I make the case for this primacy of narrow content by considering Jackson & Pettit’s 
view which makes narrow content primary and an objection from Yablo which 
threatens that picture.  I then show, against Yablo, that an alternative case can be 
made for a similar thesis by showing how cognitive content is crucial to certain kinds 
of psychological explanations of behaviour. 
 
 




3.3 Hybrid explanations: narrow and wide causes 
Jackson & Pettit (1988) develop a hybrid theory of explanations of behaviour which 
assign different causal roles to wide and narrow content.  On this view, internal 
(narrow) states are directly causally responsible for behaviour, and relate to what are 
called ‘process’ explanations.  Wide contents are also taken to be causally relevant in 
a certain constrained sense, but without themselves being the direct causes of 
behaviour, serving instead as ‘program’ explanations.    This approach is motivated 
by what Jackson & Pettit call the doppelganger challenge, which is seen as a 
problem for the externalist to explain what role wide contents play given an 
underlying view of causation in terms of proximal causes.  The worry is that: 
 
…the ascription of [wide] content does not play an appropriate role in the 
explanation of behaviour.  It is argued that it is the assumption of narrow 
content, content which does not depend on how things are outside the subject, 
which plays the appropriate role in explaining behaviour.  (Jackson & Pettit 
1988, 382) 
 
As discussed above, some externalists will reject this construal of the relevant issues.  
However, Jackson & Pettit pitch themselves against this view, and they intend to 
provide an explanatory role to wide content, in addition to that of narrow content.  
This dialectical position is important for their account since they see themselves as 
aiming to provide an explanatory role for wide content given the (obvious) 
explanatory role of narrow states.  While they intend to allow that wide states are 
causally relevant, this is highly constrained in that the relevant wide state: 
 
…plays no distinctive role, the explaining it does being best done by a 
combination of narrow psychological states together with environment. 
(Jackson & Pettit 1988, 390) 
 
The basic idea is that the fundamental causal work is done by narrow proximal 
causes, and that the wide belief states typically invoked by descriptions of behaviour 
play an explanatory role in relation to how they function to draw attention to the 
relevant narrow states and the environment.  The hybrid view provides a distinctive 
role for wide content.  Jackson & Pettit provide the following example to illustrate 
this: 




I observe that Fred’s sighting of that cup causes him to reach for it, and 
explain his behaviour in terms of his belief that it contains water.  This 
explanation says that a range of states playing the belief that-that-cup-
contains-water role would have caused him to reach for it, and that one of 
them did cause him to.  (Jackson & Pettit 1988, 396) [My emphasis] 
 
On this view, narrow states provide process explanations of behaviour in terms of the 
relevant internal processes, whilst wide belief states causally program for this 
behaviour, identifying a range of relevant states, without doing any causing.  The 
wide state of believing that the cup contains water is not itself causally efficacious, 
but it is explanatory in that it functions to pick out a range of narrow states, one of 
which actually did cause the relevant behaviour.  Wide explanations can therefore be 
seen as laying out the general causal terrain where their explanatory role is 
essentially related to the underlying proximal causes. 
 
Unlike Fodor who relies on the appeal to causal powers and mental taxonomy, 
Jackson & Pettit rely on the inherent plausibility that proximal causation is at some 
level essential to causation, together with a claim about how intentional descriptions 
of behaviour, that cite wide states, function to draw attention to the narrow states.  
The problem is whether the externalist needs to accept that this is the extent to which 
wide states are causally relevant.  If, contrary to this view, wide states may be 
construed as being causally relevant in some other sense, then the externalist may be 
able to reject the centrality of narrow states.  One reason to doubt the view of 
Jackson & Pettit is that it is not obvious that wide descriptions function in this way.  
For instance, when we cite S’s belief that there is water in the cup, and contrast this 
with her twin’s belief that there is twin water in the cup, the externalist might appeal 
to the Burge-type view and draw a connection to the distinct belief states and the 
distinct objects interacted with.   
 
The worry is that the view does not add enough to narrow content’s being central to 
causal explanations to prevent an externalist digging their heels in and taking the 
wide state to provide an adequate explanation.  For instance, the externalist might ask 
what has been left out of our explanation of S and T’s behaviour when we only cite 
their wide belief states.  S drinks water because she believes there is water in the cup, 




and T drinks twin water because she believes there is twin water in the cup.  This 
seems to be explanatory, in that it appeals to a relevant psychological state, a wide 
belief state, and explains the relevantly different behaviours in terms of these beliefs.  
It is therefore central to Jackson & Pettit’s defence of the role of narrow content that 
the only reason the wide cause is casually relevant is because of its role in picking 
out the proximal causes.  As was the case in Section 2, there appears to be something 
of an impasse at this stage.  Above, it was noted that there is a plausible sense in 
which causal powers are wide, and this allowed the externalist to accept that 
proximal causes are important, whilst contending that wide states are causally 
relevant.  Jackson & Pettit accept that wide states are causally relevant, but the 
problem is that an externalist may deny that the causal relevance of wide states is 
limited to the extent to which they pick out a range of narrow states. 
 
3.4 Yablo on explanatory generality and causal relevance 
Just how the externalist would want to say that wide states are causally relevant has 
not yet been made clear, and Jackson & Pettit could reply that without such an 
account the role of narrow states remains central.  However, Yablo (2003) has 
provided a range of objections to the internalist’s appeal to narrow states, which he 
takes to show that wide states alone are indeed causally relevant.  Thus, in Section 
3.4 I outline Yablo’s rejection of the relevance of narrow states, which would support 
the externalist view that there is no need to appeal to proximal causes, and hence that 
citing wide states is explanatorily adequate for psychological explanations of 
behaviour. 
 
3.4.1 Proximal causes, generality and locality 
Yablo (2003) provides a partial reconstruction of the reasoning behind an account 
like that of Jackson & Pettit (1988).  Recall that Jackson & Pettit’s dialectical 
position was that narrow causes are taken for granted and that there is a question 
about the causal relevance of wide states.  The hybrid view provided an account of 
the causal relevance of wide states which was essentially connected to the relevant 
narrow states that do the underlying causal work.  Yablo (2003) picks up on a similar 
way of reasoning discussed by Williamson (2000) and notes that the purported 




problem for externalism about explaining behaviour can be understood as arising 
from two main points: 
 
(Locality)  Causation of behaviour is proximal, requiring that the cause of 
   some action is a relevant proximal state internal to the agent.  
   Causes operate via a relevant causal mechanism or process, 
   and so causation is ‘here and now’ 
 
(Generality)  There are common causes for different wide behaviours such 
   as drinking water/drinking twin water, for instance a brain  
   state common to intrinsic duplicates S and T 
 
This distinction neatly captures the basis for Jackson & Pettit’s hybrid view.  On one 
hand (locality), proximal causes directly cause actions.  On the other (generality), 
identical causes are common to different wide intentional behaviours.  Thus, the 
problem for externalism is to explain how wide states are causally relevant given 
locality and generality.  Following Williamson (2000), Yablo explains that we can 
reject the claim concerning generality by pointing out that it is plausible that a given 
action type A, such as drinking water, caused by some brain state M1 could have 
been caused by some other brain state M2, since the differences between M1 and M2 
are not such as to prevent S from doing A.  This seems right if the generality 
principle is that some specific narrow state Mx is the cause.  This is consistent with 
Jackson & Pettit’s hybrid view, since wide states relate to one of a range of possible 
narrow states, and intentional descriptions do not pick out a specific narrow (brain) 
state Mx.  Contrast this with an account of generality in which a single mental state Q 
explains actions of type A, regardless of the underlying narrow states: 
 
(Maximal Generality)  Explanations of behaviour are maximally general when 
    we can explain actions of type A with a common  
    mental state Q 
 




Explanations of this type are more general, since we can say that Q is the cause of A, 
rather than any of M1…Mn, each of which might have been the cause of A.  Since 
any of narrow states M1…Mn are sufficient for causing A, then, as Williamson notes, 
narrow causes are less general than wide causes.  Consequently, if maximal 
generality is a reasonable constraint on an account of psychological explanations of 
behaviour, then we should deny that there are common causes to actions of type A, 
since different behaviours characterised by different wide intentional descriptions 
needn’t have common causes. The objection then is that on a view like Jackson & 
Pettit’s, it’s not the case that the same narrow cause must be responsible for actions 
of type A as performed by subjects (whether intrinsic duplicates or not), since if A 
would have been performed had M1 caused S to do A, and M2 caused T to do A, then 
there is in fact not a common narrow cause.  Maximal generality, however, can 
preserve the generalization that actions of type A are caused by mental states of type 
Q, and this would lend support to externalism in the familiar Twin Earth scenario.  
For instance, water-drinking behaviour (A1) can be causally explained by water-
beliefs (Q1) while twin water-drinking behaviour (A2) can be causally explained by 
twin water-beliefs (Q2).  Thus, where we think that psychological explanations 
should allow for generalizations of this nature, then only the externalist view can 
accommodate this constraint. 
 
With regards to locality, Williamson’s strategy is to appeal to paradigmatic wide 
states like knowledge and perception and to consider whether in such cases we need 
to appeal to proximal causes.  If we can provide a causal explanation of behaviour 
without invoking the relevant set of narrow proximal causes, then we could reject 
locality.  This would answer the point raised at the end of the previous section 
regarding why an externalist account which appealed only to the causal relevance of 
wide belief states would be adequate.  According to Williamson, wide states like 
knowledge are ‘prime’ in the sense of lacking any internal component common to, 
say, a case of knowledge (the good case) and a case of belief without knowledge (the 
bad case).  Suppose in the good case S does A because S knows that P.  On this view, 
S’s knowing that P causally explains why she does A.  One reason for there being no 
common component in the good and bad case is that if a range of narrow states are 




equally suitable for providing the relevant internal component for S to know that P, 
then brain state M1 could be relevant to when S knows that P and M2 could underlie a 
case where S does not know that P.  The relevant difference is the external facts, not 
which brain state S is in.  So, if prime states like knowledge can feature in 
psychological explanations of behaviour, then locality can be rejected in so far as the 
explanatory force of the prime mental state relates to the wide belief state and not to 
any of the possible range of narrow states which S could be in while being in such a 
wide state. 
 
If this response works, then the worry for Jackson & Pettit is that the casual 
relevance of wide states might be secured without there being an essential connection 
to the underlying narrow states.  What their view required was that a wide state was 
only causally relevant because it effectively states that one of a range of narrow 
states actually caused A.  According to Williamson, prime states like knowledge are 
causally relevant without picking out a set of narrow states.  However, while Yablo 
accepts the point about generality, he contends that Williamson doesn’t give a 
satisfactory account of locality and the issue of proximal causation.  This is surely 
correct in so far as Williamson appears to be aiming at a way of bypassing proximal 
causation so that in citing the relevant prime wide state we have fully explained S’s 
action.  The worry with this view is that it doesn’t seem plausible to do without the 
underlying proximal causes altogether since prime states still involve relevant narrow 
states which must do some causal work.  It doesn’t seem that we can completely 
ignore proximal causes.  For instance, while it may be right to say that prime states 
depend crucially on certain external factors and not internal factors, this does not 
show that citing a prime state does not thereby get its force partly from the relevant 
internal (brain) states that must occur with any given prime state.  Thus, Yablo is 
right that Williamson’s appeal to prime states is not enough to deal with proximal 
causation in terms of internal (brain) states. 
 
One way to reject the claim that states of knowledge are irreducible is to highlight 
that in relevant scenarios, such as where S falsely believes that P and still does A, 
once we have the same behaviour type but a different wide mental state, it is 




tempting to appeal to a common (narrow) factor in these cases as the relevant cause.  
For example, consider two cases, first where S drinks water because she believes that 
there is water in the glass, however, suppose S doesn’t know there is water in the 
glass because her belief is not sufficiently justified (or formed in the right way).    
Second, S drinks water because she knows there is water in the glass.  Only the latter 
case involves a prime mental state, yet without further justification for accepting 
Williamson’s point we lack motivation for accepting that there is no common factor 
that explains S’s behaviour.  It is tempting to appeal to S’s mental representations as 
the common factor, which provides a basis for a role for narrow content. 
 
Here is where we are.  Williamson provides a good case for preferring maximal 
generality if the internalist’s only case for narrow causes is that some set of proximal 
causes are causally necessary.  Where internalists appeal to a set of proximal causes, 
if it is correct that any member of this set would have resulted in the same action A, 
then it would seem that citing this set of possible proximal causes provides a less 
general explanation than citing a wide intentional mental state Q.  What this asks us 
to choose between is the relevance of proximal causes and maximal generality.  
However, as yet we do not have a case for the irrelevance of narrow states.  To this 
end, Yablo develops an alternative line of reasoning intended to respond to locality, 
so that citing wide causes is sufficient and that there is good reason to take them to 
be causally relevant without also requiring that we must cite relevant proximal 
causes.  I will show that the objection is a good one, and that it raises serious 
problems for internalist accounts, which serves as motivation for an alternative 
internalist approach to defending a role for narrow causes. 
 
3.4.2 Generality and the explanatory irrelevance of narrow states 
As noted above, Williamson fails to satisfactorily account for locality.  Where wide 
intentional states were taken to be causally relevant, what to say about proximal 
causes was not explained.  To this end, Yablo develops a line of reasoning where 
locality is “…not refuted; it is not even mentioned; it is overruled” (Yablo 2003, 321).  
The aim is to show that in citing wide causes our interests in the causal explanation 
are satisfied.  If this approach succeeds, then wide states do not get their causal 




relevance by virtue of stating that a range of narrow states are causally responsible.  
The case for the irrelevance of narrow states combines Williamson’s idea of 
generality with a second point developed by Yablo.  This second point relates to an 
objection Yablo takes to be assumed by those who appeal to proximal causes in 
psychological explanations of behaviour.  Yablo notes that one objection an 
internalist might make is that wide causes contain “extrinsic irrelevancies” (Yablo 
2003) because they include redundant components in addition to proximal causes.  
Wide states like the belief that P involve the wide content associated with ‘that p’.  
For instance, S’s belief that the cup contains water relates to the wide content, which 
on one view of representational content is given by the actual cup and its contents 
(i.e. H2O).  The idea of irrelevance is that wide content, a central component of the 
wide belief state, is irrelevant to the actual proximal causes of S’s behaviour (e.g. 
drinking the cup’s contents) because it is “too far away” (Yablo 2003) to make a 
causal difference to S’s actions. 
 
In order to motivate the idea that narrow proximal causes are explanatorily irrelevant, 
Yablo points out that narrow causes also contain irrelevancies and hence that this is 
no reason to reject wide causes.  The irrelevancies in question relate to the fact that, 
as in Jackson & Pettit’s view, the wide intentional description highlights a set of 
proximal causes, only one of which was the actual cause.  Now, since the causal 
explanation says that any of states M1…Mn could also have caused A, then the causal 
explanation contains extrinsic irrelevancies, namely those states that did not cause A.  
However, the internalist could respond that this does not show that the narrow states 
can be overruled.  While it would be right that on Jackson & Pettit’s view the wide 
explanation cites a set of possible causes which contains irrelevant states, this does 
not of itself show that the wide explanation should take priority.  Furthermore, it 
seems open to the internalist to make a similar point in response to Yablo and hold 
that wide causes are in fact explanatorily redundant if the narrow causes provide a 
suitable explanation, since there is no need to invoke wide causes.  Thus, an 
internalist might say that Jackson & Pettit are too concessive to externalism. 
 




In response, Yablo can motivate the point by drawing attention to maximal generality, 
and link this to the point about relevance.  Recall that Williamson’s contention was 
that citing states M1…Mn was less general than citing a wide state Q, because in 
citing Q we can get maximal generality since states of type Q are taken as causes of 
actions of type A, whereas the internalist account must allow that a range of states 
could result in actions of type A.  Combining these points allows Yablo to consider 
narrow causes casually irrelevant because the same kind of criticism about the 
irrelevance of wide content made by the internalist that underpins the appeal to 
narrow states can be applied to the internalist. 
 
If narrow states can be overruled, or ignored, then we have some reason to think that 
appealing to wide states provides better explanations, because we get maximal 
generality and cite causally relevant wide states.  For Jackson & Pettit, the wide 
cause is causally relevant because it cites a set of proximal causes.  For Yablo, the 
wide cause cites a wide state only, with no requirement that it makes reference to 
proximal causes.  In support, there is no scope to object to the wide state on the basis 
that the wide content is causally inert as it’s ‘too far away’, since the set of narrow 
states likewise contains causally inert components.  We are left with a trade-off 
between maximal generality, linking single wide states of type Q to actions of type A, 
and accounting for proximal causation and a set of narrow states M1…Mn.  If given a 
choice between maximal generality and attention to proximal causes, there is little 
the internalist can say to motivate preference for proximal causation without 
apparently begging the question against the externalist. 
 
In the next section I develop and defend a different view which I contend provides a 
stronger case for internalism, as well as a suitable response to Yablo.  The view I 
develop is intended to prevent any kind of externalist appeal to wide states, since if I 
am right then narrow contents are indispensable to psychological explanations of 
behaviour, without this relating simply to the notion of proximal causation, and wide 
states can play a role similar to that as identified by Jackson & Pettit. 
 




4. Reasons, rationality and the explanatory role of narrow content 
In Section 3 I considered two internalist accounts of why we need narrow causes in 
psychological explanations of behaviour.  The most pressing objections to these 
views related to generality and causal relevance.  The objections seem compelling in 
so far as the internalist appeals to a set of proximal causes, whereas the externalist 
appeals to causally relevant wide intentional states which may satisfy a preference 
for maximal generality in giving an explanation of actions of type A in terms of a 
single mental state Q.  In Section 4 I contend that there is an alternative basis for 
defending internalism derived from criteria identified in Section 2 in relation to the 
role of reasons in giving rational explanations of why S performed an action A.  
Focusing on reasons provides a way of putting narrow content at the centre of 
explanations of behaviour.  In particular, I base the view on Davidson’s (1963) claim 
that we should be able to say something about what the subject saw in her actions 
which can rationalize why she did what she did, and McDowell’s (2006) suggestion 
that subjects must have the capacity, in principle, to stand back and evaluate their 
reasons.  I show how this can provide the basis for the claim that reasons that 
causally and rationally explain behaviour must be narrow (i.e. have a narrow content).  
I then show how this account provides a clear response to Yablo’s objections based 
on generality and causal relevance. 
 
4.1 Rationality and responsiveness to reasons 
In Section 2 I introduced Davidson’s (1963) account of reasons as causes of action.  
According to Davidson, giving reasons provides both a rational and causal 
explanation of action.  On that view, the reason that we cite must meet several 
important conditions.  The first is that: 
 
A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the agent 
saw, or thought he saw, in his action.  (Davidson 1963, 23) 
 
When we give a typical description of a subject’s action, such as S drank some water, 
the reason we cite, such as S was thirsty and believed there to be water in the cup, 
must relate to how S sees her action.  In addition, the primary reason why S does A 
must meet two further points: 




R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the 
description [D] only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards 
actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the 
description [D], has that property. (Davidson 1963, 25) [My emphasis] 
 
As noted in Section 2, the notion of having a pro attitude is to be favourably 
disposed to actions of that type.  Thus, we might say that where S is thirsty, S’s pro 
attitude relates to actions that involve S drinking water.  Davidson is saying that a 
reason R rationally explains S’s action only if R relates to S having a desire that 
relates to certain actions.  The second point relates to the description, D, used to 
express R.  Davidson holds that R is captured by D when S has a belief that the 
action has the relevant property (e.g. results in drinking) and this is adequately 
captured by D.  Thus, for the description S desires to drink some water and believes 
there is water in the cup to be S’s reason for drinking water, it must be the case that 
it meets these conditions.  Where ordinary psychological explanations of behaviour 
cite a description, the description’s causally explaining A depends on its picking out 
in some sense S’s primary reason, although it can imply it as we needn’t explicitly 
identify S’s primary reason.  Combining these points provides the following 
conditions on an account of reasons that causally explain action: 
 
(1) The reason must tell us what S saw in her action 
(2) The reason must relate to S having a pro attitude towards the relevant action 
(3) The description of the reason must reflect that S believes the action to have a 
certain property and that S believes it under this description 
 
I want to focus on the first and third points: what S saw in her action, and how D 
relates to what S believes about her action.  Where we use the wide description S is 
thirsty and believes there is water in the cup, for this to be a primary reason it should 
say something about what S saw, and reflect S’s belief about her action.  Thus, when 
we consider the water example, it should be the case that S believes that her action is 
an instance of water-drinking, and that the description S drank the water because she 
was thirsty and believed there was water in the cup tells us what S saw and what she 
believed. 




The question I want to raise is whether a typical wide intentional description would 
imply S’s primary reason if it needs to meet conditions (1) and (3) above.  This 
provides a basis for saying what descriptions would not provide S’s primary reason.  
For instance, if a given description does not tell us what S saw in her action, and 
doesn’t capture how S thinks of the relevant action type, then we have not been given 
a reason that will provide a rational, and hence causal, explanation of S’s doing A.  
Consequently, an argument against wide intentional descriptions being primary 
reasons can be developed from Davidson’s criteria on rational explanations of action.  
If successful, the view that wide intentional descriptions provide S’s primary reasons 
can be resisted, since the internalist will deny that the description captures what S 
believes and tells us what S saw in her action.  If we have reason to doubt that the 
wide intentional description does meet these conditions, then wide intentional 
descriptions may fail to rationally explain S’s actions. 
 
Before developing a case in favour of internalism, I want to introduce a further 
condition on S’s reason providing a rational explanation of her action from 
McDowell’s (2006) account of reasons and rationality.  McDowell’s notion of 
rationality in his account of reasons for action makes use of the idea of 
“…responsiveness to reasons as such” (McDowell 2006, 2).  This allows for a 
distinction between acting for reasons, on the one hand, and acting for reasons as 
such, on the other.  The former is suitable for animals that lack rationality in 
McDowell’s sense, so that a reason for an animal’s action of fleeing might be that 
danger is near, without this being a reason as such for the animal.  The latter notion 
of acting for reasons as such involves the reason serving as a subject’s rational 
justification.  McDowell (2006, 2) stresses the importance of a rational subject being 
able, in principle, to stand back and evaluate the reason.  For instance, S should be 
able to assess whether the apparent danger provides her with good reason to flee, 
something apparently not available to non-human animals which consequently lack 
rationality in McDowell’s sense.
48
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 McDowell’s (2006) aim was to argue that since perceptual beliefs or experiences can serve as 
rational justifications of action, this could only be the case if perception was in some sense conceptual.  
The basic idea was that for experience to provide a rational ground for action, serving as a reason for 
action, then it must be recognised for the reason it provides, which entails that it is conceptual as it 




From this view we can take it that the ability to reflect on one’s reasons endows a 
subject with the capacity to recognise the reason for the reason it is.  That is, in 
having access to her reasons S can reflect on what her reasons are and, perhaps, why 
they would serve as reasons for doing A.  Consider McDowell’s example.  S can 
reflect on her reason for running away, that danger is near, which requires that she 
can entertain a belief with this content, or equivalently, that she can entertain a 
thought with this content by virtue of possessing the relevant concepts.  Given this 
view, it seems to follow that recognising a reason for the reason it is implies that a 
subject is able to distinguish differences between possible reasons for some action A, 
for instance between the cliff edge is dangerous and the loose rocks at the cliff edge 
are dangerous.  Differences in content entail differences in reasons, and if S has the 
capacity to reflect on the content that rationally explains her action, then S should be 
able to distinguish between possible contents that would not explain her action and 
those that would.  That is, given responsiveness to reasons as such, S is able to 
identify, in principle, what her reason for doing A was.  Thus, if the former reason, 
the cliff edge is dangerous, was S’s reason, then S should be able to reflect on this 
and recognise that this was her reason, and not the loose rocks at the cliff edge are 
dangerous. 
 
Davidson’s and McDowell’s points can be seen to overlap.  From Davidson, I 
identified two points: what S saw in her action, and S’s belief that her action has a 
relevant property under the description D.  From McDowell, we can now add that the 
description must also relate to the reason that S is rationally responsive to, such that 
S would be able to stand back and reflect on her reason, as captured by D.  Where D 
tells us what S saw in her action, D will also provide us with the reason that S is 
responsive to, hence the reason which caused S’s action.  Suppose that S’s reason for 
fleeing was that the cliff edge is dangerous.  What S might reasonably see in her 
action is that it is the evasion of the dangerous cliff edge.  So, the description S ran 
away from the cliff edge because she believed that it was dangerous tells us what S 
                                                                                                                                                                    
relates directly to rationality.  Now, my point does not depend on the debate about conceptual and 
nonconceptual content, or if conceptual capacities are operative in perception.  The point I develop is 
the idea of recognising reasons as reasons, so that what causally explains S’s action is what is 
available to her for rational reflection. 




saw in her action and gives us the reason she was responsive to and can stand back 
and reflect on.  This gives the following rational constraint on psychological 
explanations of behaviour: 
 
(Rationality)  Rational explanations of action require that the reason R,  
   expressed by description D, captures what the agent saw in  
   their action, and provides the reason the agent is rationally  
   responsive to 
 
These conditions on D providing a rational explanation of why S did A provide the 
basis for an argument in favour of internalism as the primary explanatory basis of 
psychological explanations of behaviour which I will develop in the next section.  
Before that, it’s important to explain why externalists and internalists alike should be 
interested in rationality when considering explanations of behaviour.  To anticipate 
my response to Yablo’s appeal to maximal generality below, I will consider two 
general points in favour of placing the emphasis on, or at least recognising the 
importance of, rationality.  First, psychological explanations that cite mental 
representations or their contents in explanations of behaviour are tied to rationality in 
the following manner.  Typically, we assume that subjects are rational, in that they 
will not knowingly hold conflicting beliefs, and, importantly, if S desires that P and 
believes that doing A will satisfy her desire, then S doing A relates to S’s reasons and 
hence rationality.  Second, the defence of wide causes by motivating the principle of 
maximal generality involves making sense of S doing A by virtue of her mental state 
Q.  What explanatory power Q has must relate, in part, to the rational domain, since 
citing Q involves citing one of S’s beliefs, which, as just noted, typically explains 
why S does A in terms of her reasons.  This appeal to rationality is as yet neutral 
between wide and narrow content, and should be accepted by both externalists and 
internalists.  However, as I will now show, once we consider the importance of 
rationality, a case can be made that only narrow content can provide the required link 
to rationality and S’s reasons for action. 




4.2 Primary reasons and cognitive content 
In the example above, we considered two contents that S can distinguish which relate 
to the dangerousness of the cliff edge, and the dangerousness of the loose rocks at the 
cliff edge.  When we consider the water example in the context of a Twin Earth 
scenario we can question whether S will be able to distinguish between two reasons 
with different wide contents.  For instance, consider scenario 1 where the cup 
contains water (H2O) and scenario 2 where the cup contains twin water (XYZ).  If S 
picks up the cup and drinks the contents in each scenario, this results in different 
actions A1 and A2: in scenario 1 S picks up and drinks water, in scenario 2 S picks up 
and drinks twin water.  Prima facie, it seems that S could fail to distinguish between 
her reasons for performing these different actions.  For instance, H2O and XYZ are, 
by definition, superficially identical, so when S perceives H2O and XYZ, then even if 
the contents of her perceptual state are wide in some sense, S would fail to recognise 
any difference in the contents of her perceptual states.  Suppose for present purposes 
that the contents of S’s wide states related to her reasons for performing these actions.  
This follows from a reasonable assumption that our perceptual contact with the world 
in some sense guides our actions.  It is plausible that S would not be able to tell the 
difference between the different perceptual contents or between the actions.  For 
instance, suppose S reflects on her reasons in each scenario, which may involve 
accessing the contents of her perceptual states.  Since the two liquids are 
superficially identical, S would plausibly be unable to distinguish between the liquids.  
Likewise, S would seemingly fail to recognise a difference in the distinct actions of 
drinking water and drinking twin water, since from S’s perspective she may take 
herself to be performing the same action type, such as drinking a liquid. 
 
So far I have talked about perceptual contents providing S’s reasons, and S being 
unable to distinguish between the contents of her perceptual states.  It is possible to 
provide further support to this claim by appealing to the account of concepts and 
cognitive content developed in Chapter 2.  Suppose S has a prototype concept 
WATER.  Prototype concepts represent superficial properties, such as appearance 
properties, and these properties are shared by H2O and XYZ.  S’s WATER prototype 
therefore has a narrow representational content which relates to this appearance 




property.  When S encounters H2O and XYZ in scenario 1 and 2, the same prototype 
is triggered, and S represents the same superficial properties in each case.  
Furthermore, the cognitive content of prototypes derives from perceptual templates 
which encode information derived from perceptual experience, specifically in terms 
of narrow phenomenal properties of the experience.  Such cognitive content is 
narrow because it supervenes on S’s intrinsic properties.  Now, where S’s WATER 
prototype is triggered in both scenarios, S thinks of each liquid in the same way, via 
the identical narrow cognitive content: S thinks of both H2O and XYZ in terms of the 
same superficial appearance and functional properties (the watery properties, for 
short). 
 
The case for internalism can now be made as follows.  If we understand S’s reasons 
as relating to the cognitive content of her concepts, then in both scenarios the same 
narrow cognitive content reflects how S thinks of water and twin water.  The 
connection between cognitive content and S’s reasons can be motivated by 
considering what aspect of the content of her concepts S is responsive to.  One way 
to determine this is to see what S would judge as being in the cup in each scenario.  
Following the typicality effects experiments discussed in Chapter 2 where subjects 
make category judgements based on superficial properties, we have reason to think 
that S would judge that the contents of the cups have the same superficial appearance 
properties.  Thus, S’s reason will likely relate to these superficial properties, and in 
turn to the cognitive content of her prototype concept WATER, since this reflects 
how she thinks of these properties. 
 
It should be noted that it is plausible that S’s perceptual states and concepts have 
wide contents.  For instance, where S perceives water, the wide content relates to 
H2O, and where this is slowly
49
 switched with some XYZ the wide content relates to 
the XYZ.  Furthermore, S’s concepts may have wide content which  relate to the 
specific substance in the cup at the relevant time and context.  However, it is 
plausibly the cognitive content of S’s general concepts which S has cognitive access 
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unproblematic. 




to, that is, which reflects the way S represents things as being around her.  
Consequently, in both scenarios, S will be in a state with the same narrow cognitive 
content. 
 
We can now return to the problem with wide content.  Suppose we try to capture S’s 
reasons for drinking water/twin water using the typical wide intentional description S 
believed there was water in the cup (D1) and S believed there was twin water in the 
cup (D2).  Descriptions D1 and D2 must tell us what S saw in her actions (A1 and A2) 
and provide the reasons S was responsive to.  By hypothesis, D1 and D2 imply 
different reasons, in so far as S is being held to have a belief specifically about each 
substance in each scenario.  Where cognitive content is narrow, S would not think of 
these substances in different ways since the cognitive content of S’s concepts tells us 
how she represents things as being.  I outlined why we should think S is responsive 
to the narrow cognitive content of her concepts.  If this is right, then when S drinks 
water and drinks twin water S’s reason in both scenarios is plausibly the same, given 
in terms of the way that she thinks of both liquids in terms of identical superficial 
appearance properties.  Therefore, the reason S is responsive to will be something 
like there is watery stuff in the cup, where ‘watery stuff’ relates to the cognitive 
content of S’s WATER prototype.  Consequently, D1 and D2 fail to meet our 
conditions, and so do not provide rational, and hence causal, explanations of why S 
did A1 and A2. 
 
I conclude that it is narrow cognitive content that is most causally relevant in 
psychological explanations of behaviour, and not wide mental states or contents.  
Nonetheless, wide intentional descriptions may imply something like S’s narrow 
cognitive content, and hence they could be true or imply something true.  The truth 
of the wide description would rely on it implying something that more closely 
reflects S’s actual reasons – her primary reason, given by the cognitive content of her 
concept.  A standard wide description may sometimes fail to convey this, but as long 
as it implies something like S thought that there was watery stuff in the cup, then it 
will do for normal purposes.  The upshot of this is that we have the basis for an 
alternative hybrid theory.  Unlike Jackson & Pettit (1988), wide descriptions are 




causally relevant because they imply a primary reason, not because they identify one 
of a range of narrow states that was causally responsible for A.  I will show in the 
next section that this provides the basis for a response to Yablo. 
 
4.3 Explanatory generality and causal relevance revisited 
In Section 3.4 I raised two related objections to internalist accounts of psychological 
explanations of behaviour.  The first relates to the generality of psychological 
explanations.  Following Williamson (2000), Yablo (2003) contends that 
explanations of behaviour that cite a range of sufficient proximal causes (narrow 
states) are less general than explanations that cite a single wide mental state Q (such 
as believing that P).  The second relates to the case for the causal relevance of wide 
causes, which in turn relates to the irrelevance of narrow causes.  The irrelevance of 
narrow states was based on two points.  First, Yablo responds to the concern that 
wide causes are ‘too far away’ and hence contain extrinsic irrelevancies by 
highlighting that narrow causes also contain irrelevant components, such as the 
redundant narrow states in the set of narrow states picked out by Jackson & Pettit.  
Second, if we explain the causal relevance of wide states in terms of a wide mental 
state Q, which provides a maximally general account of the causes of actions of type 
A, then Q alone may be sufficient for providing an adequate explanation of actions of 
type A.  This is because if we prefer maximal generality, then our citing Q does not 
invoke whatever narrow states Q may relate to on an occasion. 
 
The response I will develop here notes that there is a trade-off between  maximal 
generality, where a single wide state Q explains actions of type A, and the account of 
rational explanations of behaviour developed above, where rational explanations of 
action involve citing S’s reason for doing A which rationally and causally explains 
actions of type A.  The view developed in Sections 4.1-4.2 appeals to the rational 
role of reasons, and identifies narrow cognitive content as playing the role of S’s 
primary reason.  This does not involve saying that a set of narrow states would cause 
A and that one of them actually did.  It may rely on this fact, since narrow content 
supervenes on intrinsic properties, but the explanation relies on rationality, not on 
proximal causes.  In a sense, there is more generality in this account than that 




associated with Jackson & Pettit’s (1988) view, since we cite the relevant reason or 
cognitive content for doing A, rather than a set of possible narrow states.  We can say 
that it is a given narrow cognitive content that caused A, and although this may 
supervene on a similar set of narrow states, the explanation is pitched in terms of 
rationality, and not proximal causes.  However, that my view is less general than the 
externalist view follows from allowing the same reason to explain actions A1 and A2.  
For instance, the same narrow cognitive content can explain why S drinks water and 
twin water.  Whether this is a disadvantage of my account is not obvious, since it has 
not been shown that we require unique mental states Q1 and Q2 to rationally explain 
distinct actions A1 and A2.  In fact it would be surprising if this were the case, since 
two subjects could plausibly perform the same action type without having the same 
reasons, which means that we should not expect a single state Q to relate to actions 
of type A.  Hence, we shouldn’t be surprised if the same reason could explain two 
different actions. 
 
Setting this point aside for now, a case in favour of internalism can be made even 
supposing that maximal generality is a desirable feature of psychological 
explanations of behaviour.  Given that our interest is in what it was about S’s reasons 
that caused her to do A, rationality should be central to psychological explanations 
that invoke reasons for performing actions.  An internalist can accept that 
Williamson’s maximal generality principle allows wide states to be more general 
than narrow contents.  However, I contend that in the trade-off between maximal 
generality where only one wide state Q explains actions of type A, and rationality, 
where narrow cognitive content best provide S’s primary reason, we should prefer 
the latter over the former.  Choosing maximal generality at the expense of rationality 
would render the externalist’s account unable to link psychological explanations to 
the rational role of reasons.  Thus, we should tolerate some variation in causes of 
actions of type A, and indeed sameness of reasons for different actions A1 and A2, if 
we can allow that the reasons we cite as causes provide rationally intelligible 
psychological explanations of behaviour. 
 




4.4 Against Fodor on Frege cases 
In Section 2 I introduced Frege cases which relate to psychological explanations of 
behaviour in cases where subjects do not know that two names refer to the same 
thing.  In these cases, Fregeans contend that what explains behaviour is the relevant 
mode of presentation of the referent, such that an explanation only succeeds where 
the explanation relates to the mode of presentation the subject associates with the 
referent.  Millians, on the other hand, contend that all modes of presentation are 
explanatorily irrelevant, and hence that the wide semantic content associated with 
either term can provide a suitable explanation. 
 
Eschewing his earlier appeal to narrow causes of behaviour, Fodor (1994) defends a 
Millian account of Frege cases.  The basic idea is that, in general, holding everything 
else equal, we can explain why S does A by appealing to the wide Millian content of 
her mental representations.  Thus, ceteris paribus, S will do A because A believes 
that P (where that P is a relevant wide content).  In a similar spirit to Yablo (2003), 
Fodor (1994) endorses the view that scientific explanations typically aim for 
maximal generality, such that if a single mental state or content Q can explain actions 
of type A, then this should be preferred to introducing additional explanatory devices 
to account for unusual cases.  What is important, according to Fodor, is that the 
Frege cases are exceptions to general psychological explanatory practices which get 
by perfectly well citing wide Millian contents.  The differences between Fregean and 





(4) Oedipus wants to fly to Hesperus 
(5) Oedipus believes that the USS Evening Star is about to depart for Hesperus 
(6) So, Oedipus boards the USS Evening Star 
 
(7) Oedipus wants to fly to Hesperus 
(8) Oedipus believes that the USS Evening Star is about to depart for Phosphorus 
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objection to Fodor (1994) on Frege cases see Wakefield (2000). 




(9) So, Oedipus boards the USS Evening Star 
 
Fregeans hold that while (4)-(6) is acceptable, (7)-(9) is problematic, since (9) 
doesn’t seem to follow from (7) and (8).  According to Fodor’s view, however, we 
may ignore the appearance of a problem with (7)-(9) because such cases are 
exceptions to general explanatory principles which allow us to explain behaviour by 
citing the wide Millian content of S’s beliefs. Recall from Chapter 4 that Millians 
hold that occurrences of co-referring names in propositional attitude ascriptions have 
the same semantic content.  Thus ‘Hesperus’ in (5) has the same content as 
‘Phosphorus’ in (8).  What Fodor is saying is that since explanations can ordinarily 
get by perfectly well by appealing to wide Millian content, then we can effectively 
ignore cases such as (7)-(9), in preference for maintaining maximal generality in our 
explanatory practices. 
 
The importance of rationality in typical explanations of behaviour, however, causes a 
problem for Fodor.  Above I suggested that rationality is presumed in psychological 
explanations of behaviour that cite mental representations as causes of behaviour.  
This is because mental representations are linked to the rational domain, and, as such, 
there is a presumption of rationality in psychological explanations of behaviour.  The 
worry with ceteris paribus clauses then is that it would seem that Oedipus’ behaviour 
in (7)-(9) is not rationally intelligible, and in preferring generality, Fodor gives up the 
link to rationality and hence, ultimately, to an important explanatory component of 
the subject’s mental representations.  If rationality is going to be side-lined for 
generality, then this looks like an unattractive consequence of Fodor’s position.  Now, 
it is not the case that we are then forced to choose between rationality and generality.  
On my account, explanations that cite the narrow contents of S’s states can provide 
suitably general explanations of behaviour, though perhaps not maximally general 
explanations.  But as I noted above, there are sufficient problems with maximal 
generality which raise doubts about the plausibility of the principle as a general 
condition of psychological explanations of behaviour. 





In this chapter I hope to have shown that narrow content is central to psychological 
explanations of behaviour by virtue of the rational role of reasons in causally and 
rationally explaining why S does A.  This provides a suitable basis for internalism 
about psychological explanations of behaviour which has advantages over the views 
discussed in Section 3, in part because it moves away from the reliance on the 
proximal causes model of explanation.  A key problem for Jackson & Pettit’s (1988) 
hybrid theory was that it is susceptible to Yablo’s (2003) concerns about generality 
and locality.  My alternative account focused on reason-giving explanations.  From 
Davidson (1963) and McDowell (2006), two main constraints on an adequate 
rational explanation of behaviour were identified.  These are that a description D 
should tell us what S saw in her action, and should provide the reason that S is 
responsive to and hence which caused her to do A.  I showed that wide intentional 
descriptions do not provide plausible rational explanations of actions of type A.  This 
provided a problem for externalist accounts of psychological explanations of 
behaviour.  Furthermore, my view provides a suitable response to Yablo’s objections 
and allows the internalist to opt for rationality over maximal generality.  Finally, my 
account lends support to a Fregean account of Frege cases, and shows that Fodor’s 
(1994) appeal to ceteris paribus clauses can be undermined in so far as psychological 
explanations needn’t prioritize generality over rationality, since rationality should be 





















In part one of this thesis, I argued for a pluralist view of narrow content, grounding it 
in two main forms of representation and in concept pluralism.  The central argument 
of Chapter 1 was that representation comes in a variety of forms, both externalist and 
internalist.  What is important in understanding the representational nature of narrow 
content is to correctly characterise the supervenience claim and the relevant 
representational framework.  Where existing accounts focus on just one form of 
representation, the view I propose suggests that we should countenance a number of 
different kinds of approaches to representation, including descriptive representation 
and informational (or relational) representation.  Furthermore, narrow content relates 
to different sorts of properties, encompassing natural and non-natural kind properties, 
and correspondingly different mental representations and truth conditions.  Chapter 2 
provided a suitable foundation for the pluralist account by showing that mental 
representations can relate to a range of conceptual structures, each of which may 
relate to conceptualizing the world in different ways, and in terms of different 
properties.  I showed that concept pluralism is consistent with internalist 
individuation, and that the cognitive content of concepts relates in part to 
phenomenal internalism through the mechanism of perceptual templates.  I defended 
this view against Weiskopf’s (2007) argument against narrow cognitive content, as 
well as the notion of phenomenal externalism (Tye 2000), and the idea that narrow 
content may be too complex to play the role of cognitive content (Vaughan 1989).  I 
then showed, in Chapter 3, that the internalist should not be worried about arguments 
for externalism based on social externalism (Burge 1979; Goldberg 2002), since 
these appear to be at odds with ways of individuating mental representations on the 
concept pluralist approach.  I also showed that perceptual psychology is consistent 
with narrow content, and that the approaches to individuation from Burge (2010) and 
Egan (2010) do not put pressure on the notion of narrow content in psychology. 




Some of the advantages of my account relate to avoiding the problems noted in 
Chapters 1 and 2 for existing accounts.  In particular, my account provides a viable 
basis for narrow content in an approach to mental representations derived from 
recent work in philosophy and empirical psychology, while avoiding problems 
associated with Prinz’ (2000; 2002) similar appeal to work in the psychological 
literature.  Approaching narrow content in this way also avoids the kinds of issues 
that arise in relation to two-dimensional semantics, especially Chalmers’ (2003) 
epistemic framework. 
 
In part two, I developed the semantic and psychological role of narrow content in 
propositional attitude ascriptions and psychological explanations of behaviour.  The 
account developed in part one played an important role in both of these areas.  In 
Chapter 4, I showed that narrow content can relate to the truth conditions of Fregean 
attitude ascriptions.  There were two main consequences of this view.  In showing 
that attitude ascriptions may express narrow contents, it was possible to show that 
two arguments for externalism (Putnam 1975; Burge 1979), and one against 
internalism (Soames 2002), could be rejected in so far as they rely on the assumption 
that attitude ascriptions only express wide contents.  Second, given the variety of 
mental representations and narrow contents that may be associated with a term like 
‘water’, I showed that there is no simple reading-off mental content from attitude 
ascribing sentences.  Consequently, to ascertain the truth conditions of attitude 
ascriptions we must consider the narrow content expressed.  Chapter 5 made the case 
that psychological explanations of behaviour are best accounted for in terms of the 
reasons why subjects perform certain actions, and that only narrow content can play 
this role.  There were two main advantages of this approach over existing internalist 
accounts from Fodor (1991) and Jackson & Pettit (1988).  First, in moving away 
from the role of narrow states, I showed how it is that narrow content plays a central 
role in explaining behaviour.  Second, appealing to the role of reasons provided a 
way to respond to Yablo’s (2003) objections that can be raised against the hybrid 
theory of Jackson & Pettit, as well as providing a response to Fodor’s (1994) appeal 
to ceteris paribus clauses to reject Fregean explanations of behaviour. 
 




I was unable to consider the complete range of accounts of wide and narrow content, 
and other important issues thrown up by the externalism/internalism debate.  This is 
partly due to the fact that a detailed study of wide and narrow content would require 
a much longer work (perhaps a lifetime of study), and partly because the issues 
discussed here form a coherent line of thought.  What drives the discussion is the 
nature and role of mental content in philosophy and psychology.  As noted in the 
introduction to this thesis, Fodor (among others) has embarked on a project of 
showing that all content is wide, and that this is sufficient for accounting for mental 
representations and for psychological explanation in psychology.  Thus, part of my 
aim has been to rebut much of this picture by showing the importance of narrow 
content in understanding mental representations and psychological explanation, 
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